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PREFACE 
'Once a person is sentenced to death by the 
Supreme Court or a death sentence is affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, he will definitely be 
statement reflects the views of many 
hanged' 
people. This 
this 
is 
because all legal channels of appeal have been exhausted. 
This is in fact untrue. The prisoner has yet another 
avenue of appeal - to the Pardons Board. 
The existence of Pardons Boards, let alone their 
constitutions and procedural requirements, are not 
commonly known to a layman . •  The people who are aware of 
their existence are usually confined to the legal 
profession generally, 
direct contact with 
but 
the 
particularly those who have 
cases on appe�l to the Pardons 
Boards and those from the prisons'. authorities. They are 
the ones who are directly involved in the process of any 
petition for pardon by way of recommending a pardon or 
otherwise, assessing the attitude and behaviour of 
prisoners as candidates for pardon, and their progress in 
every aspect. Apart from this minority group of people 
the Pardons Boards are "invisible and unheard of." 
i 
Even for those who know of the existence of 
Pardons Boards in Malaysia, they are unaware of the actual 
powers and functions of the Pardons Boards as these are 
not clearly defined in any statute and very few queries 
are ever directed at the functioning of these Pardons 
Boards. 
Nevertheless, because the role of the Pardons 
Boards can be found in the constitution itself, it is for 
that reason I find it a worthwhile project to study its 
functions. 
It is with· these factors in mind that I have 
chosen the topic for this dissertation as "The Powers and 
Functions of the Pardons Board in Malaysia - A Review." 
This thesis sets out to examine the nature, 
powers and functions of the Pardons Boards, the procedures 
governing the exercise of the power of pardon and also the 
anomalies, consequences and problems associated with the 
implementation of Article 42 of the Federal Constitution, 
an Article which confers and regulates the exercise of the 
power of pardon in Malaysia. For a comparative analysis, 
a chapter is included setting out the exercise of the 
power of pardon in other countries. 
ii 
Having regard to the subject matter of this 
thesis generally and the collation of data specifically I 
encountered a number of problems. 
Firstly, very little writings locally, can be 
identified in this area. In addition to that, no 
'first-source' data is available and therefore, almost all 
of the information in this thesis with regard to the 
position in Malaysia has been obtained through interviews 
and sending questionnaires to various people. 
The second major problem was the difficulty 
involved in getting interviews as the people concerned had 
busy schedules, a"d MoS4 of -the. pru>f f(, I ha.ve- spokt..1'1 fo di'il "of
wish -h> L,t.. c.Jtt..cl "s � �c,u.l""C.t.- • 
It is hoped that this dissertation will clarify 
and improve understanding with regard to the powers and 
functions of the Pardons Boards. This work covers the 
relevant law and events in Malaysia as at 15th July 1989. 
The statistics cover appeals made to the various Pardons 
Boards as at 31 July 1988. 
iii 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. DEFINITIONS OF 'PARDON' AND 'PARDONS BOARD'
The word 'pardon' is defined as meaning 'to 
forgive; to exempt from punishment; to erase guilt for.•1
A pardon therefore, entails an exemption from punishment 
or the erasure of guilt. These two concepts are different 
in effect. An exemption from punishment does not 
necessarily erase a conviction and therefore the guilt of 
a person. It could mean that a person is exempted from 
the punishment which the courts have passed on him, but 
another punishment, normally of a less serious nature is 
substituted instead. 
An erasure of guilt on the other hand has the 
effect of wiping out the conviction itself and 
consequently restores the accused person to the position 
he had been in before he was charged with the offence in 
question. 
1. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, pg.
1078. Mozley & Whiteley's Law Dictionary 10th ed 
Butterworth, defines pardon as an act by the sovereign 
in virtue of the prerogative or by Act of Parliament. 
Prerogative means the special power, preeminence or 
privilege which the Queen has, over and above other 
persons, in right of her Crown and independently of 
statutes and the courts. 
1 
2 
The word 'board' is defined as 'a body of persons 
directing some activity. 1 2 A Pardons Board therefore
means a body of persons which directs the grant of 
forgiveness, exemption from punishment or erasure of guilt. 
B. SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF STUDY
The object of this dissertation is to examine the 
powers and functions of the Pardons Boards in Malaysia. 
The establishment of Pardons Boards is prescribed under 
Article 42 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. It 
follows naturally that an analysis will be made regarding 
the meaning and effect of the provisions laid down in 
Article 42 as compared to the actual workings of the 
Pardons Boards. A comparative study of the exercise of 
the power of pardon in England and India is also made so 
as to enable one to assess the effectiveness or otherwise 
of the prevailing system in Malaysia. 
This topic has been chosen as many people are in 
fact unaware of even the existence of Pardons Boards in 
Malaysia. Secondly, even for those who are familiar with 
the existence of the Pardons Boards, due to the 
confidentiality surrounding the proceedings, their 
knowledge of the nature, powers and functions of Pardons 
Boards may still be incomplete. Thirdly and most 
2. Ibid, pg. 170.
• 
!
3 
importantly, the grant of a pardon to a convicted person 
conveys to us the implication that a sentence, though 
confirmed or itself passed by the highest court of appeal 
in the land, (and in the Malaysian context this would be 
the Supreme Court) may not necessarily be carried out. 
The sentence is final and decisive as far as the legal 
system is concerned but yet the convicted person still has 
another channel of appeal, ie to the Pardons Board. Even 
though the grant of a pardon, commutation, reprieves, 
respites and all the other powers mentioned in Article 42 
are not to be seen as a reversal of the judgment of the 
courts, nevertheless the fact remains that power is vested 
in some other executive authority who could actually 
change a final sentence passed by the courts. As such, it 
is indeed important to be apprised of the nature and 
powers of this 'powerful' executive authority. The power 
to grant a pardon in Malaysia rests with the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong, Rulers or Yang di Pertua Negeri of the 
States of Malaysia, depending on the type of offence and 
the place in which it is committed. The Yang di Pertuan 
Agong acts on the advice of a Pardons Board. So do the 
Rulers and Yang di Pertua Negeri of States, only that the 
advice of the various States Pardons Boards are binding 
upon the Rulers and Yang di Pertua Negeri, but 
theoretically not so on the Yang di Pertuan Agong. 
4 
This dissertation will essentially concern itself 
with the problems and procedures governing the invocation 
of the power of pardon vested in the various authorities 
as explained earlier. In particular, Chapter II traces 
the history or origins of the pardoning power in England 
and the rationale behind it. The need to examine the 
power in England has arisen for two reasons. Firstly 
there is hardly any documented evidence as to the origins 
of the power in Malaysia. Secondly due to the historical 
fact that Malaysia or Malaya, as it was before, was a 
British colony for a long time until it attained 
independence in 1957, there exists the need to study the 
origins of the prerogative of mercy in England to see the 
extent of its influence and application over the origins 
of the pardoning power in Malaysia. 
Chapter III deals with the current situation in 
Malaysia. It purports to examine the theoretical 
framework of the law providing for the functioning of the
Pardons Boards as well as the practical aspects and 
related problems in implementing the law. This chapter 
also lists down the types of offences that normally 
constitute the subject-matter of appeal to the Pardons 
Boards. 
5 
Chapter IV analyses the statistics and data 
relating to the number of appeals made to the Pardons 
Boards and the different results thereof. These 
statistics relate to convictions under the different types 
of statutes. 
Chapter V focuses on the exercise of the power of 
pardon in India and England and comparisons are drawn with 
that prevailing in Malaysia. 
Chapter VI summarises and 
important issues raised in the 
reviews 
earlier 
the more 
Chapters. 
Suggestions aimed at improving the functioning of the 
system have also been incorporated 
C. LIMITATIONS
There are practical difficulties encountered in a 
research into an area such as the present one. A fair 
amount of information seems to be shrouded in "secrecy." 
At times, no information was forthcoming at all. A major 
point of note is as to the details in relation to the 
procedures taken, as soon as an appeal to the Pardons 
Board is initiated. They appear sketchy. The feedback 
6 
from interviews conducted with several people who may have 
first-hand knowledge about the procedures involved, was 
minimal. 
details 
There seems to be a reluctance to discuss 
as to the proceedings in the Pardons Board. 
Written sources on this subject are scarce. As a result 
much of my research had to be done through the sending of 
questionnaires, conducting interviews and 
with people involved in the procedure. 
conversations 
All the issues raised and discussed represent the 
extent of information available to the writer at the 
material time. Consequently, there may be other aspects 
which could have been omitted in this thesis. 
A. ENGLAND
(a) Anglo-Saxon Period
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY 
The Kings and Queens of England have always 
promised that justice in the country shall be 
'administered in mercy.' Legal historians have traced the 
royal pardon to the laws of Edward the Confessor, whereby 
the King used the 'royal prerogative of mercy' as part of 
the power of the Sovereign of his pure grace to show mercy 
to an offender by mitigating or removing the consequences 
of conviction. 
A prerogative means 
privilege,1 and in Great Britain 
a peculiar right 
today, it seems that 
royal prerogative is theoretically subject to 
or 
a 
no 
restrictions; it is the power of God acting upon earth, 
where the Sovereign has become the sole fountain of 
justice. 
1. Concise Oxford Dictionary.
7 
8 
The starting point of the royal pardon may be 
traced to the first significant period in the history of 
England ie the invasion of England by the Anglo-Saxons up 
until the Norman Conquest. The Anglo-Saxons invaded 
England in the fifth century in a piecemeal fashion. 
These Anglo-Saxons together with the Norman Kings laid the 
foundations of the modern legal order that is prevalent in 
England today. The Anglo- Saxons destroyed all traces of 
the then existing legal order and replaced 
institutions which were Germanic in nature. 
it with 
This community limited private feuds as a whole 
by inducing the wrongdoer to offer, and the injured 
parties to accept, compensation for the wrong; and a large 
part of the extant laws of the Anglo-Saxon Kings is 
occupied in laying down a minute tariff compensation (bot) 
for injuries, based on the extent of the wrong done and 
the rank of the sufferer. 
If compensation is refused the law has no means 
to enforce its payment. The most that the law court can 
do was to assist the injured party by declaring the 
wrongdoer an 'outlaw', whereby he may be pursued and slain 
by anyone with impunity like a wild beast. Even in those 
times there were many offences which could not be 
completely atoned for by compensation paid to the 
sufferer. A fine (wite) was also payable to the king 
through the medium of his officer the sheriff. 
9 
Further, and this was of great importance to the 
future, in the later Anglo-Saxon periods there were some 
offences which no compensation could wipe out. They were 
'botless,' were punishable with death or mutilation and 
the property of the offender were forefeited to the King. 
Naturally from the point of view of the royal finances, it 
was desirable that the number of 'botless' offences should 
be maintained and if possible, extended. 
Thus in the laws of Canute it is laid down that 
the rights which the King enjoyed over all men were 
breaches of the King's peace, house-breaking, ambush and 
many others. 
There is intimate connection in English history 
between these early forms of punishment and the doctrine 
of the King's peace. (This doctrine of the King's peace 
later gave birth to the royal prerogative of mercy.) In 
Canute's day the 'King's Peace' did not extend to all 
places at all times. At first every house had its own 
peace and so had every Church. There was a peace for each 
township. If the peace of a man's house was broken, a bot 
must be paid. So too if a lord's peace was broken in his 
manor. 
10 
The next step was to treat the King's peace as 
independent. If the King was dining in A's house, and B 
broke the peace, a bot must be paid to A, and a fine to 
the King. The King's peace was more extensive than that 
of others. Gradually the idea emerged that any peace not 
specially under any other peace, was in the King's peace. 
Finally, the King's peace absorbed all other peace, and 
became an all-embracing atmosphere. An act of violence 
anywhere was a breach of the King's peace though the King 
was not in any way directly affected by it. 
The notion that "the King never dies" and "the 
throne is never vacant," gave continuity to the King's 
peace, and a new meaning to the allegation "against the 
King's peace" in every indictment. The King now became 
equivalent to the State, and "against the King's peace" 
implied that the wrong was against the State; a public 
wrong.2 
(b) The Norman Period 1066-1154
It was under the Norman Kings' reign, 
particularly Henry II, that anti-social conduct came to be 
categorised into torts and crimes, the former still to be 
redressed (or forgiven) at the choice of the victim or his 
2. P.K. Sen, Penology Old and New, London, Longmans, 1943
pg. 2.
11 
family, but the latter to be punished (or forgiven) always 
in the name of the Crown. That was how the royal 
prerogative of mercy came about. The sovereign showed 
mercy to an offender by mitigating the severity of the 
punishment imposed or by lifting the punishment altogether. 
Notionally the royal prerogative extended to the 
right of sending and receiving ambassadors, making 
treaties, war, concluding peace, conferring honours, 
commissioning officers in the Army and Navy, choosing 
Ministers of State, summoning Parliament and 
assent to a Bill.3 
refusing 
Sir William Blackstone, a legal historian, 
described the King as 'a magistrate who had it in his 
power to extend mercy when it was deserved, holding a 
court of enquiry in his 'own breast. •4
Only the Sovereign could forgive a crime. Later 
on his mercy was partially delegated to the judges, and 
only when they failed, either because they have been 
deceived or misled into doing injustice, that the King 
could still be moved to employ his prerogative and confer 
his pardon. 
3. C.H. Rolph, The Queen's Pardon, London, Cassell, 1978
pg. 17.
4. Ibid.
12 
If the judges had before them a man who had been 
declared by a jury to have killed, 'they do not acquit him 
nor can they pardon him, they bid him hope for the King's 
mercy, ,S 
The reason as to why it was essential that such 
final redress was available was due to the inflexibility 
of the punishments used, and their irreversible nature. 
All the serious crimes were called felonies and their 
fixed and only punishment was death. In these instances, 
the King was the 'injured party' and thus only he could 
decide whether life and limb could be spared. 
(c) The Early Angevins 1154-1215
In the Norman period the criminal law was still 
in a very primitive condition, but in the period of the 
Early Angevins, when Henry II was King, the criminal law 
had taken on a new form in which one can see the traces of 
the modern system now prevailing in England. 
5. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law,
Cambridge University Press, Vol. II, pg. 496.
13 
During this period the royal court held the 
centre of the stage. Any act of serious violence wherever 
and whenever committed would constitute a breach of the 
King's peace, punishable by the King's judges. It was to 
the King's court then that the people had to go for 
security and redress. It followed that prosecution was 
also at the suit of the King and not merely at the suit of 
the injured party. 
(d) England from the fourteenth century
By the fourteenth century, the relief of royal 
pardon had become a discreet affair. At times it was also 
"dishonest," simply because the granting of a pardon was 
set in motion by those who had money. In consequence, a 
statute was passed declaring that killing was not 
pardonable except where it was done in self-defence or by 
misadventure. Pardons that were obtained by untrue 
representations were held void. 
According to Sir William Holdsworth's History of 
English Law, by the end of the fifteenth century the royal 
power to pardon was confined to cases in which the offence 
was merely "malum prohibition", that is, wrong because the 
law said so. With malum in se, (wrong in itself) neither 
the King nor any other can theoretically dispense pardon 
and yet when the offences have been committed the King may 
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pardon them. The release of a forfeiture can only be done 
after it has been incurred and not before. Quoting a 
judge's ruling in 1946, Holdsworth added that "neither 
King nor priest can give licence to permit fornication. 
But after it has been committed they can pardon it."6
By the sixteenth century, Henry VIII enacted the 
Jurisdiction in Liberties Act 1535 which inter alia, 
extinguished the power of the Church and the great 
landowners to grant pardons at all. Thus for the first 
time the royal prerogative in the statutes was established. 
In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries the royal pardon was in fact being granted 
rather freely. For instance, in 1678 a Chief Minister was 
impeached in the House of Lords for treasonable dealings 
with France. The House, who regarded the King as the 
principal 'traitor', wanted to impeach the King. However, 
finding that Kings could not be impeached, they turned 
their wrath upon the Chief Minister. The King then 
appeared before the House of Lords to say that he had 
given the Minister a 'free pardon' and subsequently 
dismissed him from office. Consequently all
investigations into the King's own conduct were frustrated 
by his employment of the prerogative of mercy. 
6. Holdsworth, History of English Law,
Vol. II, pg. 218.
London, Methuen, 1966 
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To ensure the same situation did not happen 
again, in 1700 Parliament provided in the Act of 
Settlement that a royal pardon could not be pleaded in bar 
of impeachment. But in actual fact, there is nothing to 
prevent the sovereign from pardoning after the impeached 
person has been convicted and sentenced. 
"Surviving also into this period was the absurd 
historical convention, an aspect of the 'divine right' 
conveniently protecting King and Church, that the King and 
his courts could not condemn a member of the clergy. 
Although they could try him and find him guilty, or even 
hear him describe himself as guilty, he must then be 
accorded his 'benefit of clergy' and be handed over to the 
Church for his punishment. And the Church, more often 
than not, failed to punish him at all. It was a good time 
to be a cleric."7
Whenever the jury passed a verdict of 'guilty' 
and the officer of the court asked the accused if he had 
anything in his favour so that the death sentence be 
lifted, he claimed his benefit of clergy.8 This required 
7. 
8. 
C.H. Rolph,
21, 22. 
The Queen's Pardon, London, Cassell, 1978 pg. 
As the severity of punishments 
the courts increased, clergy 
in the sense of anyone able to 
able to read. 
and the number of crimes in 
or cleric came to mean 'clerk' 
write, and then of anyone 
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that he knelt in the dock, take the Bible in his hands and 
at least appeared to be reciting; but more often than not, 
reading, the first verse of the 51st Psalm.9 
The 'benefit of clergy' was finally abolished in 
1827. In its final stages of existence the practice had 
ridiculously reached a state whereby a totally illiterate 
prisoner could pay his gaoler a shilling (sometimes less) 
to teach him the 51st Psalm, so that when the moment came 
he could recite it in the dock and save his life. 
From 1827 onwards those sentenced to death could 
save their lives by way of the 'conditional pardon', which 
entailed in their being sent off to the colonial 
plantations. It is not clear as to the details of their 
work at the plantations. 
By 1830 the prerogative of mercy was to be 
exercised only on the advice of Ministers. These 
encroachments upon the royal power gradually put an end to 
the personal involvement of the sovereign in exercising 
the prerogative of mercy unasked, and made the 
Secretary responsible for advising its use. 
Home 
9. The 51st Psalm reads,
to thy loving kindness.
thy tender mercies, blot
"Have mercy upon me O God, according 
According unto the multitude of 
out my transgressions." 
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In 1874, the Home Office issued a memorandumlO 
containing principles to be applied in matters pertaining 
to the royal prerogative of mercy. These were some of the 
principles: 
(1) The Home Secretary did not interfere with the
administration of the law unless recommended to 
do so by the judge who had tried the case 
concerned, or on recommendations made to the Home 
Office (or to the Queen} on behalf of convicted 
persons on grounds which seemed to call for 
investigation. He usually "gave effect" to the 
judge's suggestion. 
(2) Remissions on merits were seldom granted except
with the concurrence of the judge concerned.
(3) A free pardon is granted only on legal grounds,
or where there is ascertained innocence or a
doubt of guilt.11
Until 1907, when the Criminal Appeal Act was passed, 
the Home Office was forced to become a 'Court of Appeal' in 
criminal cases. The Home Office had from time to time to 
review the whole of the evidence in the most difficult cases. 
It had to decide on the question whether the law should take 
its course or the alleged offender should receive either a free 
pardon or a conditional pardon. A conditional pardon 
10. Home Office Memorandum 33391, 1874. See also C.H. Rolph, 
The Queen's Pardon, pg. 28, 29.
11. This statement is the only one available as an account of
the prevailing practice.
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is where a death sentence is substituted 
servitude. 
for penal 
By the end of the eighteenth century, free 
pardons would only be granted to those, who in the opinion 
of the Secretary of State, had suffered a wrongful 
conviction or whose innocence had been satisfactorily 
established. 
The Home Office possessed none of the ordinary 
powers of a court of law. As such, in its inquiries, 
evidence could not be taken on oath, and witnesses could 
not be cross- examined, but not being bound by the 
technical rules of evidence meant the Home Secretary could 
obtain knowledge of facts which remained unknown to the 
courts. No one of course, knew what evidence was received 
or why alleged evidence was rejected because there was no 
public hearing.12 
As a consequence of these irregularities the 
Court of Criminal Appeal was set up by virtue of the 
Criminal Appeal Act of 1907.13 
prerogative was not 
miscarriages of justice. 
the only 
From then onwards the 
means available for 
12. L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law,
London, Steven, 1948 Vol. I, pg. 122-124.
13, The Court of Criminal Appeal is currently the Criminal
Division of the Court of Appeal. 
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B. MAIAYSIA
(a) The Local Legal System
In the early years, Peninsula Malaysia was 
inhabited by aboriginal tribes which were divided into 
three main groups, the Negritoes, Senois and 
Proto-Malays. The head of the tribes had full powers over 
his subjects. Every crime had its own punishment, but 
there is no mention of a criminal being absolved. 
(b) The Malacca Sultanate
Under Malacca laws in the fifteenth and the 
earlier part of the sixteenth centuries, the ruler was the 
source of law as well as being the fountain of justice. 
Penalties for crimes such as killing, stabbing, battery, 
robbery, theft and lying were determined by the ruler. In 
administering his own laws, the ruler was shown to be the 
highest court.14 The ruler could grant pardons, the 
result of which would set an offender free of any 
penalties. 
14. This would be akin to the royal court that existed in
England during the Norman period.
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(c) The Portuguese Period
The Portuguese, under the leadership of Alfonso 
d'Albuquerque captured Malacca in 1511. 
The Sultan 
Portuguese Governor 
of 
and 
Malacca was 
punishments 
replaced by a 
that were meted out 
for any crimes were subject to the approval of the 
Governor himself. Presumably any power of pardoning was 
also exercisable at the instance of the Governor. 
(d) The Dutch Period
The Dutch occupied Malacca in the middle of the 
seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth 
century. During this period, Malacca was also headed by a 
Governor, who had supreme authority in all matters. 
It seemed that the Dutch only applied Dutch law 
to the Dutch population and left the natives to their own 
laws. It is not known whether any form of the Malacca 
Sultanate was in existence then. It is arguable that the 
Governor had absolute power at that time. Consequently, 
the power of pardoning a criminal would lie in his hands, 
if any. 
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(e) The British Period
The British took possession of Penang, Malacca 
and Singapore by 1825. Throughout the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and the early stages of the twentieth 
century, English statutes and Ordinances were being 
adopted in Malaya. The effect of this legislation was to 
replace the former Malay-Muslim laws by enactments based 
on principles of English law. 
In 1896, Courts of Residents and Sultans in 
Council, to whom appeals were previously made to, were
abolished. Their place was substituted with the Judicial 
Commissioner, who then became the final Court of Appeal 
for the Federation. They were appointed by the Sultans 
with the consent of the residents.15 Whether the Sultan 
still had his royal power of pardon is not known but one 
is tempted to think that if an appeal to the Commissioner 
is rejected, the Sultan could still be moved to exercise 
his power of pardon. 
15. Ahmad Ibrahim and Ahilemah Joned, The
System, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa
pg. 7-29.
Malaysian Legal 
dan Pustaka, 1987 
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(f) The position after 1957
The Federation of Malaya secured her independence 
from Great Britain in 1957. A new Constitution was 
approved and had the force of law throughout the 
Federation from the thirty first day of August, 1957.16
In an article in 1975, Professor Hickling17 
argued that the prerogative exists in Malaysia. He argued 
that in the territories such as Penang, Malacca, Sarawak 
and Sabah, over which the Crown had direct government, the 
existence of prerogative powers were as extensive as those 
in England, and that they duly devolved on independence 
upon the appropriate successor authority. 
In relation to the Malay States Professor 
Hickling argues that: 
"Given an inheritance of the common law of 
England, therefore, coupled with a transfer 
of power on independence, it is logical to 
assume that on 31 August, 1957 there was a 
transfer from the Crown of both major and 
minor prerogatives; and the transferee of 
such prerogatives must have been, at the 
federal level, the Yang di Pertuan Agong 
and, to such extent, as they affected the 
Malay States, the Malay Rulers."18
16. Federal Constitution Ordinance 1957 (No. 5 of 1967),
s. 2.
17. The Prerogative in Malaysia (1975) 17 Mal. L.R. pg 207.
18. Ibid, pg 213.
23 
A contrasting view was propounded by A.J. 
Harding.19 Whereas Professor Hickling argues that
prerogatives exist under the cover of the Malaysian 
Constitution, A.J. Harding is of the view that the effect 
of the introduction of the Constitution on 31 August 1957 
was that important redispositions of legislative, 
executive and judicial power were made. 
follows, 
He observed as 
"Her Majesty's prerogatives ceased to apply, 
insofar as they had applied, and to the 
different extents to which they applied (if 
at all), to the states which joined the 
Federation. The Head of that Federation was 
the Yang di Pertuan Agong; he occupied an 
office which had never previously existed 
The prerogatives of the Crown at common 
law merely lapsed when the Malaysian flag 
was raised in Kuala Lumpur on 31 August 
1957, and the Yang di Pertuan Agong owes 
nothing to Her Majesty by way of 
succession.1120 
Whichever view is adopted, the main point is that 
prerogatives do exist in Malaysia, whether by way of 
devolution or created and governed by the Constitution. 
19. Monarchy and the Prerogative in Malaysia (1986) fB
Mal. L.R. pg 345.
20. Ibid, pg. 353-4.
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In relation to the power of pardon, under Article 42 of 
the Constitution the 
or the Yang di Pertua 
pardon for certain 
territories. 
Yang di Pertuan Agong and the Ruler 
Negeri have the power to grant 
offences committed in specified 
It may not be accurate to say that the idea of 
the royal pardon in Malaysia today was imported from 
England, seeing that as early as the sixteenth century the 
Sultans of Malacca had already exercised the royal power 
of pardon. 
Nevertheless, it is felt that the idea to include 
the royal power of pardon in the Federal Constitution and 
consequently, retaining the existence of such a power was 
to a large extent influenced by the British royal 
prerogative of mercy. Factors governing the occasions as 
to the hows and whens the power of pardon may be exercised 
differ in order to suit local circumstances. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
A. THEIAV
(a) Article 42 of the Federal Constitution
The Federation of Malaya secured her independence 
from Great Britain in 1957. A new Constitution was given 
to this new State, which was to have the force of law 
throughout the Federation on and after the 31st August 
1957.1 The Constitution provides a convicted criminal 
with a last chance of having his sentence reviewed and 
hopefully, reduced; by vesting the power of pardon in the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the Rulers of the States in 
Malaysia. 
The relevant provision is Article 42, which reads: 
(1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong has power to
grant pardons, reprieves and respites in 
respect of all offences which have been 
tried by court-martial and all offences 
committed in the Federal Territories of 
Kuala Lumpur and Labuan; and the Ruler or 
Yang di-Pertua Negeri of a State has power 
to grant pardons, reprieves and respites in 
respect of all other offences committed in 
his State. 
l. The Federal Constitution Ordinance 1957, s. 2.
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(2) Subject to Clause (10), and without 
prejudice to any provision of federal law 
relating to remission of sentences for good 
conduct or special services, any power 
conferred by federal or State law to remit, 
suspend or commute sentences for any offence 
shall be exercisable by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong if the sentence was passed by a court­
martial or by a civil court exercising 
jurisdiction in the Federal Territories of 
Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, and in any other 
case, shall be exercisable by the Ruler or 
Yang di-Pertua Negeri of the State in which 
the offence was committed. 
(3) 'Where an offence was committed wholly
or partly outside the Federation or in more
than one State or in circumstances which
make it doubtful where it was committed, it
shall be treated for the purposes of this
Article as having been committed in the 
State in which it was tried. For the 
purpose of this Clause the Federal Territory 
of Kuala Lumpur or the Federal Territory of 
Labuan, as the case may be, shall each be 
regarded as a State. 
(4) The powers mentioned in this Article -
(a) are, so far as they are exercisable by
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, among
functions with respect to which federal
law may make provision under Article
40(3);
(b) shall, so far as they are exercisable
by the Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri
of a State, be exercised on the advice
of a Pardons Board constituted for that
State in accordance with Clause (5).
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(5) The Pardons Board constituted for each
State shall consist of the Attorney-General
of the Federation, the Chief Minister of the
State and not more than three other members,
who shall be appointed by the Ruler or Yang
di Pertua Negeri; but the Attorney-General
may from time to time by instrument in 
writing delegate his functions as a member
of the Board to any other person, and the 
Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri may appoint
any person to exercise temporarily the 
functions of any member of the Board 
appointed by him who is absent or unable to 
act. 
(6) The members of a Pardons Board 
appointed by the Ruler or Yang di-Pertua 
Negeri shall be appointed for a term of 
three years and shall be eligible for 
reappointment, but may at anytime resign 
from the Board. 
(7) A member of the Legislative Assembly of
a State or of the House of Representatives
shall not be appointed by the Ruler or Yang
di-Pertua Negeri to be a member of the 
Pardons Board or to exercise temporarily the 
functions of such a member. 
(8) The Pardons Board shall meet in the
presence of the Ruler or Yang di-Pertua
Negeri and he shall preside over it.
(9) Before tendering their advice on any
matter a Pardons Board shall consider any 
written opinion which the Attorney-General 
may have delivered thereon. 
(10) Notwithstanding anything in this 
Article, the power to grant pardons, 
reprieves and respites in respect of, or to 
remit, suspend or commute sentences imposed 
by any Court established under any law 
regulating Islamic religious affairs in the 
State of Malacca, Penang, Sabah or Sarawak 
or the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur 
and Labuan shall be exercisable by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong as Head of the religion of
Islam in the State.
(a)(i) 
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(11) For the purpose of this Article, there
shall be constituted a single Pardons Board
for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur
and the Federal Territory of Labuan and the
provisions of Clauses (5), (6), (7), (8) and 
(9) shall apply lllUtatis lllUtandis to the
Pardons Board under this Clause except that 
reference to •Ruler or Yang di-Pertua
Negeri• shall be construed as reference to 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and reference to 
•Chief Minister of the State• shall be
construed as reference to the Minister 
responsible for the Federal Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur and the Federal Territory of 
Labuan. 
Offences Triable by court-martial 
There are three services of regular forces in 
Malaysia, "The Malaysian Army", "The Royal Malaysian Navy" 
and "The Royal Malaysian Air Force." The armed forces, as 
they are called, are governed by the Armed Forces Act 
1972.2 (hereinafter: the Act). 
Any person who is subject to service law under 
the Act shall be tried and duly sentenced by a 
court-martial in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act.3 
2 · Act 77.
3. Armed Forces Act, 1972, s. 103(1).
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The court-martial is a 'military court', which 
consists of the president and not less than two other 
officers. The panel of 'judges' vary according to the 
rank of the accused.4 
Offences that are triable by court-martial are 
laid down in Part V of the Act. They relate to offences 
in respect of military service,5 mutiny and 
insubordination,6 failure to perform military duties,7 
offences relating to property,8 offences relating to, or 
by, persons in custody,9 navigation and flying offences,10 
II 
offences relating to service tribunals),-l and other { 
miscellaneous offencesl2 such as falsifying service 
documents and making false accusations. 
4. Ibid, s. 105.
5. Ibid, ss. 38-46.
6. Ibid, ss. 47-53.
7. Ibid, ss. 54-60.
8. Ibid, ss. 61-63.
9. Ibid, ss. 64-67.
10. Ibid. ss. 68-74.
11. Ibid, ss. 75, 76.
12. Ibid, ss. 77-78.
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It is in relation to these offences that the 
Pardons Board may exercise jurisdiction.13 Only the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong has the power to pardon a person tried
and sentenced by a court-martial. This power is also 
extended to the granting of remission, suspension or 
commutation. The reason the Yang di- Pertuan Agong is 
given the power of pardon for court-martial cases is 
because he is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of 
the Federation.14 The command, discipline and
administration of the armed forces are all under the 
general authority of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.15 He 
plays two main roles in determining the fate of a person 
sentenced by a court- martial. 
Firstly, as one of the reviewing authorities 
which, upon a petition, reviews a finding or sentence of a 
court- martial; and secondly as head of the Pardons Board 
hearing the same petition. 
It is felt that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (if not 
in fact, in theory) must face a conflict in these 
situations. If a petition to the reviewing authority16 
fails, which means that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
13. See discussion below as to whether the Pardons Board
really has jurisdiction over this matter.
14. Federal Constitution, Article 41.
15. Ibid, Art. 137. 
lG. See Armed Forces Act, s. 128.
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has agreed not to quash the finding or the sentence, a 
further appeal to the Pardons Board would not provide much 
help to the petitioner as it would be very unlikely that 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong will then change his mind. 
Under the Act, a death sentence is not to be 
carried out unless it has been approved by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong.17 Again here, once the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong confirms the death sentence, it does not seem 
probable that the sentence would be changed if a petition 
were to be made to the Pardons Board. But nevertheless 
there is still the possibility of a pardon being granted. 
The sentence may be affirmed on the technicality of the 
law but a pardon is usually granted for humanitarian 
reasons. After all the whole idea of pardons is based on 
extra-legal and not legal, grounds. However this has yet 
to be seen as to date, no one has been sentenced to death 
under the Act. 
A more puzzling question that arises in 
connection with the power of pardon of the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong in respect of all offences which have been tried by 
court-martial is whether the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acts on 
the advice of a Pardons Board or a Ministry or some other 
body or persons. 
17· Ibid, s. 127.
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Article 42, Clauses (5) and (6) of the Federal 
Constitution, and in general, the whole of Article 42 
refer to State Pardons Board. Court-martial cases are not 
State matters. Section 103(1) of the Armed Forces Act 
1972 provides: 
Subject to the provisions of this section a 
court-martial shall have the power to try 
any person subject to service law under this 
Act for any offence which, under this Act is 
triable by court-martial and to award for 
any such offence any punishment authorised 
by this Act for such offence. 
Therefore the question that arises is whether a Pardons Board 
comes into play at all in hearing a petition against a sentence 
passed by a court-martial. Should the answer be 'yes', the 
next question would be which Pardons Board? Members of this 
Pardons Board cannot be the same as those laid down in Clauses 
(5) and (6) as the Pardons Board referred to are the States
Pardons Board. In the absence of any provision in the federal 
laws,18 expressly stating that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in 
18. Article 40(3) of the Federal Constitution provides:
Federal law may make provision for requiring the
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to act after consultation with
or on the recommendation of any person or body of
persons other than the Cabinet in the exercise of any
of his functions other than -
(a) functions exercisable in his discretion;
(b) functions with respect to the exercise of which
provision is made in any other Article.
There is no provision stating that the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong is to act on the advice of a Pardons
Board in relation to court-martial offences.
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exercising his power of pardon (in respect of court­
martial cases), it seems that Article 40(1) will come into 
operation. 
Agong, 
Article 40(1) reads as follows: 
In the exercise of his functions under this 
Constitution or federal law the Yang di­
Pertuan Agong shall act in accordance with 
the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister 
acting under the general authority of the 
Cabinet, except as otherwise provided by 
this Constitution 
As such, the conclusion is that the Yang di-Pertuan 
when exercising his power of pardon granted under 
Article 42 of the Federal Constitution, in relation to offences 
tried by a court-martial, shall act in accordance with the 
advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general 
authority of the Cabinet.19 
19. The Attorney-General has confirmed that for sentences
passed by the military court, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
acts on the advice of the Cabinet. This actually, is an
interpretation of statutory power, since to date, no
petition for pardon in relation to a courts-martial case
has ever been made to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
34 
To take the argument further, if in actuality 
there existed past cases20 where the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
acted on the advice of a Pardons Board, the Pardons Board 
would be ultra vires, reasons being, firstly, if it was a 
State Pardons Board it is ultra vires because 
court-martial cases are not State matters and therefore 
outside the Pardons Board's jurisdiction; secondly, if it 
was a separate Pardons Board, since it is not governed by 
any law, this Pardons Board would be void. 
(a)(ii) Offences under the Internal Security Act, 196021
Until the 5th of October 1975, any pardon for 
offences under the ISA lie with the Rulers of the States. 
It is only after the enactment of the Essential (Security 
Cases) Regulations, 1975, which was effective from the 5th 
October 1975 that the power to pardon offences under the 
ISA lies with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
20. This is just an assumption. The writer does not have
any statistical records to support her argument.
21. Hereinafter referred to as ISA, 1960 (Revised 1972-Act
82).
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A 'security offence' means an offence (whether 
committed before or after the commencement of these 
Regulations) against sections 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 or 62 of 
the Internal Security Act, 1960, or any offence against 
any other written law the commission of which is certified 
by the Attorney-General under paragraph (2) to affect the 
security of the Federation.22 
It is further provided23 that: 
the power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
to grant pardons, reprieves and respites or 
to remit, suspend or to commute sentences
under Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 42 of 
the Constitution shall extend to all 
security offences wherever committed or 
tried and such extended power shall be 
exclusively exercisable by him notwith­
standing however the provisions of any 
written law to the contrary.• 
22. Essential (Security Cases)(Amendment)
1975, reg. 2(1), P.U.(A) 362/75 w.e.f.
1975. (hereinafter referred to as ESCAR)
23. Ibid. Regulation 29(1).
Regulations, 
5th October 
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Regulation 29(2)24 states:
"The power conferred upon the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong by virtue of paragraph (1)
shall be exercised on the advice of a 
Pardons Board constituted for security 
offences wherever committed or tried, and 
the provisions of Clauses (5), (6), (7), (8) 
and (9) of Article 42 of the Constitution 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Pardons 
Board, except that reference to 'Ruler or 
Yang di-Pertua Negeri' shall be construed as 
reference to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and 
reference to 'Chief Minister of the State' 
shall be construed as reference to the Prime 
Minister.• 
It is provided25 that:
"Where the commission of any offence against 
any written law other than sections 57, 58, 
59, 60, 61 and 62 of the Internal Security 
Act, 1960, in the opinion of the Attorney­
General, affects the security of the 
Federation, he shall issue a certificate to 
that effect and the case shall thereupon be 
dealt with and tried in accordance with 
these Regulations." 
24. ESCAR, 1981: P.U.(A) 206/81.
25. ESCAR 1975, reg. 2(2), P.U.(A) 362/75.
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Consequently, the current position is that the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong has the power to grant pardons, 
reprieves and respites or to remit, suspend or commute 
sentences which have been tried by court-martial, for all 
offences committed in the Federal Territories of Kuala 
Lumpur and Labuan, for offences under sections 57, 58, 59, 
60, 61 and 62 of the ISA 1960 and sentences imposed by the 
Syariah Courts in the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah, 
Sarawak or the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and 
Labuan. 26
This power to grant pardons extends to juvenile 
offenders too. In relation to the death sentence, the 
general rule is that a death sentence cannot be imposed on 
a juvenile offender who is found guilty of an offence 
punishable with death. 
This is provided for in section 16 of the 
Juvenile Courts Act 1947 which reads: 
"Sentence of death shall not be pronounced 
or recorded against a person convicted of an 
offence if it appears to the Court that at 
the time when the offence was committed he 
was a juvenile ... " 
26. Clause (1) of Article 42 of the Constitution. See 
discussion below under The Islamic Perspective.
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However this exception will not apply to a juvenile who is 
charged with a security offence. Regulation 3(3) of the 
ESCAR expressly excludes the application of the Juvenile 
Courts Act 1947 where the offender is charged with a 
security offence. 
An authority for this is the case of P.P. v Lim 
Hang Seoh,27 where a boy of 14 years at the time of the
commission of the offence was sentenced to death by the 
High Court after being found guilty of the possession of 
firearms under section 57 of the ISA, and thus a security 
offence by virtue of Regulation 2 of ESCAR. On appeal to 
the Pardons Board for security offences, the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong commuted his sentence to one of detention
at the Henry Gurney School until he reached the age of 21 
years. 
Apart from the above-mentioned sections under the 
ISA, 1960, appeals against sentences for all other 
offences (under the ISA, 1960) may be made to the State 
Pardons Board in accordance with Clauses (1) and (2) of 
Article 42 of the Constitution, subject of course, to 
Regulation 2(2) of ESCAR.28
27. [1978] 1 M.L.J. 68. See also Mimi Kamariah Majid, 
Criminal Procedure in Malaysia, pg 295-6. 
28. See above, n. 25.
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(b) Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction or powers of a Pardons Board, be 
it a State Pardons Board constituted under Article 42 of 
the Constitution or a Pardons Board constituted under the 
Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975, is only 
advisory in nature. 
In Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & 
Ors,29 the Supreme Court said that the function of a 
Pardons Board is merely to tender advice and not to 
commute sentences. 
As such, the jurisdiction of a State Pardons 
Board would be to tender advice to the Ruler or Yang 
di-Pertua Negeri in respect of petitions of mercy for all
offences committed in that state, with the exceptions of 
offences which have been tried by court-martial and 
security offences. For the Federal Territories of Kuala 
Lumpur and Labuan, advice of the Pardons Board will be 
tendered to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
(b)(i) Comments 
There seems to be an inconsistency between the 
function of the Pardons Board and Clause (8) of Article 
42. As stated above, the Pardons Board only tenders
29. (1985) 2 M.L.J. 385.
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advice to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler, as the case 
may be. At the same time, by virtue of Clause (8), the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler himself is required to 
preside over the proceedings. 30 As things stand, one 
would have thought that the Pardons Board would meet and 
discuss and thereupon reach a 'decision'. This 'decision' 
would then be presented to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or 
Ruler, as the case may be, for His Highness' 
consideration. But this is not the case. Apparently the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler participates in the 
discussion. Therefore the function of the Pardons Board 
as an advisory body would only remain so in theory. This 
is because when the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler 
actively participates in the whole process; and by 
presiding over the Board he would just be doing that; the 
supposedly separate functions or powers of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler (which is the power to grant
pardons or reduce the sentence of a petitioner)31 and the 
Pardons Board, (which is only to tender advice) becomes 
blurred. Any advice that is tendered to the Yang 
30. In response to questionnaires sent to the State
Secretaries of Selangor, Perak and Kelantan, all three 
states adhere to clause (8) of Article 42. The same 
provision is laid down in LX(7) of Undang-Undang Tubuh 
Kerajaan Selangor, 1959. 
31. See Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 42 of the 
Constitution, above.
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di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler is not final, in the sense that
that advice may or may not be adhered to by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler in exercising his power of
pardon. The inconsistency may arise if the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler chooses to exercise his powers
under Article 42 (1) and (2) against the advice of the 
Pardons Board. In theory, the Pardons Board will not be 
able to do anything since it would be outside their powers 
to interfere. But in practice, the Pardons Board may 
reopen the discussion and convince the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong or Ruler to adopt their advice. 
(c) Composition32
as its 
Article 
A Pardons Board constituted under Article 42 has, 
members, persons stipulated by 
( se.e. Re.s �or.�e .s) 
Clause (5) of 
42./..... As for the other three members which are 
not
fixed, so long as they are not a member of a Legislative 
Assembly of a State or of the House of Representatives, 
they will qualify to sit on the Pardons Board. 
32. The writer has written to obtain information as to who
are the present members of the Pardons Board in some
states, but answers have not been received. The only
information that is given is that the members are as
laid down in Clause (5) Art. 42 .
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For instance, in 1963, the Governor of Penang 
appointed three medical practitioners to serve on the 
State Pardons Board for three years.33 In Malacca, two
medical practitioners and another (whose profession was 
not stated) were appointed as members of the Pardons 
Board.34 In Trengganu, three palace officials were
appointed to become members of the State Pardons Board.35
A Pardons Board constituted under the Essential 
(Security Cases) Regulations, 1975,36 has as its members;
the Attorney-General, the Prime Minister and three other 
members, the appointment of which is subject to the 
provisions of Clauses (5), (6) and (7) of Article 42. 
(c)(i) Comments 
The Attorney-General is a permanent member of 
both types of Pardons Board. Undoubtedly this will lead 
to unfairness and prejudice by reason of the fact that the 
Attorney-General who was the Public Prosecutor technically 
in the main trial now participates as a member of the 
Pardons Board. The unfairness becomes more obtrusive when 
33. The Straits Times, 25.11.1963.
34. The Straits Times, 14.10.1963.
35. The Straits Times, 3.12.1964. The Trengganu Pardons 
Board was constituted on 30.11.64.
36. Regulation 29(2).
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the Pardons Board has to consider the written opinion of 
the Attorney-General before tendering any advice to the 
Ruler or Yang di Pertuan Agong.37 
This very point was raised in SuEerintendent of 
Pudu Prison & Ors V Sim Kie Chon 38 I where the court 
responded by saying that this question was unarguable in 
view of the specific constitutional requirement to this 
effect in Article 42(5) and (9). By saying this, one 
cannot help but feel that the court was deliberately 
avoiding the issue. By taking such a stand it is 
submitted that the court failed to utilise the opportunity 
to critically examine the provisions of the Constitution 
in question. 
In any case it is obviously and undoubtedly 
unfair for the petitioner that the "very official" who 
prosecuted him is now hearing his petition for a pardon. 
On the other hand there may be a cause to argue for the 
participation of the Attorney-General in the Pardons 
Board. It is because of his. "bias" that he should sit on 
the Board, so he could give clear reasons as to why the 
sentence of the petitioner should not be altered. He is 
the only official there who "knows" the details in which 
the petitioner committed the crime. The counter-argument 
for this is that the idea of an appeal or a petition for 
37. Art. 42(9).
38. (1986) 1 M.L.J. 494.
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pardon is based on extra-legal or 
opposed to legal grounds. It 
humanitarian grounds as 
sentence could not 
such, the argument 
on 
is 
be changed upon 
that justifies 
quite 
legal 
clear that the 
grounds. As 
the presence 
the Pardons Board being a 
of the 
member Attorney-General 
biased in favour of the retention of the sentence, and so 
being able to give reasons against any pardon or 
commutation or the like, is not a very good reason. 
A better way of justifying his presence on the 
Board would be to assume that he is sitting there in a 
different capacity, considering humanitarian reasons 
rather than legal ones. In truth, it is not easy for an 
official who has successfully prosecuted an accused and 
thereby a conviction was obtained, to then consider to 
reduce the sentence passed, based even on humanitarian 
grounds. 
The presence of the Attorney-General as a member 
of the Board will still, more often than not (and perhaps, 
at all times) be a disadvantage to the petitioner. At 
present, all the other members 
parties. Maybe one of them 
may be 
should 
viewed as neutral 
be a person who is 
"biased" in favour of the petitioner. This could at least 
neutralize the bias of the Attorney-General. 
person would be the Director- General of 
One such 
Prisons. 
However, to date, a Director-General of Prisons or any 
other high-ranking officials of the prisons has never 
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been appointed even as a temporary member, of the Pardons 
Board. Of course, the Director-General may not be biased 
in favour of petitioners all the time a petitioner may 
have behaved in such a way whilst serving sentence in 
prison that the prison authorities do not support his 
petition for pardon. In these circumstances, there would 
be only one "biased" party the Attorney-General. The 
writer feels that it is not important that his "bias" be 
highlighted. If a petitioner does not "deserve" his 
sentence to be reduced, whether the people sitting to hear 
his petition are biased or not would be irrelevant. In 
any event, it is only one out of five members. 
(d) Types of sentences that go before the Pardons Board
In theory, a person who is convicted of any 
offence may petition the Yang di Pertuan Agong or Ruler 
for a pardon. This is clearly stated in Clauses (i) and 
(2) of Article 42. In practice however, it would be 
impractical and ludicrous if a road traffic offender in 
the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur were to petition the 
Yang di Pertuan Agong for a pardon! 
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In practice however, it is the more serious 
crimes those that entail more serious punishments, that 
appeal to the Pardons Board. Maybe the law on this 
aspect, that is a person convicted of any offence may make 
a petition for pardon, ought to be reviewed. The scope of 
pardonable offences should be a lot narrower than what 
exists today. Pardons should be extended only if there 
are very strong and clear reasons for it coupled with the 
fact that if a pardon is not granted, "injustice" would be 
done. This would of course relate to the sentence that is 
meted out. The sentence should be serious, such as death, 
imprisonment for natural life or life imprisonment, before 
a petition for pardon can be made.39 Statistics show that 
those who appeal come largely from these three types of 
punishments; death sentences, life imprisonment and 
imprisonment for natural life. 
(d)(i) 
are: 
Death Sentence 
Offences that impose death sentences in Malaysia 
trafficking in dangerous drugs,40
unauthorised possession of firearms, 
ammunitions and explosives,41 
39. See Chapter VI
40. Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Act 234), s. 39B.
41. Internal Security Act 1960 (Act 82), s. 57(1).
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discharging a firearm in the commission 
of a scheduled offence,42 
being an accomplice in the above,43 
murder,44 
offences against 
di Pertuan Agong 
Governor 45 and • 
the person of the Yang 
or a Ruler or a 
abetment of the above.46 
These offences all entail mandatory death sentence, although so 
far no one has been tried for the two offences last mentioned. 
The offences below are punishable with death as the 
maximum punishment, the alternative being life imprisonment: 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
'46. 
47. 
48. 
Firearms 
Ibid, s. 
abduction, wrongful restraint or 
wrongful confinement for ransom,47 
waging or attempting to wage war, or 
abetting the waging of war, against the 
Yang di Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or 
Governor of a State,48 
(Increased Penalties) Act, 1971 (Act 37), 
3A. 
Penal Code, s. 302. 
Ibid, s. 121A. 
Ibid, s. 121A. 
Kidnapping Act 1961 (No. 41 of 1961), s. 3(1). 
Penal Code, s. 121. 
s.3.
49. Ibid, s.
50. Ibid, s.
51. Ibid, s.
52. Ibid, s.
53. Ibid, s.
54. Ibid, s.
55. Firearms
56. Internal
57. Ibid, s.
58. Arms Act,
48 
abetment of mutiny, if mutiny is 
committed in consequence thereof,49 
giving or fabricating false evidence, 
intending and thereby causing an 
innocent person to be convicted and 
executed,SO 
abetment of suicide committed by a 
child, or insane or delirious person, 
or any idiot, or a person intoxicated,51 
attempt to murder by a life convict, if 
hurt is caused, 52 
kidnapping or abducting in order to 
murder 53 • 
gang robbery with murder,54 
trafficking in firearms55 
consorting with person carrying or 
having possession of arms or 
explosives,56 
receiving, having in possession or 
providing supplies of firearms, 
ammunition or explosives,57 and 
manufacturing an arm or ammunition 
without a valid licence or in 
contravention of any condition imposed 
under Section 12(2)(a). 58 
132. 
194. 
305. 
307. 
364. 
396. 
(Increased Penalties) Act, 1971 (Act 37), s. 
Security Act 1960 (Act 82), s. 58(1). 
59. 
1960 (Act 206), s. 14(1). 
7 (1). 
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(d)(ii) Life Imprisonment 
The second category of type of punishments that 
appeal to the Pardons Board is life imprisonment. It is 
provided59 that: 
Where any person is treated as having been 
sentenced or is hereafter sentenced to 
imprisonment for life, such sentence shall 
be deemed for all purposes to be a sentence 
of imprisonment for twenty years. 
Offences that entail life imprisonment as the maximum 
punishment are: 
offences which involve 
morphine, prepared opium or 
as its subject matter.60
hereoin, 
raw opium 
59. Criminal Justice Act, 1953 (Act 345), s. 3. Hereafter,
'life imprisonment' means imprisonment for twenty years in
accordance with this provision unless otherwise stated.
60. Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952, (Act 234), s. 39A.
so 
At this juncture, the writer would like to raise 
the different meanings of the phrase 'life imprisonment'. 
Life imprisonment under 
Act 62
the Dangerous Drugs 
Act, 63
Act 61' 
Internal Security ' and Kidnapping means 
imprisonment for twenty years in accordance with the 
provision in section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act.64
Under the Penal Code, s. 130A provides: 
"In this Chapter: 65 
(b) 'imprisonment for life' means (subject
to the provisions of any written law 
conferring power to grant pardons, 
reprieves or respites or suspension or 
remission of punishments) imprisonment 
until the death of the person on whom 
the sentence is imposed." 
Apart from Chapter VI, those offences which were 
punishable with 'life imprisonment' before have now been 
amended 
years.' 66
to 'imprisonment which may extend to twenty 
61. 1952 (Act 234).
62. 1960 (Act 82).
63. 1961 (No. 41 of 1961).
64. 1953 (Act 345).
65. Chapter VI i.e. Of Offences Against The State, include
ss. 121-130A.
66 . Penal Code (Amendment and Extension Act, 1976) (Act
327). Schedule Part II, s. 3 ( 2) . 
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Out of the many offences in the Penal Code that 
entail imprisonment which may extend to twenty years, the 
more common ones are: 
counterfeiting, or 
of the process 
current coin 67 
performing any part 
of counterfeiting . 
culpable homicide not amounting to 
murder, if the act by which the death 
is caused is done with the intention of 
causing death, or 
bodily injury as is 
death,68 
of causing such 
likely to cause 
attempt to murder and hurt is caused to 
any person by such act,69 
voluntarily causing grievous hurt by 
dangerous weapons or means,70 
rape,71 and 
gang robbery.72 
It is felt appropriate that sentences of life 
imprisonment and imprisonment which may extend to twenty 
years be classified under the same heading since in both 
67. Penal Code, s. 232.
68. Ibid, s. 304.
69. Ibid, 2. 307.
70. Ibid, s. 326.
71. Ibid, s. 376.
72. Ibid, s. 395. See also, Penal Code, ss. 131, 194,
222, 225, 238, 255, 313, 314, 329, 371, 376, 377, 394,
400, 409, 412, 413, 430A, 436, 438, 449, 459, 460, 
467, 472, 475, 477, 489A, 489B and 489D. 
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types of punishments imprisonment for twenty years is the 
common factor. 
(d)(iii) Imprisonment for Natural Life 
In order to avoid confusion as to the meaning of 
'life imprisonment', imprisonment until the death of the 
person would be referred to as imprisonment for natural 
life. 
The offences that entail mandatory imprisonment 
for natural life are: 
offences against the authority of the 
Yang di Pertuan Agong, Ruler or Yang di 
Pertua Negeri,73 
exhibiting 
to put any 
hurt, at 
attempting 
commission 
robbery,74 
a firearm in a manner likely 
person in fear of death or 
the time of committing or 
to commit or abetting the 
of a scheduled offence or 
and 
having a firearm at the 
committing or attempting to 
abetting the commission of a 
offence.75 
time of 
commit or 
scheduled 
73. Ibid, s. 121B. This section is part of Chapter VI and
therefore subject to the interpretation given in s.
130A(b) as laid down above.
74. Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act, 1971 (Act 37), s.4.
S. 2(1) states that:
"imprisonment for life" means, notwithstanding 
section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1953, and any 
other written law to the contrary, imprisonment for 
the duration of the natural life of the person 
sentenced. 
75· Ibid, s. 5.
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As for imprisonment for natural life being the 
maximum punishment, the offences are: 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79, 
80. 
81. 
Penal 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
collecting arms or ammunition with 
intention of waging war against 
Yang di Pertuan Agong, a Ruler or 
Di Pertua Negeri,76 
the 
the 
Yang 
waging 
alliance 
Agong,77 
war against 
with the 
any 
Yang 
power in 
Di Pertuan 
harbouring or attempting to harbour any 
person in Malaysia or person residing 
in a foreign State at war or in 
hostili� against the Yang Di Pertuan 
Agong, 78 
public servant voluntarily 
prisoner of State of War in his 
to escape,79 
allowing 
custody 
aiding the escape of rescuing or 
harbouring such prisoner,86 and 
where a person makes or attempts to 
make use of an arm or imitation arm 
with intent to resist or prevent the 
lawful apprehension or detention of 
himself or any other person.Bl 
Code, s. 122. 
s. 125. 
s. 125A. 
s. 128. 
s. 130. 
Arms Act, 1960 (Act 206), s. 32(a)(a). 
s. 2(1) provides:
"imprisonment for life" 
notwithstanding section 3 of the Criminal 
Act, 1953, and any other written law 
contrary, imprisonment for the duration 
natural life of the person sentenced. 
means, 
Justice 
to the 
of the 
54 
All of the above-mentioned are the types of 
Qre.. -¼he S1A.bj.td of 
that
/... 
usually
" 
appeal to the sentences Pardons Board. Where 
sentences of death are concerned, appeals to the Pardons 
Board would be as against the decision of either the High 
Court or the Supreme Court.82 Where the sentence is one
for life imprisonment or imprisonment for natural life, 
the appeals could be made either as against the decision 
of a court or as against the decision of the Pardons Board 
itself. The latter situation would arise when a death 
sentence is commuted. 
B. INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS
(a) Appeals to the Pardons Board
An appeal to the Pardons Board may be made in one 
of three ways. Appeals may be made through a lawyer, 
through the Prison Rules, 1953 or from a decision of a 
court-martial. In all the three ways, the nature of the 
appeal always remains the same. The only difference, 
albeit minor, lies upon the authority who is advising the 
prisoner. 
82. For further details, see Mimi Kamariah Majid, Criminal
Procedure in Malaysia, 1987, pg. 294-8.
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(a)(i) Appeal through counsel 
Appeals through counsel may be made either by the 
prisoner himself or by his personal representatives. In 
the former situation, an interview with a lawyer has 
revealed that all it involves is the lawyer seeing the 
prisoner in prison at the request of the prisoner and 
help the prisoner draft a letter to the Yang Di Pertuan 
Agong or Sultan, as the case may be. What happens after 
that would be beyond the powers of the counsel or the 
prisoner. 
Alternatively, the personal representatives of 
the prisoner may go to see a lawyer and seek his aid to 
draft a letter of petition to the Yang Di Pertuan Agong or 
the Sultan, as the case may be. 
(a)(ii) Appeal through Prisons Rules, 1953
It is provided83 
"A prisoner may, if he wishes, petition 
the Yang Di Pertuan Agong or Ruler or 
Governor, as the case may be, on the 
subject of his conviction or sentence 
on the completion of one year of his 
sentence, a second such petition shall 
B3 . The Prisons Rules, 1953, Rule 111(1). 
imposed 
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be allowed when a prisoner has 
completed three years from the date of 
conviction, and thereafter such 
petitions shall be granted at two 
yearly intervals, unless there are any 
special circumstances which the 
Officer-in-Charge may consider should 
be brought to the notice of the Yang Di 
Pertuan Agong or Ruler or Governor, as 
the case may be." 
This particular section prescribes that the sentence 
must be more than one year. Sentences for life 
imprisonment or imprisonment for natural life would be covered 
under this proviso. The one year sentence referred to above is 
after remission being granted. A remission of one-third of the 
sentence is automatically granted to every convicted prisoner 
who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding one 
month.84 As such, for Rule 111 of the Prisons Rules, 1953 to 
apply to a prisoner, he originally has to be sentenced to more 
than eighteen months' imprisonment. The purpose of having the 
84. Ibid, Rule 43(a). Rule 43 reads: With a view to 
encouraging good conduct and industry and to 
facilitate reformative treatment, a prisoner sentenced 
to imprisonment shall be entitled to be granted 
remission as follows:-
(a) a convicted prisoner sentenced to a term of
imprisonment exceeding one month shall be granted
as remission one-third of his sentence: Provided
that in no case shall any remission granted
result in the release of a prisoner until he has
served one calendar month;
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prisoner wait for one year before a petition is made on his 
behalf is so that the prison authorities have ample time to 
assess his conduct or behaviour and his attitude towards prison 
training, amongst other things, before a recommendation for his 
pardon or otherwise, can be made. 
Once a prisoner is brought to the prisons, an Officer­
in-Charge will open a file on the prisoner and record all 
particulars relating to the offence that has been committed, 
personal details of the prisoner and other relevant matters. 
If the prisoner is to serve a term of imprisonment of one month 
or less, he will not be granted remission.BS 
If however, his term of imprisonment exceeds one 
month, the Officer-in-Charge will inform the prisoner of the 
one-third remission of his sentence. The prisoner will also be 
informed of his right to appeal after completing one year of 
his sentence. Should the prisoner want to exercise his right 
of appeal, this intention will be communicated to the 
Officer-in- Charge when the time comes. 
will 
The Officer-in-Charge 
then 
85. Ibid, Rule 43(b), which reads:
(b) a prisoner sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
one month or under shall not be granted remission.
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prepare a report on the behaviour and characteristics of 
the prisoner. A report will also be made by a medical 
officer regarding the health of the prisoner, with details 
as to whether further imprisonment would impair the health 
of the prisoner. Another report that will be included in 
the appeal would be a report from the head of department 
in which the prisoner has worked for during his prison 
training. All these reports will be sent to the 
Director-General of the Prisons, who will then add or 
enter any recommendations that he may want to make. 
Finally, a letter addressed to the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong, or Ruler or Governor, as the case may be, 
will be enclosed in the appeal; signed by the prisoner.86
This 'appeal letter' will be sent to the State Secretary 
of the State in which the prisoner committed the crime, 
who will then forward the letter to the Pardons Board. 
An official at the Prisons Headquarters affirms 
that prisoners prefer to wait until they have served one 
year of their sentence before making an appeal to the 
Pardons Board. This is as opposed to appealing through a 
lawyer. The reason, obviously, is cost. Appealing 
through the Prisons Rules is free of charge. 
86· See Appendix I.
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So far, the discussion has centred around the issue of 
the prisoner electing to exercise his right to appeal. Under 
the Prisons Rules, there is a provision87 whereby, even if the 
prisoners do not wish to appeal, an appeal will nevertheless be 
made on their behalf. This "automatic appeal" only applies to 
prisoners who have completed at least four years and 
thereafter, eight, twelve, sixteen or twenty years of their 
sentences. The "automatic" appeal also applies to a prisoner 
who has served seven or more years of his sentence and has 
attained the age of sixty years. The Officer-in-Charge is 
required to prepare a report on every such prisoner. A report 
under this Rule is referred to as the quadrennial reports. The 
function of a quadrennial report is to appeal for a reduction 
in sentence. 
The report by the Officer-in-Charge include -
(a) a statement by the Officer-in-Charge on the work
and conduct of the prisoner; and
(b) a statement by the Medical Officer on the mental
and bodily condition of 
particular reference to 
imprisonment on his health.88 
87. Prison Rules, 1953, Rule 55(1). 
88. Ibid, Rule 55(2).
the prisoner, 
the effect 
with 
of 
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The Officer-in-Charge shall forward every such 
report to the Commissioner who shall enter thereon any 
recommendations he may desire to make and forward it to 
the Chief Minister of the State within which the offence 
was committed or treated to have been committed for the 
purpose of Article 42 of the Constitution, except that in 
the case of a person convicted of an offence by a Military 
Court constituted under the Military Courts Proclamation, 
such reports shall be forwarded to the Minister.89 
The Yang di Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or 
Governor, as the case may be, may, acting in accordance 
with the provision of Article 42 of the Constitution, 
remit the residue of the prisoner's sentence or may direct 
at what later time or times the case shall be re­
submitted for his consideration and in that event he may 
at any later date either remit part thereof or the residue 
of the prisoner's sentence.90 
In order to carry out the requirements stated in 
Rule 55 of the Prisoners Rules, 1953, the Prisons 
Authorities provide quadrennial reports booklets.91 
booklet, one will find -
89. Ibid, Rule 55(3).
9o. Ibid, Rule 55(4). 
91· See Appendix II.
In a 
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precis of offence from the police,11 
personal details of the prisoner, 
record of past offences, 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) report of his conduct by his prison 
supervisor, 
(v) report of the Director of Prisons,
(vi) report of the medical officer and
(vii) certification by the
Prisons.
Director-General of 
This booklet, as in the appeal mentioned above, 
will be sent to the relevant State Secretary to be 
forwarded to the Pardons Board. 
If a prisoner is under a sentence of death, 
obviously the one-year bar does not apply. Such prisoner 
may petition the Yang di Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or 
Governor, as the case may be, as soon as the sentence is 
passed. 93 In this situation the prison authorities will 
only help the prisoner to draft the letter of petition to 
the relevant authority.94 Some selected details of the 
92- It has been suggested that this precis may be biased
as it is prepared by the police, who is the 
prosecutor. It is felt, however, that the issue 
should not be taken out of proportion. Since the 
police arrested the prisoner, therefore reliance has 
to be made on their story. 
93. Prisons Rules, 1953, Rule 112.
94. See Appendix III.
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prisoner, taken from his original record, will be attached to 
the letter of appeal. No recommendations or reports from the 
prison authorities will accompany this letter of appeal. 
(a)(iii) Appeal from a decision of a court-martial 
Once the court-martial imposes the death sentence or 
life imprisonment, the accused may petition the Yang di Pertuan 
Agong for a pardon. The situation is similar to that of a 
prisoner sentenced by the ordinary courts, appealing through a 
lawyer. 
Once the offender is sent to prisons, he will be 
subject to the Prisons Rules, 1953. Military law, that is the 
Armed Forces Act 1972 ceases to apply. As such, if he is under 
a sentence of death, he may make an appeal immediately,95
otherwise he is also subject to the one-year bar.96
(b) Covening a Pardons Board; nature of proceedings
Once a person is sentenced to death, even if he 
refuses to exercise his right to appeal under rule 112 of the 
Prisons Rules, 1953, his sentence of death would nevertheless 
be considered by the relevant Pardons Board. Section 281 of 
95. Prison Rules, 1953, Rule 112.
96. Ibid, Rule III.
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the Criminal Procedure Code97 lays down the procedures to be 
followed with regard to sentences of death. 
In cases in which a notice of appeal is not given 
within the prescribed period, the Judge passing sentence of 
death shall, as soon as convenient; after such period has 
elapsed, forward to the Mentri Besar of the State in which the 
crime was committed, a copy of the notes of evidence taken at 
the trial, together with a report in writing signed by him, 
setting out his opinion whether there are any reasons, and, if 
any, what reasons there are, why the sentence of death should 
or should not be carried out. 98 
In cases in which notice of appeal is given the Judge 
who passed the sentence of death shall, as soon as convenient, 
forward to the Supreme Court the report in writing referred to 
in the previous paragraph. If the Supreme Court dismisses the 
appeal, the Judge presiding in such Court shall as soon as 
convenient after such dismissal forward to the Mentri Besar the 
said report in writing together with a copy of the notes of 
evidence taken at the original trial, a copy of the record of 
the proceedings before the Supreme Court and also such report, 
if any, on the case as the Supreme Court may think fit to make 
and signed by the Judge presiding in the Supreme Court. 99
98. Criminal Procedure Code (F.M.S. Cap. 6), s 28l(b)(l).
99. Ibid, s. 28l(b)(2).
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Upon receipt of the proceedings, the Mentri Besar 
shall submit the same to the Ruler of the State. But before 
that, when the documents are received by the Mentri Besar, a 
file will be opened and the matter will be referred to the 
State Legal Adviser, who will further refer the matter to the 
Attorney-General. The Attorney-General will then submit his 
written opinion of the case. Once this is done, a member of 
the Pardons Board will request the Ruler for an audience. Once 
the date and place have been fixed, the necessary preparation 
of the working papers to be presented will be made. Finally 
members of the Pardons Board will be notified and invited to 
acting in accordance with the the meeting. The Ruler, 
provisions of Article 42 of the Constitution, may pardon the 
offender or commute his sentence or exercise the other options 
available to him. 
communicated to the 
Any decision 
Judge who passed 
of 
the 
the Ruler 
sentence. 
will 
If 
be 
the 
sentence is to be carried out, the place of execution will be 
stated.l
The Ruler of the State, acting in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 42 of the Constitution may order a 
respite of the execution of the warrant and afterwards appoint 
some other time or other place for its execution.2
1. 
2. 
Ibid, s. 28l(c). 
Ibid, s. 28l(d)(2). 
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The procedure as laid down above applies when a death 
sentence is passed, whether or not an appeal is made to the 
Pardons Board. 
An appeal under rule 111 of the Prisons Rules, 1953, 
may be made by the prisoner himself or his closest relatives 
such as his parents, children or wife (husband).3 When an 
appeal is received in this way, all details of the prisoner 
will be gathered. The prison authorities will also be asked to 
submit their opinion on the prisoner. The Attorney-General 
will also be asked to submit his written opinion. All these 
for the documents will be presented to the meeting 
consideration of the Pardons Board. 
The Pardons Board will only meet if and when there are 
cases for consideration of the board. It does not function on 
a scheduled basis. The Board will only sit when all members 
are present which normally is 
Pertuan Agong or Ruler or Governor. 
six, including the Yang di 
The Yang di Pertuan Agong 
or Ruler or Governor himself has to preside and chair the 
meeting in accordance with the provision in Clause (8) of 
Article 42 of the the Constitution. 
3. See Appendix IV Perak. 
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The Attorney-General may delegate his functions as a 
member of the Board to any other pers·on. 4 Normally either the 
Solicitor-General or the State Legal Adviser of the relevant 
State will be appointed in place of the Attorney-General. This 
'delegate' is normally appointed for that one meeting. 
However, the practice has been for the person delegated with 
the functions of the Attorney-General to attend the subsequent 
meeting which considers the unfinished business of the previous 
meeting, if any. There are no criteria that must be satisfied 
by the 'delegated member' but the Attorney-General is of the 
opinion that the person should be legally trained.5 
During the meeting, the Pardons Board will consider 
all matters relevant to the case. It will consider the written 
opinion of the Attorney-General before tendering advice to the 
Yang di Pertuan Agong or Ruler or Governor. The advice of the 
Attorney-General is not binding on the Board but it is true to � 
say that more often than not his advice is adhered to. But the 
rule remains that a Pardons Board is free to make its decisions 
without being bound by any views or precedent. 
4. 
5. 
Article 42(5) of the Constitution. 
See Appendix IV: Attorney-General. 
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When members of a Pardons Board have reached a
decision this will be communicated to the Yang di Pertuan 
Agong, or Ruler or Governor, as the case may be, who will act 
in accordance with the advice. Any decision as to the details 
of commutation, remission and so forth shall be decided by the 
Yang di Pertuan Agong or Ruler or Governor.6 As far as 
commutation is concerned, normally a particular sentence will 
be commuted to the next less serious sentence. For instance, a 
death sentence commuted to imprisonment for natural life, a 
sentence of imprisonment for natural life commuted to life 
imprisonment and so forth. When the evidence shows that a 
person is mentally disturbed or insane during the commission of 
the offence, the Yang di Pertuan Agong or Ruler or Governor may 
commute his sentence and detain him for an indeterminate 
period. The Criminal Procedure Code provides that whenever 
there is a finding that the accused committed the act alleged, 
and the act would have constituted an offence but for the 
incapacity found, the Court before which the trial has been 
held shall order such person to be kept in safe custody in such 
place and manner as the Court thinks fit. The Court shall also 
report the case for the orders of the Ruler of the State in 
which the trial is held.7 
6. 
7. 
This would only be in theory, as discussed previously. 
Section 348(1). 
It is 
confined under 
68 
further provided that when any 
the provisions of section 348 
person is 
in a mental 
hospital and any two of the visitors and Medical Superintendent 
jointly certify that in their judgment such person may be 
safely discharged without danger of his doing injury to himself 
or any other person, the Ruler may order for such person to be 
discharged from such mental hospital.a 
There is no clear way of knowing how long a Pardons 
Board may take to reach a decision as this would depend on the 
case in question, but normally a decision would be reached at 
the end of each session.9 Finally, the applicant and the
prison authorities will be notified of the decision. 
C. TYPES AND EFFECTS OF PARDON
(a) Types of pardons
There are two types of pardon in Malaysia, namely the 
full pardon and the conditional pardon. 
(i) A full pardon
The grounds for granting a full pardon cannot be 
ascertained as the exercise of the power of pardon is 
discretionary. In England a full pardon may be given to a 
8. Criminal Procedure Code (F.M.S. Cap. 6) section 350.
9 . . For a more lengthy discussion on this issue,see Chapter VI.
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man who was wrongly convicted of a crime. An example of 
this type of pardon is the case of Maurice Swanson who was 
pardoned and freed in 1975 after serving eleven months of 
imprisonment for a robbery he did not commit when another 
man confessed to the crime.10
In Malaysia full pardons are rare. In fact the 
only instance whereby a full pardon was granted was in 
1987 to the former Chief Minister of Selangor, Datuk Harun 
Idris, who was charged and duly convicted for corruption. 
The Yang di Pertuan Ag ng granted him a full pardon upon 
recommendation by the Federal Territory Pardons Board.11
(ii) A conditional pardon
In this country, remissions or conditional 
pardons are the norm, usually given to persons convicted 
and sentenced to death. An appeal may be made to the 
Ruler, who will convene the appropriate Pardons Board to 
decide whether the death sentence should be commuted to 
life imprisonment. It is for this reason that a remission 
is sometimes known as a conditional pardon. In such a 
situation the convicted person is not forgiven for his 
crime but his life is spared on condition that he agrees 
to life imprisonment. 
10. Berita Times, 1.6.1981.
,,,.- ---
11 New Straits Times, 31.8.1987.
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It is felt that the term "conditional pardon" 
should not 
'remission.' 
reduction in 
be used interchangeably with the term 
A remission is widely understood as a 
the amount of a particular punishment, 
without the character of the original sentence being 
changed. Whereas a conditional pardon, in cases of 
sentences of death, means that the prisoner will not be 
hanged provided he is willing to serve a sentence of life 
imprisonment. It is obvious that the two are totally 
different in character. If conditional pardon is to be 
used interchangeably with another term, the 
the 
more 
appropriate 
underlying 
one would be commutation, as idea 
a conditional pardon is the substitution of one 
form of punishment for another. 
Examples of conditional pardons are in August 
1968 where thirteen men were condemned to death for 
consorting with Indonesians and 
the Indonesian confrontation. 
for carrying arms during 
Eleven were granted 
conditional pardons by the Sultan of Johore and two by the 
Sultan of Perak. 
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In yet another case, a conditional pardon was 
given to a fourteen year old boy who was sentenced to 
death in 1977 under the Internal Security Act on two 
charges of unlawful possession of a firearm and some 
ammunition. The death sentence was commuted to detention 
at the pleasure of the Yang di Pertuan Agdng until he 
reached the age of twenty-one years. This case made legal 
history because it was the first case of a fourteen year 
old being sentenced to death. The High Court judge trying 
the case had no alternative but to impose the death 
sentence because the boy was tried under the Essential 
(Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations, 197512 which 
carried a mandatory death penalty.13 
(b) Effects of pardon
The effects of a royal pardon would depend on how 
it has been worded. 
12. PU(A) 362/75.
13. See above, n. 27.
' 
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On the one hand, a pardon may be worded such that 
it means a 'clean slate.' On the other hand, the words 
could mean that the prisoner is merely released from jail 
and does not have to serve his sentence, but the 
conviction remains in the books. 
The effect of a full pardon is that 
conviction against the person is written off. 
the 
The 
offender gets a 'clean slate' and he can stand for offices 
or take part in elections. It cleanses a person from 
"all infamy and from all consequences of the 
offence for which it is granted and from all 
statutory or other disqualifications 
following upon the conviction. 11 14
A conditional pardon does not have the effect of 
absolving guilt. The conviction and stigma of having been 
convicted will remain. 
14. Extract from report in Berita Times, 1.6.1981.
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D. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE POWER OF PARDON
The issue that will be examined below is whether 
the exercise of mercy may be subject to judicial review. 
This issue, as well as the nature and scope of 
the power of pardon was raised in a case that resulted in 
two Supreme Court decisions.15 Sim Kie Chon was tried and 
convicted for possession of firearms and ammunition 
without lawful authority under section 57 of the Internal 
Security Act,16 and was sentenced to death by the High 
Court at Kuala Lumpur. His appeal to the Federal Court 
was dismissed and his sentence of death was confirmed. 
This case was then considered by the Pardons Board for 
Security Offences, which affirmed the death sentence. The 
II 
Yang di Pertuan AgQng held that in his judgment it was 
expedient to carry out the death sentence and ordered his 
execution at the Pudu Prison in Kuala Lumpur. The High 
Court consequently issued a warrant of execution. Sim Kie 
Chon then instituted proceedings challenging the denial of 
the Pardons Board of his application for pardon. 
15. Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985]
2 MLJ 385 and Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim
Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494.
16. Act 18 of 1960.
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He alleged that the Board had not properly 
considered his application for mercy by not commuting his 
sentence of death and had acted in contravention of 
Article 8 of the Constitution which ensured equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law. The basis 
of his claim of unequal treatment was based on the earlier 
decision of the Board which commuted the death sentence of 
Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim, a former government minister who 
had been convicted of murder.17 He contended that by 
rejecting his case the Pardons Board had failed to 
exercise impartiality and uniformity in its decision. 
With regard to the arguments relating to equality 
it was held that the cases of Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim and 
the appellant were not similar because the former was 
convicted under section 302 of the Penal Code and the 
latter under the Internal Security Act. Moreover the 
Pardons Board which heard the two applications for pardon 
were different. The court further said that even if two 
persons were convicted for the same offence under the same 
Act and both were sentenced to death, the sentence of one 
being commuted to life imprisonment and the other not 
commuted is no ground to say that there is inequality 
before the law because the facts of each case can never be 
the same.18
17. Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v Public Prosecutor
[1983] 2 MLJ 232.
18. [1985] 2 MCLJ 268.
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The Supreme Court ruled that the function of the 
Pardons Board is merely to tender advice and not to 
commute a death sentence. The implication that arises is 
that the Board did not make the decision to pardon and 
therefore its alleged partiality was not relevant. 
The Court further observed that although the 
p 
Pardons Board tendered advice to the Yang di Pertuan Agdng 
it was the Yang di Pertuan Agang himself who exercised the 
power in accordance with Article 42(1) of the Federal 
Constitution read with regulation 29 of the Essential 
(Security Cases) Amendment Regulations, 1975. Such power 
belongs to the area of high prerogative of mercy which 
although an executive act, by its very nature is not one 
susceptible or amenable to judicial review. 
A decision made pursuant to an exercise of royal 
prerogative of mercy cannot be varied or confirmed by the 
courts, there being no jurisdiction to do so. Proceedings 
in court aimed at questioning the propriety or otherwise 
of such a decision are therefore not justiciable.19
19- [1985] 2 MLJ 386.
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Shortly after the Court rendered this decision, 
Sim filed another action seeking to prevent his 
execution. He alleged this time, that the Board acted 
unfairly and in breach of both the rules of natural 
justice and Articles 42, 5(1) and 8(1) of the 
Constitution. The Court stated that the scope of the duty 
to act fairly imposed by the rules of natural justice 
depends upon the subject-matter and circumstances of each 
case and that neither the Federal Constitution nor the 
Criminal Procedure Code contained requirements requiring 
the Pardons Board to act in accordance with the rules of 
natural justice. 
Again the Court reiterated the position that the 
Pardons Board is only an advisory body and makes no 
decision as such but only tenders advice to His Majesty 
for the purpose of the exercise of his powers of clemency 
under Article 42 of the Constitution. 
"The primary powers of clemency are vested 
solely in His Majesty under the substantive clauses (1) 
and (2) of Article 42 of the Constitution (read in the 
light of the Regulations) empowering him to make the 
decision in the circumstances of any particular case and 
the mode of the exercise of those powers and the reference 
to the advice and constitution of a Pardons Board specified 
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in clauses (4) et sequitur of Article 42 in fact provide 
the machinery for the functional implementation thereof. 11 20 
The House of Lords in England in a landmark 
decision in the case of Council of Civil Service Unions & 
Ors v Minister for the Civil Service21 said that judicial 
review of the exercise of the prerogative was possible. 
This was repeated in the judgment of Tan 
Abdoolcader SCJ in Sim's case22 where he said: 
Sri 
"In relation to the question of the 
amenability of a prerogative power to 
judicial review we think that the 
enlightened approach is that this would be 
dependent on its nature or subject matter 
exercise of a prerogative power is 
subject to review if the subject matter in 
respect of which it is exercised is 
justiciable, that is to say, if it is a 
matter upon which the court can adjudicate." 
Dato 
He continued and stated that some prerogative powers 
are immune from judicial review, one of which is the 
prerogative of mercy, 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
" because their nature and 
are such as not to be 
judicial process. 11 23 
[1986] 1 MLJ 496-497. 
(1985) 1 AC 374· 
At pg 497. 
Ibid. 
subject 
amenable 
matter 
to the 
78 
Another earlier instance whereby this position 
was taken was in Public Prosecutor v Lim Hiang Seoh24 
where the court stated that it had no jurisdiction to 
confirm or vary the executive decision of the Yang di 
I 
Pertuan AgOng to commute a sentence. 
In yet another case25 which concerned an 
application for a stay of execution, the court held that 
it had no jurisdiction to deal with the sort of 
application made for the reason that mercy is not the 
subject of legal rights. Any stay of execution would only 
be an extension of the prerogative of the Yang di Pertuan 
in accordance with Article 42 of the Federal 
Constitution. 
It must be emphasised though that other questions 
such as the proper composition of the Pardons Board may be 
raised in the courts, as was done so in Sim's case. Since 
the grant of mercy is based on Article 42 of the 
Constitution, it has been suggested26 that if for instance
24. (1979] 2 MLJ 170.
25. Chiow Thiarn Guan V Su:eerintendent of Pudu Prison 
(1983] 2 MLJ 116. 
26. Shad S Faruqi, Exercise of Prerogative Powers Is 
Judicial Review Possible? Shariah Law Journal 1986, 
57.
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the Pardons Board met without the presence of a Ruler or 
did not consider the written opinion submitted by the 
Attorney-General, the court may vitiate the proceedings. 
To summarise, it is the grounds on which a 
decision is based or rather the decision itself that 
cannot be examined by the courts because the exercise of 
the power to grant or refuse a pardon is a highly 
discretionary power of a non-justiciable type. The 'duty 
to act fairly' which otherwise applies to administrative 
decisions also does not apply to the process of granting 
pardons for the same reasons.27 
But the courts may look into the appropriateness 
of the procedures, as laid down in Article 42 such as, 
ensuring that there are five members or that none of the 
members is a member of the Legislative Assembly of a State 
or of the House of Representatives. 
27. For a more thorough discussion of the issue, see
(i) Assoc Prof LR Penna, Pardoning Power And The "Saga" of
Sim Kie Chon, Singapore Law Review, Vol 8 1987, 106.
(ii) Peter Crook, Sim Kie 
Prison & Ors - The Royal 
JMCL, 195. 
Chon v Superintendent of Pudu
Prerogative of Mercy", 1986
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E. THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE
(a) Article 42(10) of the Federal Constitution
Pursuant to clause (10) of Article 42 of the 
Constitution, the Yang di Pertuan Agong, as Head of the 
religion of Islam in the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah 
or Sarawak or the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and 
Labuan may grant pardons, reprieves and respites in 
respect of, or to remit, suspend or commute sentences 
imposed by the Syariah Courts in the States mentioned 
above. For the remaining states in Malaysia, the Sultan 
or Yang di Pertuan ·Besar, as the case may be, as head of 
the religion of Islam shall exercise the power of pardon. 
(b) Categories of crimes in Islam
The granting of pardon in Islam depends on the 
type of offence that has been committed. Crimes fall 
under three categories in accordance with the degree of 
seriousness or the mildness of punishment 
1. Hudud,
2. Qisas and Diyat and
3. Ta'zir.
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(b)(i) Hudud crimes 
The main purpose of punishment in Islam is not 
retribution but specific and general deterrence. The more 
effective the penalty is in fulfilling that purpose, the 
more successful it becomes in combating serious crime. 
This is the rationale for enforcing severe penalties for 
the more dangerous crimes, so that the severity of the 
penalty will prevent the recurrence of similar conduct. 
'Hudud' stems from the word 'bud', which means 
'to prevent' or 'to deter'. A bud may be defined as the 
punishment prescribed as the right of Allah. In this 
definition, prescribed punishment means that both the 
quantity and quality thereof is determined. What is meant 
by its being prescribed as the right of Allah is that the 
individuals and the community cannot annul it. A wrongful 
act is said to be against the right of Allah when it 
infringes the interest of the society at Large for 
instance, doing an act that disrupts the peacefulness of 
the society. Any act that does harm to the people and the 
punishment thereof correspondingly benefits them, its 
punishment must necessarily be 
Allah. Such punishment cannot 
individual or the society. 
treated as the right of 
be invalidated by the 
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Crimes involving hud are clearly determined. 
They are seven in number, namely: 
(i) Adultery (zina)
(ii) False allegation of adultery
(iii) Drinking of alcohol
(iv) Theft
(v) Highway robbery
(vi) Apostasy and
(vii) Transgression.
(ii) Hudud and Eardons
There is a difference as to the right to grant a 
pardon depending on whether the offence has been brought 
to the courts. 
If the offence has not been brought to the 
courts, then the victim of a hudud crime has the right to 
forgive the offender. This would apply in the case of 
theft, highway robbery, slander and transgression. Only 
the victim has the right to grant a pardon. If the victim 
is murdered during the commission of a highway robbery, 
the opportunity of the 'murderer' to be pardoned would be 
lost. A next-of-kin cannot grant pardons in hudud crimes. 
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When the offence is brought to the courts, no 
pardon is admissible. The aggrieved party or the head of 
the State or the person in authority has no jurisdiction 
to grant a pardon.28 If a pardon is granted, it will be 
ineffective. Implementation of the above-mentioned 
punishments is obligatory on the State. 
Amr-bin-Shuib from his father from his 
grandfather reported that the messenger of Allah (PBUH) 
said: 
Pardon one another the ordained crimes that are among 
you. What reaches me about an ordained crime, becomes 
enforceable. 
Explanation: 
This means that pardon should 
compromise without knowledge 
be 
of 
extended 
judges 
by 
and 
magistrates. But when any crime is brought to their 
notice, it becomes unlawful to pardon the guilty and 
the criminals.29 
28. The word 'pardon' here is used loosely, in the sense that
the punishment is fixed and cannot be altered.
29. MISHKAT-UL-MASABIH. AL-Haj Maulana Fazlul Karim. Book II, 
Third Edition 1970, I.M. Trust, Dacca, pg 543. 
(iii) 
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In anoth e r incid e nt: 
And h e (Jabir) narrat e d in 
Safwan bin Umayyah came 
th e mosqu e using his she e t 
'Sharhi Sunnat' that 
to M e dina and sl e pt in 
as pillow. Th e n a 
thi e f cam e and stol e his she e t. Safwan ov e rtook 
him and came with him to the M e sseng e r of Allah 
(PBUH). 
hand. 
He passed order for cutting off his 
Safwan said: 
it to him as charity. 
I did not wish it. I giv e 
Then the M e ss e ng e r of 
Allah said: Why did you (not t e ll him) before 
you cam e with him? 30 
Explanation 
This incident affirms the rul e that onc e a hudud 
crim e is brought to the notice of the 
authoriti e s, and in this instance, the Prophet 
Muhammad hims e lf (PBUH), th e act of crim e cannot 
be pardoned anymor e . 
Qisas and Diyat crimes31 
Th e word m e ans ' e quality' or 
' equivalenc e ' . A person who has committ e d a giv e n 
violation will be punish e d in th e sam e way and by th e 
same m e ans that he used in harming anoth e r p e rson. 
30. Ibid, pg. 556.
31. M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Quesas Crim e s', in M. Ch e rif
Bass iouni ( e d. ) , ..::;Th=.:ce_..::I:..::s:..::l:..::a:::.m:::i::...:c::........;C::..:r::...:i=-:m:::.i=-:n:::.a=l-J.::.....:::u..::;s..::t..::i..::c..::e__::S_,y-'s_t_e_m,
Oceana, pg 203-9.
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There are five Qisas crimes: 
1. Murder
2. Voluntary killing (similar to intentional 
killing or voluntary manslaughter).
3. Involuntary killing.
4. Intentional physical injury or maiming.
5. Unintentional physical injury or maiming.
Crimes of fall into two categories, 
homicide and battery. Both intentional and unintentional 
homicide are included but the sanctions are different. 
The term killing includes unjustifiable and inexcusable 
homicides and for which there is either an element of 
intention or recklessness. 
The categories of battery include the infliction 
of intentional and unintentional bodily harm which result 
in serious or permanent injury to the person. It also 
includes maiming and other forms of physical disfigurement. 
The sanctions prescribed for Qisas crimes are 
either the Qisas, that is, the equivalent infliction of 
physical or bodily harm against the person who committed 
the act, or alternatively the payment of Diyat as 
compensation. 
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(iv) Qisas and Diyat and pardons
It is stated in the Qur'an: 
We ordained therein for them: Life for life, eye 
for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for 
tooth and wounds equal for equal. But if anyone 
remits the retaliation by way of charity, it is 
an act of atonement for himself. (Surat 
Al-Maaidah : 45). 
The principles of Diyat are laid down such: 
Never should a Believer kill a Believer but if it 
so happens by mistake, compensation is due. If 
one so kills a Believer, it is ordained that he 
should free a believing slave, and pay 
compensation to the deceased's family, unless 
they remit it freely. (Surat Al-Nisaa : 92). 
There are provisions in the Qur'an concerning 
other penalties for the crimes of Qisas. As between Qisas 
and Diyat the Qur'an clearly indicates a preference for 
Diyat and for forgiveness, which negates the application 
of Qisas. 
It is stated: 
Hold to forgiveness, command 
turn away from the ignorant. 
199) 
and 
what is right, but 
(Surat Al-Araaf 
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It is part of the mercy of God that thou dost 
deal gently with them for if thou had been severe 
or harsh- heated, they would have broken away 
from about thee. So pardon them and ask for 
God's forgiveness for them and consult them in 
affairs of the moment. Then, when thou has taken 
a decision, put thy trust in God. For God loves 
those who put their trust 
Ali-Imran: 159). 
In crimes, pardon 
in Him. (Surat 
or forgiveness .is 
allowed. Pardon may be given by the aggrieved person or 
his heir. This pardon may be extended to Diyat as well. 
If the aggrieved party or his heir decides to forgo Diyat, 
the offender will go unpunished. Otherwise, the offender 
has to pay compensation to the victim. 
The head of the State has no powers to condone 
crimes involving Qisas. It is only the person wronged or 
his heir who can pardon such crimes. If the person, 
against whom 
guardian, the 
guardian, for 
the guardian of 
such an offence is committed has no heir or 
head of State will be treated as his 
according to the 
the person who has 
Syariah the sovereign 
no heir. Therefore 
is 
it 
is only in his titulary capacity that the head of the 
State can pardon the offender. 
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A good example of a Qisas crime was reported 
recently in the newspapers,32 where an 18 year old boy was 
acquitted of a charge of causing grievous hurt to his 
schoolmate after he and his father publicly apologized to 
the victim's family in the Juvenile Court. The father of 
the victim forgave the offender and waived monetary 
compensation (Diyat) as well. 
However, the head of State may impose the 
punishment for Ta'zir if the victim or heir of the victim 
fully forgives the offender - that is, to forgo both Qisas 
and Diyat. The punishment for Ta'zir will be imposed as a 
deterrent measure to future offenders. 
In the example just given above, the State could 
for instance, send the 18 year old boy to an institution 
for reformative treatment or otherwise impose a small fine 
on the offender. In any event, the Ta'zir punishment must 
not exceed or be equal to either Qisas or Diyat, but at 
the same time possess deterrent characteristics. 
32. New Straits Times, July 7, 1989.
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(v) Ta'zir crimes
The third category is that of Ta'zir which 
encompasses all offences for which the Syariah does not 
prescribe a penalty. Punishment for these crimes proceeds 
from the discretionary authority of the sovereign as 
delegated to the judge.33 
Ta'zir. has several connotations. The word 
literally means chastisement in the widest possible 
sense. In its legal sense, it signifies criminal 
punishment which is not legally fixed. Jurists consider 
Ta'zir as discretionary correction, rehabilitation or 
chastisement. 
Crimes of Ta'zir are not subject to the principle 
of legality as in the first and second categories of 
crimes laid down above. Islamic law has not specified all 
violations subject to Ta'zir to the same extent as for 
other crimes. However, regardless of circumstance, all 
acts which infringe private or public interest are subject 
to Ta'zir. The public authorities have a duty to lay down 
rules penalizing all conduct which is contrary to the 
public interest, public order and social tranquility. 
33. Ghaouti Berunelha, 'Ta'zir Crimes,' in
(ed.), The Islamic Criminal Justice
211-225.
M. Cherif Bassiouni
System, Oceana, pg
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(vi) Ta'zir and pardons
The state has pardoning powers in respect of 
Ta'zir crimes. In these crimes 
has been delegated, by the Syariah, 
state has the discretion to 
the right of punishment 
to the State. The 
alter the quantum of 
punishment to the minimum extent of mere admonition. 
The 
arbitrarily. 
right 
The 
of discretion 
pardon of the 
cannot 
head of 
be exercised 
State will be 
effective insofar as the pardon does not prejudice the 
right of the aggrieved person. The aggrieved party can 
pardon only that crime which is detrimental to his own 
rights. If a crime is prejudicial to the society as a 
whole, any pardon or remission granted by the aggrieved 
party will not be effective. 
Any pardon granted 
promote the public good and 
by the 
hinder 
head of state should 
the evil. A crime 
cannot be excused before its commission. The pardoning of 
an offence before it is committed amounts to legalising 
the offence and this is prohibited by the Syariah. 
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(c) Implementation of pardons according to Syariah Law in
Malaysia34 
To recapitulate, in theory, if the commission of 
a crime involving a hud is brought to the courts and is 
established, the judge has no choice but to pass the 
sentence prescribed by the Syariah. 
If the crime entails gisas and the aggrieved 
party forgoes it or the execution of the sentence is in 
any way found to be inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Syariah, the judge is bound to order the payment of 
diyat, unless the aggrieved party decides to forgo this as 
well. In such a situation, the judge may impose ta'zir. 
In Malaysia, all the Pardons Boards operate on 
the same principle, which is according to civil law. 
Under the civil law, in view of the provisions of Article 
42 of the Constitution, the Yang di Pertuan rtgong or the 
Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri has the powers to grant 
pardons in respect of crimes, which, under Islamic Law, 
Heads of State would have no power to pardon. Such crimes 
are hudud, and diyat. As such, there are 
inconsistencies with the Syariah law whenever the sentence 
of a Muslim man or woman who has committed a hudud or a 
gisas crime is altered in any way, what more if he or she 
is eventually granted a pardon. 
34. See Chapter VI.
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As far as Ta'zir is concerned, the state is 
empowered to lay down rules and regulations. The breach 
of such rules will entail sanctions that are at the 
discretion of the head of state. 
In Malaysia, the Yang di Pertuan Agong or Sultan 
or Yang Di Pertuan Besar, as head of the state would have 
the power to lay down the rules and impose punishment in 
Ta'zir offences. So far only the State of Kelantan has 
laid down such rules through the enactment of the Kelantan 
Syariah Criminal Code, 1985. 35 The offences laid down in 
the Code are all Ta'zir offences. The granting of pardon 
to these offences lie in the hands of the Sultan of 
Kelantan. 
It is provided: 36
1. When any person has been sentenced to 
punishment for an offence His Royal Highness
the Sultan (acting in accordance with the 
provisions of Article XXVIIA of the Laws of 
the Constitution of Kelantan and Article 42 
of the Federal Constitution) may at any 
time, without conditions, or 
conditions which 
accepts, suspend 
the 
the 
person 
execution 
upon any 
sentenced 
of his 
sentence or remit the whole or any part of 
the punishment 
sentenced. 
to which he has been 
35. Enactment No. 2 of 1985 (hereinafter, the Code).
36. Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment, 1983 (No. 9 of
1983), s. 135.
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2. 'Whenever an application is made to His Royal
Highness the Sultan for the suspension or
remission of a sentence His Royal Highness
the Sultan may require the convicting Qadhi
Besar or Qadhi to state his opinion as to
whether the application should be granted or
refused and such Qadhi Besar or Qadhi shall
state his opinion accordingly.
3. If any condition on which a sentence has
been suspended or remitted is, in the
opinion of His Royal Highness the Sultan, 
not fulfilled, His Royal Highness the Sultan 
may cancel such suspension or remission, 
whereupon the person in whose favour the 
sentence has been suspended or remitted may, 
if at large, be arrested by any police 
officer or Penyelia Ugama without warrant 
and remanded by a Qadhi to undergo the 
unexpired portion of the sentence. 
His Royal Highness the Sultan (acting in accordance wit.h the 
provisions of Article XXVIIA of the Laws of the Constitution of 
Kelantan and Article 42 of the Federal Constitution) may 
without the consent of the person sentenced, commute any one of 
the following sentence for any other mentioned after it 
(a) imprisonment,
(b) fine.37
37. Ibid, s. 136.
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In all the States in Malaysia, it does not seem 
that pardons according to Islam is really being 
implemented. This is mainly because the Muslims who have 
committed crimes are still subject to the civil law of the 
land, and not Islamic criminal law. 
However, as far as Ta'zir crimes are concerned, 
the Syariah Courts do have jurisdiction over some criminal 
matters. The pardoning power of these crimes lies with 
the Ruler of the State and this pardon would be consistent 
with the teachings of Islam. 
CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICS 
As stated earlier,1 the types of punishments that
usually reach the Pardons Board for appeal are death 
sentences, imprisonment for natural life and life 
imprisonment. 
This chapter will focus on statistical findings 
as regards the number of appeals that have been made to 
the various Pardons Boards in the country from 1 January 
1970 to 31st July, 1988. Appeals against death sentences 
are submitted persuant to convictions under section 57(1) 
Internal Security Act, 1960, sections 3 and 3A Firearms 
(Increased Penalties) Act, 1971, sections 39B Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1952, sections 302 and 396 of the Penal Code and 
section 3(1) Kidnapping Act 1961. 
1. See Chapter III.
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All of the above-stated sections impose mandatory 
death sentence, the exceptions being section 396 of the 
Penal Code and section 3(1) Kidnapping Act 1961. The 
death sentence is the maximum punishment under these two 
sections.2 
(a) Death Sentences
(i) Section 57(1), Internal Security Act 1960
This section reads:
(1) Any person who without lawful excuse,
the onus of proving which shall be on
that person, in any security area
carries or has in his possession or
under his control
(a) any firearm without
authority thereforf; or 
(b) any ammunition or 
lawful 
explosive
without lawful authority therefor,
shall be guilty of an offence and
shall, on conviction, be punished
with death.
2. The writer could only obtain statistics with regard to 
the above-mentioned sections. As such, the total
number of appeals made to the Pardons Board in any one 
period may not be conclusive. They are however to the 
writer's knowledge, accurate insofar as they concern 
the statutes above. 
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Table 3.1 
Death sentence under section 57(1) 
Internal Security Act 1960, 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
A 
3 
1 
3 
43 
1 
3 
14 
9 
6 
7 
4 
6 
5 
1987 3 
1988 2 
zero 
B 
3 
1 
2 
36 
1 
3 
14 
7 
6 
7 
4 
6 
3 
C D 
2 
16 
1 
3 
11 
5 
5 
7 
3 
5 
1 
E 
1 
1 
F 
1 
20 
3 
2 
1 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
2 
A Number of prisoners originally sentenced to death. 
B Number of appeals to the Pardons Board 
C Number of prisoners who received pardon and were 
released 
D Number of prisoners whose sentences remained and 
were hanged to death (not according to the year they 
were hanged) 
E Number of sentences that were commuted to 
imprisonment for natural life by the Yang di Pertuan 
Agong 
F Number of sentences that were commuted to life 
imprisonment by the Yang di Pertuan Agong 
G Number of sentences that were commuted to a term of 
imprisonment by the Yang di Pertuan Agong 
H Number of sentences that were commuted and detained 
at the pleasure of the Yang di Pertuan Agong 
I number of sentences awaiting decision from the 
Pardons Board 
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It will be noticed that the number of prisoners 
that have been sentenced to death (column A) do not, in 
all cases, equate the number that appealed to the Board, 
(column B). There are three reasons for this. 
Firstly, if the death sentence was passed by a 
High Court, upon appeal to the Federal or Supreme Court 
the sentence and conviction may have been quashed, 
therefore there is no need to appeal to the Pardons Board 
anymore. Secondly, an appeal from the High Court may have 
resulted with the sentence being reduced to imprisonment 
for natural life, life imprisonment or a term of 
imprisonment. In this situation, an appeal may still be 
made to the Pardons Board but it will not be included in 
this table since it is no longer an appeal from a death 
sentence. Thirdly, an appeal may not have been made, the 
sole reason being the case is too recent. 
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No one who appealed to the Pardons Board received 
a pardon from the Ruler or Yang di Pertuan Agong, as the 
case may be.3 It seems that the Yang di Pertuan Agong is
loath to grant a pardon unless there are exceptional 
circumstances. The fact that the prisoner is repentant, 
which can be seen from the contents of the letter of 
petition sent to the Yang di Pertuan Agong or Ruler,4 is
obviously not exceptional enough to warrant a pardon. 
3. 
4. 
Before 5.10.1975, offences under the Internal Security 
Act 1960 were under state jurisdiction, which means 
that the Ruler of the State has the power to grant 
pardons and reprieves in respect of these offences. 
See Appendix I and III. 
number of 
appeals 
to the 
Pardons 
Board 
JS 
JO 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
5 
10 
15 
20 
Number who 
were hanged 
to death 
(not 
according 
to the 
year in 
which they 
were hanged) 
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Bar-chart 3.1 
Number of appeals where the de�th sentences remained and 
prisoners were hanged to death from 
1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
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Out of 93 prisoners who appealed to the Pardons 
Board, 59 appeals were unsuccessful in that the death 
sentences remained. This means that about 63% of appeals 
were unsucc_essful, thus only confirming the reluctance of 
the Yang di Pertuan Agong to grant a pardon. 
Only 2 sentences, that is, 2% were commuted to 
imprisonment for.natural life, in 1970 and 1972. 
Bar-chart 3.2 
Number of prisoners whose sentences of death 
were commuted to life imprisonment 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
Number of 
appeals to 
the Pardons 
Board JS 
30 
25 
20 
lS 
10 
:S 
s 
10 
lS 
20 
Number of 
sentences 
connuted 
to life 
imprisonment 
year 
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The reluctance of the Yang di Pertuan Agong to 
alter a death sentence is very much 
Q 
tempered 
one. of 
to 
;,. 
life 
with regards 
to commuting death 
f... 
sentence imprisonment. 
Compared to the previous bar- charts, it is clear that in 
this particular area the Yang di Pertuan Agong is more 
lenient. Out of the 93 appeals made, 28 sentences, that 
is 30% were commuted to life imprisonment. 
All through the years from 1970 to 1988, only one 
death sentence was commuted to a term of imprisonment, 
which constitutes about 1% of the total number of 
appeals. Similarly, only 1% of the death sentence was 
commuted to detention at the pleasure of the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong, which was in 1977. 3% of the appeals are 
still awaiting decision from the Pardons Board. 
thus: 
At a glance, the whole situation can be pictured 
Pie-Ol&rt J.l 
esult of appeals against death sentence under 
tion 57(1) Internal Security Act, 1960, 
frma 1.1.1970 to Jl.7.1988 
63?. - appeals unsuccessful and 
the prisoners have al­
ready been hanged 
Jo: - death sentence convnuted 
to sentence to life im­
prisonment 
JS - pending decision of the 
Pardons Board 
Z: - death sentence commuted 
to sentence of imprison­
ment for natural life 
lS - death sentence commuted 
to sentence of a term of 
imprisonment 
IS - death sentence commuted 
to detention at the 
pleasure of the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong 
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It seems that the result of appeals mainly falls 
into either one of the two bigger categories, which is, 
the appeal being unsuccessful and therefore the prisoner 
concerned will be hanged; or his death sentence is 
commuted to life imprisonment, which is imprisonment for 
twenty years.5 Upon remission of one-third of the 
sentence,6 a prisoner would be left with thirteen and a 
half years of imprisonment. Compared to the original 
sentence of death, a commutation to a sentence of life 
imprisonment, which at the end of the day entails 
imprisonment for a little over thirteen years is just as 
"good" as getting a pardon. 
(ii) Sections 3 and 3A, Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act
1971
Section 3 reads: 
Any person who at the time of his committing 
or attempting to commit or abetting the 
commission of a scheduled offence discharges 
a firearm with intent to cause death or hurt 
to any person, shall, notwithstanding that 
no hurt is caused thereby, be punished with 
death. 
5. Criminal Justice Act, 1954 (Act 345), s 3.
6. The Prisons Rules, 1953, rule 43(a).
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Section 3A reads: 
Where, with intent to cause death or hurt to 
any person, a firearm is discharged by any 
person at the time of his committing or 
attempting to commit or abetting the 
commission of a scheduled offence, each of 
his accomplices in respect of the offence 
present at the scene of the commission or 
attempted commission or abetment thereof who 
may reasonably be presumed to have known 
that such person was carrying or had in his 
possession or under his custody or control 
the firearm shall, notwithstanding that no 
hurt is caused by the discharge thereof, be 
punished with death, unless he proves that 
he had taken all reasonable steps to prevent 
the discharge. 
In the years of 1972, 1977 and 1984, the number 
of appeals made are fewer compared to the number of 
prisoners originally sentenced to death. In 1972 the 
death sentence was quashed by the Federal Court. 
Similarly in 1977, two of the death sentences were quashed 
by the Federal Court. In 1984, the sentences of death 
were reduced to sentences of imprisonment for natural life. 
As for 1987 and 1988, no record of appeals having 
been made was available at the material time. 
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Table 3.2 
Death sentence under sections 3 and 3A of the 
Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act, 1971 
from 1.1.70 to 31.7.1988 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
A 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
6 
2 
denotes zero. 
B 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
C D 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
E F 
1 
A number of appeals to the Pardons Board 
B number of appeals to the Pardons Board 
G H I 
C number of prisoners who received pardon and were 
released 
D number of prisoners whose sentences remained and 
were hanged to death (not according to the year they 
were hanged) 
E number of sentences that were commuted to a sentence 
of imprisonment for natural life by the Sultan or 
Ruler 
F number of sentences that were commuted to a sentence 
of life imprisonment by the Sultan or Ruler 
G number of sentences that were commuted to a term of 
imprisonment by the Sultan or Ruler 
H number of sentences that were commuted to detention 
at the pleasure of the Sultan or Ruler 
I number of sentences awaiting decision from the 
Pardons Board. 
Number 
of 
appeals 
made 
to 
the 
Pardons 
Board 
J 
2 
1 
Number of 
2 
sentences 
remained 
end were 
eubsequentl y 
hanged 
to death 
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Bar-chart 3.3 
N\,Ullber of appeals where the sentences remained 
and prisoners were hanged to death, 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 198 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
year 
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Out of 13 appeals, 12 were unsuccessful. The 
death sentences remained and the prisoners were hanged to 
death, which means that 92% of appeals remained unchanged. 
Only 1 out of the 13 appeals was commuted to a 
sentence of imprisonment for natural life, constituting 8% 
of the total number of appeals. 
At a glance the position may be summarised thus 
Pie-chart 3.2 
Results of appeals against death sentence under 
section 3 and 3A Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act, 1971, 
to the various states Pardons Boards 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
92S 
appeals 
WJSUCCeSS:;;fu:;;1 --�.,L..--
a: 
sentences 
caauted to 
i"1risoramt 
for 
natural life 
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The conclusion derived from this chart is that 
the States' Pardons Boards so far "dismissed" the appeals, 
with the exception of one appeal where the sentence was 
commuted to a sentence of imprisonment for the natural 
life of the prisoner. The reluctance to change the 
original sentence may be due to the seriousness of the 
crime committed, as well as the Pardons Boards not finding 
any grounds to reduce the death sentences. 
(a)(iii) Section 39B, Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 
Section 39B reads: 
(1) No person shall, on his own behalf or
on behalf of any other person, whether
or not such other person is in Malaysia
(a) traffic in a dangerous drug;
(b) offer to traffic in a dangerous
drugs; or
(c) do or offer to do an act
preparatory to or for the purpose
of trafficking in a dangerous drug.
(2) Any person who contravenes any of the
provisions of subsection (1) shall be
guilty of an offence against this act
and shall be punished on conviction 
with death. 
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Table 3.3 
Death sentence wider sections 39B of the 
Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952 from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
zero. 
A 
4 
7 
12 
12 
10 
27 
32 
42 
39 
27 
B 
4 
7 
12 
11 
10 
21 
12 
10 
C D 
4 
7 
12 
8 
10 
19 
5 
5 
E F 
3 
1 
G H I 
2 
7 
4 
A number of prisoners originally sentenced to death 
B number of appeals to the Pardons Board 
C number of prisoners who received pardon and were 
released 
D number of prisoners whose sentences remained and 
were hanged to death (not according to the year they 
were hanged) 
E number of sentences commuted to imprisonment for 
natural life by the Sultan or Ruler. 
F number of sentences commuted to life imprisonment by 
the Sultan or Ruler 
G number of sentences commuted to a term of 
imprisonment by the Sultan or Ruler 
H number of sentences commuted to detention at the 
pleasure of the Sultan or Ruler 
I number of sentences awaiting decision from the 
Pardons Board. 
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From 1984 to 1988, the difference in number 
between the original number sentenced to death (column A) 
and the number who appealed to the Pardons Board (column 
B) is rather marked. Especially from 1985 to 1988, the
great difference is due to the fact that most of the 
sentences were waiting for the result of appeals to the 
Supreme Court. That is why, the number of appeals to the 
Pardons Board is very low, as most of the cases have not 
exhausted all the legal channels at the time. 
Number of 
appeals 
made to 
the Pardons 
Board 
20 
15 
10 
5 
5 
10 
15 
20 
Number of 
appeals 
whereby the 
sentences 
remained 
and 
prisoners 
were hanged 
to death 
Bar-chart 3.4 
Number of appeals where the sentences remained, and 
prisoners were hanged to death, 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
year 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197B 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
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In 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1983, all the appeals 
failed. In 1982, out of 11 appeals made, 3 were commuted 
to life imprisonment and the rest were all unsuccessful. 
In 1986, only 1 out of 10 appeals were commuted to life 
imprisonment. 5 appeals were unsuccessful and the 
remaining 4 are still awaiting the decision 
relevant Pardons Board. 
of the 
In 1984, 19 out of 21 appeals were unsuccessful. 
2 appeals are still awaiting decision. In 1986, out of 12 
appeals, 5 were unsuccessful and 7 are still awaiting the 
decision of the Pardons Board. 
Pie-chart 3.3 
Result of appeals against death sentence 
under section 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952, 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
so: 
appeals 
15: 
pending 
decision of 
Pardons 
Board 
C01aUted to 
life illlprisoraent 
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Out of the total of 87 appeals made to the 
various States' Pardons Boards throughout 1970 to 1988, 70 
were unsuccessful which resulted in the prisoners being 
hanged. This constitutes. 80% of the total number of 
appeals. Only 4 death sentences were commuted to life 
imprisonment, which is 5% of the total number of appeals. 
13 appeals are still awaiting the decision of the Pardons 
Board, constituting 15% of the total sum. 
Again, as in the previous pie-charts, the biggest 
percentage is that whereby the sentences remain unaltered. 
(a)(iv) Section 302 of the Penal Code (F.M.S. Cap. 45) 
Section 302 reads: 
Whoever commits murder shall be 
with death. 
punished 
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Table 3.4 
Death sentence under section 302 of the Penal Code 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
zero. 
A 
11 
4 
11 
1 
3 
7 
7 
6 
5 
3 
3 
3 
6 
12 
5 
6 
6 
8 
B 
2 
4 
6 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
6 
11 
2 
4 
1 
C D 
2 
3 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
2 
5 
8 
2 
3 
E 
1 
1 
1 
1 
F 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
G 
1 
1 
H I 
1 
1 
1 
A number of prisoners originally sentenced to death 
B number of appeals to the Pardons Board 
C number of prisoners who received pardon and were 
released 
D number of prisoners whose sentences remained and 
were hanged to death (not according to the year 
they were hanged) 
E number of sentences commuted to imprisonment for 
natural life by the Sultan or Ruler. 
F number of sentences commuted to life imprisonment 
by the Sultan or Ruler 
G number of sentences commuted to a term of 
imprisonment by the Sultan or Ruler 
H number of sentences commuted to detention at the 
pleasure of the Sultan or Ruler 
I number of sentences awaiting decision from the 
Pardons Board. 
Number of 
appeals 
made to 
the 
Pardons 
Board 
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In 1981, 2 appeals were made to the Pardons 
Board. (column B). Both appeals failed (column D) and 
one of the prisoners concerned appealed again, which 
resulted in the death sentence being commuted to 
imprisonment for natural life. This explains why, out of 
2 appeals m_ade, there were 'three decisions" (columns D 
and E). 
The different figures in columns A and B, as in 
all the other tables above, is due to several reasons; 
such as the original death sentence being quashed upon 
appeal to the Federal or Supreme Court, or the death 
sentence was substituted for a lesser sentence or due to 
the death of the prisoners before any appeals to the 
Pardons Board could be made. These reasons are the same 
for all subsequent tables. 
10 
Bar-chart 3.5 
Number of appeals where the sentences remained 
and prisoners were hanged to death 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
Number of 
appeals 
where the 
sentences 
remained and 
prisoners 
were hanged 
to death 
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Here again, in almost every year, there will be 
unsuccessful appeals. In the years 1970, 1981 and 1984, 
the percentage of unsuccessful appeals was 100%. In the 
other years the majority of appeals were also unsuccessful. 
23: 
Pie-chart 3.4 
Result of appeals against death sentence 
under section 302 of the Penal Code, 
from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
emailed to life 
teI'II of 
iJllprisonaent 
63: 
appeals 
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Out of the total of 56 who appealed, 35 appeals 
failed, constituting 5%. 13 sentences were commuted to 
life imprisonment, which is 23% being successful and 2 
sentences were commuted to a term of imprisonment, 
constituting 4% and the remaining 5%, that is, 3 appeals 
are still awaiting decision. 
The statistics appearing below are for death 
sentences which are not mandatory, but operating only as a 
maximum sentence. 
(a)(v) Section 396 of the Penal Code (F.M.S. Cap 45) 
Section 396 reads: 
If any one of five or more persons, who are 
conjointly committing gang-robbery, commits 
murder in so committing gang-robbery, every 
one of those persons shall be punished with 
death or imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to twenty years, and, where the 
punishment is not death, shall also be 
liable to whipping. 
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For this section, information is only available 
for the year of 1986. In 1986, 3 people were sentenced to 
death and all three appealed to the Pardons Board. All 
three sentences were commuted to imprisonment for 20 years. 
(a)(vi) Section 3(1), Kidnapping Act 1961 
Section 3(1) reads: 
Whoever, with intent to hold any person for 
ransom, abducts or wrongfully confines or 
wrongfully restrains such person shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall be punished 
on conviction with death or imprisonment for 
life and shall, if he is not sentenced to 
death, also be liable to whipping. 
Under this section, it is only for the year of 
1985 that statistics were obtainable. In 1985, one person 
was sentenced to death under the section. Upon appeal to 
the Pardons Board, the appeal was rejected and the 
prisoner was subsequently hanged. 
7. The Pardons Board involved is the Pardons Board of
Sarawak. The commutation to 20 years is not referred
to as life imprisonment because in Sarawak life
imprisonment means what we know as imprisonment for
natural life. This is because the Criminal Justice
Act, 1953 is not extended to East Malaysia.
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Summary 
Table 3.5 
Total number of death sentences, appeals to Pardons Boards 
and the results thereof from 1.1.1970 to 31.1.1988 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
zero. 
A 
14 
4 
13 
1 
4 
7 
10 
52 
6 
13 
25 
26 
27 
30 
38 
45 
57 
56 
31 
B 
5 
4 
7 
1 
2 
2 
4 
41 
4 
13 
24 
23 
26 
29 
27 
23 
18 
C D 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
20 
3 
9 
20 
21 
21 
26 
24 
14 
7 
E 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
F 
1 
2 
1 
2 
21 
1 
2 
4 
2 
5 
2 
1 
1 
G 
1 
1 
1 
3 
H 
1 
I 
1 
2 
9 
7 
A total number of death sentences originally passed 
B total number of appeals made to the various Pardons 
Board 
C total number of those who received pardon 
D total number of unsuccessful appeals, and the 
prisoners were subsequently hanged (not according to 
the year they were hanged) 
E total number of death sentences that were commuted 
to imprisonment for natural life 
F total number of death sentences that were commuted 
to life imprisonment 
G total number of death sentences that were commuted 
to a term of imprisonment 
H total number of death sentences that were commuted 
to detention at the pleasure of the Yang di Pertuan 
Agong or Ruler 
I total number of death sentences awaiting decision 
from the Pardons Boards. 
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In 1981, 23 appeals were made to the various 
Pardons Boards. Two sentences were commuted to life
imprisonment and 21 other sentences remained the same. A 
second appeal was made by one of the prisoners and his 
death sentence was later commuted to a sentence of 
imprisonment for natural life. 
Pie-chart 3.5 
Result of all appeals against death sentences that 
have been passed, from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988 
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Altogether, 253 appeals, were made to the various 
Pardons Boards from 1.1.1970 to 31.7.1988. Out of this 
figure, 176 were unsuccessful and the prisoners were 
subsequently hanged, constituting 70% of the total number 
of appeals; 7 appeals had their death sentences commuted 
to imprisonment for natural life, constituting 3%. Fo�+ypv� 
sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, which is 18% 
and 1%, that is 3 sentences were commuted to a term of 
imprisonment. 7.5% of the appeals, that is 19 appeals, 
are still awaiting the decision from the various Pardons 
Boards, while 1 death sentence so far, constituting 0.5%, 
was commuted to detention at the pleasure of the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong. 
The conclusion derived from the tables and charts 
above is that in most cases, the original death sentence 
would remain unchanged. In cases where the death 
sentences were commuted to a lesser sentence, the majority 
is commutation to life imprisonment, followed by 
commutation to imprisonment of natural life. 
Those whose sentences were commuted to life 
imprisonment would gain the most. Not only were their 
sentences altered from death to twenty years' 
imprisonment, but upon remission, those prisoners would be 
released after serving about thirteen and a half years of 
imprisonment. Therefore in effect their commutation would 
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be, from a sentence of death to thirteen and a half years 
of imprisonment. It is equivalent to getting "two 
commutations." It seems therefore, that there may be 
instances where the remission system results in a 
situation that is unintentional and probably totally 
undesired. A remission on its own is already a process of 
'automatic pardon' - the word 'pardon' here being used in 
the loose sense. Maybe if the prisoners concerned are not 
making any appeals to any Pardons Board, the remission 
system is justified; to serve as an incentive to prisoners 
to maintain good conduct and the like, as a remission may 
be lost upon bad conduct. But in cases where the 
sentences are severe, such as death sentences, 
imprisonment for natural life and life imprisonment, the 
prisoners are bound to make an appeal to a Pardons Board. 
Should their original sentences be commuted to life 
imprisonment or a term of imprisonment, because of the· 
remission system, the actual number of years that they 
have to spend in prison would be a few years fewer than 
was intended by the Pardons Board which commuted the 
original sentence. 
Thus it is suggested that for sentences that is 
the result of a commutation, the one-third remission 
should not apply, as this would defeat the whole purpose 
of the commutation. In this regard, a new provision or 
amendment may be necessary in the Prisons Rules of 1953. 
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(b) Imprisonment for natural life
(b) ( i) Internal Security Act 1960 
In 1972, a death sentence was passed for a 
conviction under section 57(1). Upon appeal, this 
sentence was commuted to imprisonment for natural life on 
the 21.8.1973 by the High Court of Sibu. Upon appeal to 
the Pardons Board, the Yang di Pertua Negeri of Sarawak 
granted a pardon and the prisoner was released on 
1.7.1980. Thereafter, no one else has been sentenced to 
imprisonment for natural life. 
(b)(ii) Section 4 and 5 of the 
Penalties) Act, 1971 
Section 4 reads: 
Firearms (Increased 
Any person who at the time of his committing 
or attempting to commit or abetting the 
commission of a scheduled offence or robbery 
exhibits a firearm in a manner likely to put 
any person in fear of death or hurt shall be 
punished with imprisonment for life and with 
whipping with not less than six strokes. 
Section 5 reads: 
Any person who at the time of his committing 
or attempting to commit or abetting the 
commission of a scheduled offence has on his 
person a firearm shall be punished with 
imprisonment for life and with whipping with 
not less than six strokes. 
8. 
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Table 3.6 
Imprisonment for natural life under sections 4 and 5
of the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act, 1971 
from 1.1.1974 to 31.7.19888 
Year A B C D E F 
1974 1 1 1 
1975 2 1 1 1 
1976 8 5 2 3 3 
1977 1 1 
1978 6 1 1 5 
1979 11 3 2 1 8 
1980 6 6 
1981 4 1 4 
1982 6 1 1 5 
1983 8 8 
1984 8 1 1 7 
1985 6 6 
1986 6 6 
1987 7 7 
1988 4 4 
zero 
A Number of prisoners serving imprisonment for 
natural life 
B Number of prisoners who appealed to the Pardons 
Board 
C Number who received pardon and were released 
D Number who did not receive pardon and sentence 
remained 
E 
F 
Some 
were 
imprisonment Number of sentences commuted to life 
i.e. 20 years by the Pardons Board.
Number of prisoners that are
sentence without appealing to the
serving their 
Pardons Board, 
or committed 
Supreme Court 
or died, or escaped from prison 
suicide, or pending appeal from the 
and others. 
of those who served natural life imprisonment 
initially sentenced to death. On appeal, the 
sentence of· death was later substituted to 
imprisonment for natural life by the Federal or 
Supreme Court. In some cases, the original death 
sentences were commuted to imprisonment for natural 
life upon appeal to the Pardons Board. 
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The total number of prisoners serving 
imprisonment for natural life is shown in Column A. 
However, these figures are not accurate, in the sense that 
the figures do not represent the number of prisoners 
originally sentenced to imprisonment for natural life. 
The main reason for this is probably because not many are 
tried and found guilty under these two sections. Thus in 
column B, which denotes the number of prisoners who 
appealed to a Pardons Board, it seems that most of the 
prisoners do not appeal. In actual fact, this is not so, 
since some of the sentences in column A are as the result 
of commutations by various Pardons Boards. 
In 1981, one prisoner appealed to the Pardons 
Board, but the Board refused to consider the appeal as 
they were of the opinion that it was too early to consider 
any appeal from the particular prisoner. Therefore a 
Pardons Board has the power to even refuse to ::onsider an 
appeal should it elect to do so. In this particular 
instance, the date of sentence was 28.12.1981 and the date 
of appeal to a Pardons Board was 30.6.1986. There is a 
lapse of about four and a half-years from the date of 
sentence before an appeal to a Pardons Board was made. 
This could be due to waiting for the result of appeal to 
the Supreme Court. It is rather strange that the reason 
given for the Pardon's Board's refusal to consider the 
appeal was because it was 'too early' to be considered. 
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According to rule Jll(I) of the Prisons Rules, 1953; 9 a
prisoner may petition to a Pardons Board on the completion 
of one year of his sentence and a second such petition is 
allowed when a prisoner has completed three years from the 
date of conviction. Therefore if a prisoner has been 
serving his sentence for four years, as in the present 
case, theoretically he could have petitioned the Pardons 
Board twice. 
In the instant case, the prisoner had already 
served four and a-half years of his sentence. It 
therefore cannot be too early for his appeal to be 
considered if rule Y,I(I) above is applied. 
On the other hand, as already mentioned above, 
the original sentence may have been passed by a High Court 
and upon 
upheld. 
appeal 
It is 
to the 
possible 
Supreme Court, the sentence was 
that the Pardons Board was
referring to the lapse of time between the decision of the 
Supreme Court and the date of appeal to the Pardons Board; 
as making the appeal too early to be considered. But this 
presumption is contradictory to the wording of rule i'(l) 
of the Prisons Rules 1953. Moreover this interpretation 
cannot have been the intention of rule ;n. 
9. Hereinafter referred to as rule III(I).
It is clear 
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that the right to petition arises after a prisoner has 
served one year of his sentence, which means a year from 
the date of conviction, not from the date the sentence is 
confirmed, assuming 
Court and an appeal 
However, 
that the sentence was passed by 
Su..bS«\_t4..U\..fly 
was made to the Supreme Court. 
/.. 
a High 
there is an anomaly in rule III(!) 
itself. Any petition to any Pardons Board can only be 
made when all legal remedies have been exhausted. 
Therefore by providing a prisoner with the right to 
petition after the completion of one year of his sentence, 
when most probably he is still awaiting the result of an 
appeal to the Supreme Court, is pointless. As such it is 
felt that the wordings in rule I I should be changed. If 
there is to be any bar at all, maybe the one-year period 
should begin from the date of decision of the highest 
court in the land. In this way, a prisoner would be 
subject to a one-year bar upon the exhaustion of all legal 
remedies before any appeal can be made to a Pardons Board. 
But it is difficult to see the justification for 
imposing a time limit before a prisoner can appeal to a 
Pardons Board. If the reason is to ensure that the 
prisoner is repentant before he appeals, the argument 
against this is that whilst waiting for the outcome of his 
appeal to the Supreme Court, he had ample time for 
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repentance. As such, as soon as the Supreme Court reaches 
its decision, the right to petition should arise. If 
there is to be any restriction at all, it should be 
directed to what types of sentences or offences that are 
appeallable to the Pardons Board. It is suggested that 
only prisoners who are serving a substantial number of 
years are eligible to petition, for instance, after 
remission, he still has 5 years to serve. 
No data is available with regards to imprisonment 
for natural life under other statutes. 
Pie-chart 3.6 
Result of appeals against sentences of imprisonment for 
natural life from 1.1.1974 to 31.7.1988 
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{) 
Fo\.\rf c.e,.¥1 appeals were made to various Pardons Boards 
and 8, constituting 57% sentences remained the same. Five 
sentences, which is 36% were commuted to life imprisonment 
and 1 appeal was not considered, which is the remaining 7% 
of the total percentage. 
Summary 
In short, the position is the same as for death 
sentences, in that most appeals to the Pardons Board are 
unsuccessful. However, the difference is that in 
imprisonment for natural life, not as many appeals are 
made to the Pardons Boards. This is probably because 
under death sentences, the appeals were 'automatic', as 
explained earlier whereas for other sentences, the 
prisoners are subject to a one-year bar before they could 
appeal and even then, it is optional. Quite a large 
percentage of sentences were commuted to life imprisonment 
as compared with the same situation where appeals were 
made against death sentences, as seen above. But the 
common factor is that the majority� of appeals were 
unsuccessful. 
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(c) Life imprisonment
According to the available records, petitions to 
the Yang di Pertuan Agong or Ruler as the case may be, 
against sentences of life imprisonment are usually made as 
a result of convictions under section 58(1) Internal 
Security Act, 1960 and section 6B Dangerous Drugs Act, 
1952. 
(c)(i) Section 58(1), Internal Security Act 1960 
Section 58(1) reads 
Any person who in any security area consorts 
with or is found in the company of another 
person who is carrying or has in his 
possession or under his control any 
fire-arm, ammunition or explosive in 
contravention of section 57, in 
circumstances which raise a reasonable 
presumption that he intends, or is aboJt, to 
act, or has recently acted, with that other 
person in a manner prejudicial to public 
security or the maintenance of public order 
shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on 
conviction, be punished with deathor with 
imprisonment for life. 
Under this section, information was only 
available for the year of 1977, where originally 25 
persons were sentenced to life imprisonment. Upon appeal 
to the Federal Court, one sentence was changed and reduced 
to a term of imprisonment. Out of the 24 prisoners 
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serving life sentences in 1977, 10 were released on the 
twenty-fifth year of Independence, which was on 
31.8.1982. Incidentally, a total of 279 prisoners who 
were serving terms for petty offences were released from 
prisons under a general amnesty on this date.10 
It seems that it was quite common for some 
prisoners who only had a few more years to serve in 
prison, to be released on certain occasions such as the 
birthdays of the Yang di Pertuan Agong or Ruler, or on 
Independence Day. For instance 93 prisoners throughout 
Malaysia, namely in the states of Johor, Pahang, Kelantan, 
Perak, Melaka, Pulau Pinang and Negeri Sembilan 
released on the tenth anniversary of Independence.11 
(c)(ii) Section 6B, Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 
Section SB(l) reads -
No person shall 
(a) either on his own behalf or on behalf
of any other person, plant or cultivate
any plant from which raw opium, coca
leaves, poppy-straw or cannabis may be
obtained either directly or indirectly;
10. The News Straits Times, 2.9.1982.
were 
11. The Straits Times, 31.8.1967. It is also common for
the Sultans to grant a pardon to prisoners on their
birthdays. Normally this would only be to those
prisoners who would only have a few months more to
completely she their term of imprisonment.
� 
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(b) allow any plant, from which raw opium,
coca leaves, poppy-straw or cannabis
may be obtained either directly or
indirectly, to be planted or cultivated
by some other person on land owned or
occupied by him or in any receptacle on
such land; or
(c) allow any plant, from which raw opium,
coca leaves, poppy-straw or cannabis
may be obtained either directly or 
indirectly, planted or cultivated by 
some other person on land owned or 
occupied by him or in any receptacle on 
such land, to remain on such land or in 
such receptacle. 
Section 6B(3) reads 
Any person who contravenes the provisions of 
this section shall be guilty of an offence 
against this Act and shall be punished on 
conviction with imprisonment for life and 
with whipping of not less than six strokes. 
From 1976 to 1988, 354 persons were originally 
sentenced to life imprisonment. Only 4 appeals were made 
to the Pardons Board, 1 in 1976, which appeal was rejected 
and the prisoner is now still serving his sentence. The 3 
other appeals were made in 1979. The result is that for 
two appeals, the sentences were reduced to a term of 
imprisonment and one prisoner was granted a pardon. In 
this particular case, the prisoner was granted a special 
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pardon by the Duli Yang Maha Mulia Sultan of Kedah on 17 
June 1982. The prisoner was already 65 years old on the 
date of conviction and was 68 years old upon release. The 
reason why the special pardon was granted was because the 
prisoner could not withstand prison regulations due to her 
age and general health condition. 
Out of 354 sentences of life imprisonment, 40 
convictions were quashed by the Federal or Supreme Court 
and 2 sentences were reduced to a term of imprisonment by 
the Federal or Supreme Court. The remaining 308 prisoners 
are still serving their sentences as at 31.7.1988. 
Pie-chart 3.7 
Result of appeals against sentences of life imprisonment 
under section 6B Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952 
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Out of the total of 4 appeals made, 1 appeal, 
constituting 25%, was rejected, 2, that is 50% were 
commuted to a sentence of a term of imprisonment and the 
remaining 1 or 25% was granted a special pardon. 
persons 
statues. 
Summary 
No materials 
sentenced to 
are available with 
imprisonment for life 
regards to 
under other 
There is no record of whether the remaining 14 
prisoners who were serving a sentence of life imprisonment 
in 1977, made any petitions to the Yang di Pertuan Agong. 
As for sentences of life imprisonment under 
section 6B, Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952, only 25% of appeal 
were unsuccessful and 50% of the sentences were commuted 
to a term of imprisonment. There is a significant 
difference here from the previous conclusions pertaining 
to those appealing against death sentences and 
imprisonment for natural life, where the largest 
percentage was those where the appeals were unsuccessful. 
In this instance, not only was the percentage of 
commutations larger, a pardon was also granted. 
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If the results of appeals to the various Pardons 
Boards, against all three sentences were put together, one 
will detect a pattern whereby as the sentences get less 
severe, the percentage of appeals who received 
commutations also increased. It is as though the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong or Ruler, as well as other members of the 
I 
Pardons Board are more enient the less severe the original 
sentence is. 
In the absence of any reasons or explanations, 
and with due respect to all members of the Pardons Boards, 
this 'trend' is rather puzzling. One would have thought 
that if there is to be any leniency practised, it would be 
directed to the more severe sentences and not otherwise. 
This is because if a person who is sentenced to life 
imprisonment appeals to the Pardons Board and the appeal 
was unsuccessful, which therefore means that the prisoner 
has to spend about 40 months in prison, (that is, after 
remission he will be released after 40 months). By not 
receiving a commutation from the Yang di-Pertuam Agong or 
Ruler, this may well be good in that the time spent in 
prison will actually rehabilitate the prisoner so that by 
the time he is released from prison he has really turned 
over a new leaf. 
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Of course the situation is entirely different for 
a prisoner who is facing a death sentence. An
unsuccessful appeal to the Pardons Board would cost him 
his life. Then again, it is arguable whether by granting 
him a commutation, to say, life imprisonment, which 
therefore means he will be free after 40 months in 
prison, he will be rehabilitated.12 Suppose his death 
sentence was commuted to imprisonment for natural life 
is it better for him to live in confinement for the rest 
of his life or to die? While these are pertinent 
questions, they fall outside the ambit of the present 
dissertation. 
12. The Report of the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, 1949-1953 in England was that the death
sentence had failed as a deterrent in cases of murder
but the deterrent value of the death sentence was 
clearly seen in its effects on professional crimes. 
See also Hans Zeisel, "The Deterrent Effect of 
the Death Penalty: Facts v Faith, in The Death Penalty 
in America (Third Ed) Oxford University Press (1982) 
where upon statistical research he found that the 
death penalty did not deter the commission of crimes 
entailing death sentences. 
CHAPTER V 
THE POYER OF PARDON IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Since Malaysia's 
"borrowed" from English 
legal 
law 
system 
having 
generally is 
regard to its 
historical origin (see earlier discussion - Chapter II) it 
is considered useful to compare the legal provisions 
governing pardon in England. In like manner, India has 
been selected as another country to compare the Malaysian 
position with. India, like Malaysia applies English 
principles of law inherited from its colonial past. 
Moreover, much of Malaysia's constitutional provisions are 
adapted or adopted from the Indian Constitution. 
A. INDIA1 
(a) Legal sources of the power of pardon
The legal source of pardoning power in India lies 
within the provisions of the Constitution of India 
itself. The power of pardon is granted to the President 
and the Governors of the various States. The power of 
pardon has been granted to the President of India by 
article 72, and to the Governors of States, by article 161 
of the Constitution. 
1. See Chitaley & Rao, The Constitution of India; 2nd ed.
Vol 2 pg 798-813, 820-824 and Vol 3 pg 295-299,
303-309. See also M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional
Law; 4th ed. 1987 pg. 87-100, 108-9.
I 35 CL, 
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Article 72 reads as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The President shall 
pardons, reprieves, 
of punishment or to 
commute the sentence 
of any offence -
have the power to grant 
respites or remissions 
suspend, remit or 
of any person convicted 
(a) in all cases where the punishment or
sentence is by a court-martial;
(b) in all cases where the punishment or
sentence is for an offence against any
law relating to a matter to which the
executive power of the Union extends;
(c) in all cases where the sentence is a
sentence of death.
Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) 
shall affect the power conferred by law on 
any officer of the Armed Forces of the Union 
to suspend, remit or commute a sentence 
passed by a Court Martial. 
Nothing in sub-clause (c) of clause (1) 
shall affect the power to suspend, remit or 
commute a sentence of death exercisable by 
the Governor of a State under any law for 
the time being in force. 
Article 161 states: 
The Governor of a State shall have the power to 
grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions 
of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the 
sentence of any person convicted of any offence 
against any law relating to a matter to which the 
executive power of the State extends. 
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(b) Analogous Law
(i) Criminal Procedure Code 1973
Section 32 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, 
1973, (hereinafter referred to as the Code) provides that 
the appropriate Government may, at any time, without 
conditions or upon any conditions which the person 
sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of the sentence 
or remit the whole or any part of the sentence to which he 
has been sentenced. 
Whenever an application is made to the 
appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of 
a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the 
presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the 
conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as 
to whether the application should be granted or refused, 
together with his reasons for such opinion and also to 
forward with the statement of such opinion certified copy 
of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as 
exists. 
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This section applies only to persons sentenced to 
imprisonment. It clearly provides both for remission and 
r suspension of a sentence with or without conditions.
Where a sentence has been suspended without any condition, 
it does not amount to remission. Indisputably, Article 
161 of the Constitution is of much wider latitude enabling 
the Governor to give an unconditional and absolute pardon, 
while section 432 does not empower him to do any such 
thing. 
Section 433 provides that 
Government may, without the consent 
the 
of 
appropriate 
the person 
sentenced commute a sentence of death for any other 
punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code; a sentence 
of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding fourteen years or for fine; a sentence of 
rigorous imprisonment, for simple imprisonment for any 
term to which that person might have been sentenced, or 
for fine; a sentence of simple imprisonment, for fine. 
This section actually incorporates the substance 
of sections 54, 55 and SSA of the Indian Penal Code. 
Under this section too, the Governor can 
sentence of death.2
commute a 
2. See B.B. Mitra, Code of Criminal Procedure, 15th ed.
Calcutta, Debooks Eastern Law House, 1979, pg. 861-69.
(ii) Penal Code
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Under section 54 of the Penal Code it is stated 
that in every case in which the sentence of death shall 
have been passed the appropriate Government may, without 
the consent of the offender, commute the sentence for any 
other sentence provided by the Code. 
provided 
Under section 55 of the Penal Code, it is further 
that in every case in which a sentence of 
imprisonment for life may have been passed, the 
appropriate Government may, without the consent of the 
offender, commute the punishment for imprisonment of 
either description for a term not exceeding fourteen years. 
(c) Scope of Article 72
The powers conferred on the President under this 
Article, though judicial in nature, are to be exercised by 
him in the exercise of executive functions. When the 
President exercises these powers he is not doing so as a 
judicial or quasi-judicial authority and he is not 
required to follow the rules of natural justice by giving 
a hearing to the parties concerned. The power of pardon 
in India and the other allied powers of reprieves, 
suspension of sentence and so forth can be exercised 
during the pendency of a judicial proceeding. 
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The question regarding the basis upon which the 
President's power under Article 72 ought to be exercised 
has cropped up before the Supreme Court in a few cases. 
In Maru Ram v Union of India,3 the Supreme Court
ruled that all public power, including constitutional 
power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or with mala 
fide. Public power which rests on a "high pedestal" has 
to be exercised justly. The court said that though 
considerations for the exercise of power under Article 72 
(the same goes for Article 161) may be "myriad and their 
occasion protean" and would best be left to the 
appropriate government, yet, if in any case the power to 
pardon, commute or remit is exercised on irrational, 
irrelevant, discriminatory or mala fide considerations, 
the courts would intervene if necessary. The Supreme 
Court suggested that the government make rules for its own 
guidance in the exercise of the power of pardon und at the 
same time retaining a large residuary power to meet 
"special situations" or "sudden developments." This will 
avoid the pitfall of discrimination in the exercise of 
this power. The court also clarified that the President 
is to exercise this power on the advice of his Ministers. 
3. 1981 1 sec 107.
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In the most recent case, Kehar Singh v Union of 
India,4 the Supreme Court held that it may not be possible
to lay down any precise and clearly defined guidelines as 
the power under Article 72 is of the widest amplitude. 
The court went on to say it can contemplate myriad kinds 
and categories of cases with facts and situations varying 
from case to case, in which the merits and reasons of 
State may be profoundly assisted by prevailing needs and 
passing time. It is of great significance that the 
function itself enjoys high status in the constitutional 
scheme. 
The Supreme Court also said that in the exercise 
of the power in Article 72, the President is entitled to 
go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has 
been judicially concluded. The President is entitled to 
examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to 
determine for himself whether the case is one deserving 
the grant of the relief falling within that power. He 
can, on scrutiny of the evidence on record in the criminal 
case, come to a conclusion different from that recorded by 
the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed 
on, the accused, and in doing so the President does not 
amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. 
4. 1989 1 sec 204.
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{d) Scope of Article 161 
The powers of the Governor under this Article to 
grant pardons, reprieves, respites and to suspend, remit 
or commute sentences is limited to offences against any 
law relating to matters to which the executive power of 
the State extends under Article 162 of the Constitution. 
The power under the Article is confined to the Governor 
and any provision of law purporting to confer such power 
on any other functionary will be invalid. Just as in 
Article 72, the powers under this Article, though judicial 
. / 
b i� nature are to e exercised by the governor in the 
exercise of executive functions and in exercising the 
power, he is not required to give a hearing to the parties 
in accordance with the rules of natural justice. 
The power of pardon is exercised on the advice of 
the Council r-of Ministe� and the Courts are not competent 
to inquire into the question whether any, and if so what 
advice was tendered by the Ministers.6 The grant of 
pardon too, is not reviewable by the Courts. As was 
stated in the case of K.M. Nanavati v State of Bombay.7: 
5. The Constitution of India, Article 74(1) and 165(1).
6. Ibid, Articles 74(2) and 163(3).
7. AIR 1961 SC 112.
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"the power to grant pardon is essentially 
vested in the head of the executive because 
the judiciary has no mercy jurisdiction.' 
As stated above, the Governor has the power of 
pardon in respect of offences against any law relating to 
a matter to which the executive power of the State 
extends. He has no such power in respect of other 
offences. Therefore, if in any case it is alleged that 
the Governor has exceeded his powers by granting a pardon 
in respect of an offence against any law not relating to a 
matter to which the executive power of the state extends, 
the High Court can inquire into that question and decide 
whether the action taken by him is within the law, even 
though it will not be possible to make any order against 
the Governor personally.a In other words, although the 
exercise of the power of suspension or remission is an 
executive function, it is nevertheless open to the Court 
to go into the question of the legality of the suspension. 
8. The Constitution of India. Article 361 protects the
Governors of States from all criminal and civil
proceedings. In State v Kawas Maneskhaw Nanavati AIR
1960 Born 502(505), it was held that if the action is
illegal and invalid, a fresh process may be issued by
the court.
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It has been argued9 that the Governor of a State
has no power to grant pardon in cases of sentences of 
death by virtue of Article 72(3) of the Constitution. He 
only has the power to suspend, remit or commute the 
sentence. Therefore the President alone has the exclusive 
power to grant pardon, reprieves and respites in all cases 
where the sentence is a sentence of death. Both the 
President and the Governor have concurrent power in 
respect of suspension, remission and commutation of a 
sentence of death. In all other matters, that is, where 
the sentence is not of death, the Governor has all the 
powers enumerated in this Article. Therefore the Governor 
has the power to grant pardon or remit the sentence of a 
person who is sentenced to imprisonment for life. 
(e) The role of Ministers in the exercise of the power of
pardon
(i) Pardon by the President
As seen above, in Malaysia, the Pardons Boards 
play an important if not the main role in the exercise of 
the pardoning power of the Yang di Pertuan Ag ng or the 
Yang di-Pertua Negeri of a State. The Pardons Boards are 
advisory committees, the establishment of which is 
provided for in the Constitution. 
9 . Above, note 1, Vol 3, pg 29 7. 
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In India, there is no such advisory committee. 
The advisory role is played by the Minister. 
of the Constitution of India provides: 
Article 74 
(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with
the Prime Minister@r the head to aid and
advise the President in the exercise of his
functions.
(2) The question whether any, and if so what,
advice was tendered by Ministers to the
President shc!lll not be inquired into in any
court.
(ii) ScoEe and effect of Article 74
It is pertinent at this stage to examine Article 
74 itself. 
The words of Article 74 standing alone mean that 
the function of the Ministers is only to advise and it is 
for the President to accept the advice or not. Therefore 
the decision in all matters is to be that of the 
President. It seems however, that if Article 74 is taken 
along with other provisions of the Constitution, it 
implies that the President is bound to act according to 
the advice of his Ministers. Article 78 clearly indicates 
that decisions are taken by Ministers or Council of 
Ministers and that their function under the Constitution 
is not purely advisory. It is not their advice but their 
decision that is communicated to the President. 
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The words "aid and advice" in clause (1) of 
Article 74 therefore, seem to imply, in the context of the 
Constitution, power to give binding advice, which it would 
be 
f"\. 
u�,, constitutional for the President to reject. The 
President cannot therefore exercise executive power 
without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. 
He is bound to follow the advice of the Minister. 
Under clause (2) of Article 74, a Court cannot 
enquire as to whether any or what advice was given by the 
Minister to the President in any matter. But a President 
can be impeached for violation of the Constitution and it 
would be unconstitutional for him to refuse to accept the 
advice of a Ministry which enjoys the confidence of the 
majority of members of the House of the People. As such 
it is only in form that the Council of Ministers advices 
the President. In substance the Constitution vests them 
with the power of making decisions. 10 The words "aid and
advice" are used, more to maintain the dignity of the 
office of President than to suggest that the advice of the 
Council of Ministers is not binding on the President.11
10. Although these decisions are enforced in the name of
the President under Article 77(1) of the Constitution.
11. Before 1976, Article 74(1) merely said that the 
Council of Ministers is to 'aid and advise' the 
President in the exercise of his functions. Article
74(2) declares that no court can inquire into the 
question whether any, and if so what, advice was 
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By comparison to the situation in Malaysia, it 
seems that the Yang di Pertuan Agdng has more room to 
exercise his powers of discretion in relation to his power 
of pardon. The Constitution of Malaysial2 provides that 
the executive authority of the Federation is vested in the 
Yang di Pertuan Ag ng, exercisable by him or by the 
Cabinet or any Minister authorised by the Cabinet. 1/ Even
though the Yang di Pertuan Agong has to act in accordance 
with the advice of the Cabinet when exercising most of his 
functions,13 he nevertheless enjoys the power to act in 
his discretion in certain matters.14 In the matters of 
pardon, it is the Pardons Board and not the Minister who 
advises him. 
Cont ... 
tendered by the Ministers to the President. Article 
74(2) thus expressly makes advice tendered by the 
Ministers to the President non- justiciable. 
Originally there was no provision in the Constitution 
to make ministerial advice binding on the Presid�nt� 
but, for all practical purposes, this was so. In 1776/ / 
Article 74(1) was amended by the Constitution 
(Forty-Second Amendment) Act, so as to state 
explicitly that the President shall act in accordance 
with the advice of the Ministers in exercise of his 
functions. Thus the present position is that the 
President has to act on Ministerial advice. The only 
right the President has is to ask the Council of 
Ministers to reconsider the matter but he is bound by 
the advice given thereafter. 
12 . Article 39. 
13. The Constitution of Malaysia, Article 40(1).
14. Ibid, clause (2) of Article 40.
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Of course, this argument is purely academic, from 
the point of view of the provisions contained in the 
Constitution. 'Whereas in India, the Constitution 
expressly provides for the President to act on the aid and 
advice of the Ministers. 
From the practical point of view, the weight 
attached to the advice or decision of the Pardons Board 
and Council of Ministers in Malaysia and India, 
respectively, is the same. In Malaysia, because of the 
arguments laid down in Chapter III and in India because of 
Article 74(1), both the Yang di Pertuan Ag_smg and 
President are "bound" to act on the advice of the Pardons 
Board or decision of the Council of Ministers. 
(iii) Pardon by the Governor of a State
The Governor of a State, just as the President is 
advised by the Ministers in the exercise of his power of 
pardon. This is provided for in Article 163 of the 
Constitution, which states: 
(1) These shall be a Council of Ministers 
with the Chief Minister at the head to 
aid and advise the Governor in the 
exercise of his functions, except in so 
far as he is by or under this 
Constitution required to exercise his 
functions or any of them in his 
discretion. 
(iv) 
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(2) If any question arises whether any 
matter is or is not a matter as 
respects which the Governor is by or 
under this Constitution required to act 
in his discretion, the decision of the 
Governor in his discretion shall be 
final, and the validity of anything 
done by the Governor shall not be 
called in question on the ground that 
he ought or ought not to have acted in 
his discretion. 
(3) The question whether any, and if so
what, advice was tendered by Ministers
to the Governor shall not be inquired
into in any court.
Scope and effect of Article 163 
The position of the State Governor 
constitutional head of the State is similar to that 
President as the constitutional head of the Union. 
one difference, that being under this Article there 
as 
of 
There 
is 
exception to the provision as to the Council of Ministers 
the 
the 
is 
an 
to 
aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions. 
This exception relates to functions which the Governor is 
required to exercise "in his discretion." There are no similar 
functions contemplated with regard to the President which he is 
required to exercise in his discretion, independently of the 
aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. But in relation to 
the exercise of the power of pardon by the Governor, he has no 
power of discretion. 
Council of Ministers. 
He has to act on the advice of the 
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The function of the Council of Ministers is to 
"aid and advise" the Governor in the exercise of his 
functions. Just as in Article 74, the words "aid and 
advice" here mean that the Governor is constitutionally 
bound to act according to the advice of his Council of 
Ministers. If the Council of Ministers is not consulted, 
the question is not justiciable in a court of law and the 
validity of any action taken by the Government cannot be 
questioned in a court of law. This would constitute an 
unconstitutional act on the part of the Governor, the 
remedy for which is not legal action but constitutional 
action, which is the resignations of the Ministers and a 
request that the Governor be recalled. 
In comparison to the position in Malaysia, there 
does not seem to be any difference between the exercise of 
the power of pardon by the Governors in India and State 
rulers in Malaysia, since in 
rulers have to act in accordance 
State Pardons Board.15 
Malaysia too, the State 
with the advice of the 
(f) Contents and Effects of a Pardon
(i) Contents
The pardoning power in India comprises a variety 
of acts, such as pardon, reprieve, respite, remission, 
suspension and commutation. 
15,constitution of Malaysia, Article 42(4)(b). 
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A pardon should also be distinguished from the 
power of the sovereign to enter a nolle prosegui, which 
stops a criminal proceeding. A pardon is an act of grace 
which releases a person from the punishment of an 
offence. A pardon affects both the punishment prescribed 
for the offence and the guilt of the offender � in other 
words, a full pardon may blot out the guilt itself. 
(ii) Effects
A pardon may be either full, limited or 
conditional. A full pardon wipes out the offence in the 
eyes of the law and rescinds the sentence as well as the 
conviction. It frees the convicted person from serving 
any term of imprisonment. It has the effect of restoring 
the offender to the position in which he would have been 
in had the crime not been committed. 
A limited pardon relieves the offender of some 
but not all of the consequences of the guilt. It only 
relieves an offender from part of the penalty but not the 
conviction. It is in effect similar to a remission. 
A conditional pardon is similar to a full pardon 
but for the pardon to be effective the offender will have 
to fulfil a condition, normally one of good behaviour. 
The condition may not extend beyond the term for which the 
offender was sentenced. 
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Other powers alongside the power to pardon are 
powers of reprieve, respite, remission and commutation. 
The differences will be briefly explained below. 
A reprieve means a stay of the execution of a 
sentence or of the enforcement of a penalty for a 
temporary period. For instance, a reprieve generally is 
granted until the birth of the baby where a female 
prisoner under a sentence of death is pregnant. 
A respite means the award of a lesser sentence 
instead of the penalty prescribed. This is normally due 
to the fact that the accused has had no previous 
convictions or the like. Both the court and the executive 
are vested with this power but in England this power is 
exercisable by the court and not available in the case of 
conviction of murder. 
A remission reduces the amount of a sentence 
without changing its character. The guilt of the offender 
is not effected nor is the sentence of the court affected, 
except in the sense that the person concerned does not 
suffer incarceration for the entire period of the 
sentence, but is relieved from serving out a part of it. 
A commutation is a change to a lighter penalty in 
a different form. A commutation is normally granted on 
considerations of public welfare. 
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(g) lJltether there can be judicial review of the power of
pardon
In G Krishta Goud and J Bhoomiah v State of 
Andhra Pradesh,16 two political extremists were convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. The President refused 
clemency and his act of doing so was assailed on the 
ground that the mercy power is subject to the rule of law, 
and therefore the President was under an obligation to 
take into account all relevant factors and reject 
irrelevant factors. It was argued he had not done this 
because he had ignored the political motives of the 
convicts, and that the grant of clemency to some and 
denial to others was discriminatory. 
The Court rejected the arguments and said that 
the Constitution had empowered the President with powers, 
the exercise of which excludes judicial review and that it 
would procedurally be ultra vires as well as an 
encroachment for the court to enquire into the exercise of 
that power. However the court may intervene if there is 
an absolute or arbitrary mala fide execution of public 
power. In the instant case the court decided there was no 
"malignancy" or "degraded abuse" of power. 
16 · [ 19 7 6 ] 2 S CR 7 3 .
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In another case 17 ' two men were sentenced to
death for kidnapping two children for ransom and then 
murdering them. The President rejected their mercy 
petitions. It is felt that if permitted the existence of 
the pardoning power may just undermine the workings of the 
legal system. 
judicial power. 
It is in effect, an extension of the 
Moreover, a subsequent grant of pardon 
would only create confusion - is it right to "pardon" an 
innocent person? 
It was argued before the Supreme Court that the 
power of pardon has a corresponding duty of exercising it 
fairly and reasonably. The court observed that there is 
no uniform standard or guidelines by which the exercise of 
the power of pardon is subject to. The Court also said 
that the necessity or justification of exercising the 
pardoning power had to be judged from case to case. 
In Kehar Singh's case the Supreme Court held that 
the question as to the scope of the President's power 
under Article 72 falls squarely within the judicial domain 
and can be examined by the court by way of judicial 
review. It is the function of the court to determine 
whether the act of a constitutional or legislative 
conferment of power, or is vitiated by self-denial on an 
erroneous appreciation of the full amplitude of the power. 
17. Kuljeet Singh v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 1572.
155 
However, the order of the President under Article 
72 cannot be subjected to judicial review on its merits 
except within strict limitations defined in Maru Ram. (see 
page 140, above) 
Therefore it appears that in India the exercise 
of pardoning power involves a wide discretion that is 
beyond judicial scrutiny. The power of the President, in 
comparison to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in Malaysia, is 
even wider, since the President can inquire into the 
merits of the case and even come to a different decision 
than that which the courts have arrived at. 
B. ENGLAND
In England, crimes are wrongs against the Crown, _ 
that is, the State. As such, criminal proceedings are 
conducted in the name of the Crown, and the C�own has two 
special prerogative rights in relation to criminal cases. 
First there is the royal power of pardon and second, the 
Attorney-General, acting on behalf of the Crown, has the 
power to enter a nolle prosegui in criminal proceedings, 
whereby the Attorney-General informs the court that he is 
no longer prepared to proceed with the prosecution. 
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A pardon in England is granted on the advice of 
the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary is 
constitutionally responsible for recommending the exercise 
of the royal prerogative of mercy to grant either a free 
pardon, conditional pardon or a remission.18
(a) The Scope and Effects of a Pardon
(i) Scope
The prerogative of pardon can be extended to 
persons who are convicted of virtually any criminal 
offence. However it has been saidl9 that the right of
pardon is confined to offences of a public nature20 where
the Crown is the prosecutor and has some vested interest 
in the matter at hand. If the Crown wishes to interfere 
with any private prosecution, then it must do so before 
conviction by taking over the prosecution and terminating 
it. 
18. See below for the meanings of, and differences between
these three concepts.
19. Halsbury, Laws of England 4th ed, 1974, Vol 8 pg 606.
20. This includes ecclesiastical disciplinary offences.
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The Crown is not free to relieve a person from 
the consequences of a civil wrong. The prerogative of 
mercy covers criminal law only. An area in which it is 
unclear whether the power of pardon may be exercised is 
that of public nuisance. Public nuisance is a hybrid of 
tort and crime and in most cases of public nuisance it may 
be difficult to ascertain whether the case is one which is 
tortious or criminal in nature. Halsbury says that the 
Crown may not pardon the commission of a public nuisance 
before conviction whilst it continues, as to do so would 
deprive the interested citizen of his vested rights. 
Two points arise from this. One is that if the 
proceedings are clearly criminal in character, then the 
Crown may grant a pardon in cases of public nuisance. 
Secondly, the limitation imposed on the exercise of pardon 
here only relates to "advance" pardons rather than pardons 
granted after conviction. Therefore it seems that if the 
action taken against a public nuisance is a civil 
(,� 
o e, the 
Crown may still grant a pardon provided it is done after 
conviction. It is submitted that this should not be so 
since it would defeat the whole purpose of the limitation 
imposed upon the granting of a pardon in cases of public 
nuisance of civil character. The rule is that the Crown 
cannot relieve a person from the consequences of a civil 
wrongdoing it should therefore mean that the Crown 
cannot exercise its royal prerogative of mercy, at any 
stage before, during or after, a civil matter. 
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The second area in which the Crown is said to 
have no power to exercise mercy is the breach of 
recognisances to keep the peace. A recognisance is "a 
contract between Her Majesty the Queen on the one hand and 
the principal and surety on the other, under which the 
principal and surety undertake the performance by the 
principal of an obligation on pain of forfeiture of a 
stated sum of money." It has been said21 that it is a
strange contract if one of the parties to it cannot 
release the other from his obligations. 
"A distinction can be drawn between the 
general recognisance which protects all Her 
Majesty's subjects, and the specific, which 
is designed to afford protection to a named 
person. If the rationale for the rule is 
that the Crown cannot deprive the citizen of 
vested rights, it could be suggested that 
the Crown should not be free to release a 
person from the latter but should be free to 
release from a general recognisance. But in 
both cases, it seems, the proceeds of any 
forfeiture of the recognisance belong to the 
Crown rather than to any named individual, 
which suggests that the individual does not 
have any vested pecuniary interest and it 
follows that the Crown should be free to 
release from either. 0 22
21. A.T.H. Smith, 1983 Public Law, Aut '83 pg 411.
22. Ibid, pg 411.
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The other area in which there exists uncertainty 
is over circumstances in which the Crown has the power to 
pardon for contempt of court. Just as in a public 
nuisance, the Crown has power to pardon criminal contempt, 
but not civil contempt. The uncertainty is caused by the 
difficulty to distinguish between the two forms of 
contempt. In any event however, it is clear that the 
Crown has power to pardon in criminal cases only. 
By analogy to the position in Malaysia, there is 
no difference here. In Malaysia too, it is quite clear 
that the power of pardon extends to criminal cases only, 
since the Constitution expressly provides that the power 
of pardon covers 'offences. ,23 In any event, as the 
position stands, all the appeals that have been made to 
the various Pardons Boards in Malaysia are clearly 
criminal cases and as such no dispute has arisen (or could 
arise) to determine the nature of the proceedings. 
The difference in approaches between England and 
Malaysia relating to the scope of pardon is that in the 
former a pardon may be pleaded before conviction. 24
23. See Article 42 of the Constitution, especially clauses
( 1 ) , ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) .
24. Halsbury, Laws of England, Vol 8 pg 606.
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"Even though the power does not at present 
seem to serve any identifiable 
constitutional purpose, the prerogative has 
proved itself to be a remarkably enduring 
power, and one that can reappear at 
unexpected moments, and until the advance 
pardon is expressly abrogated by statute, 
the possibility that its use will revive at 
some future time cannot be discounted. 11 25 
(ii) Effects
In theory there are three different types of pardons, 
the effect of which is different. These are (1) the absolute 
pardon, (2) the conditional pardon, and (3) remission of 
sentence. 
(1) Absolute or Free Pardon
The effect of a free pardon is that a conviction will 
be disregarded, so that, as far as is possible, the person is 
relieved of all penalties and other consequences of the 
conviction.26 A free pardon is normally recommended when there
25. A.T.H. Smith, Public Law, Aut '83, pg 416-417.
26. Sixth Report from the Home Affairs
House of Commons, Miscarriages of
(1981-82), Minutes of Evidence, pg
referred to as Miscarriages, Minutes).
Committee of the 
Justice, H.C. 421 
1. (hereinafter
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are convincing grounds, and not merely doubts, for 
thinking that a particular accused is innocent. It is not 
sufficient for the accused to be 'technically' innocent of 
the offence. It has been a long-established policy that 
the free pardon should be confined to those who are 
morally as well as technically innocent. Thus the 
implication is that the Home Secretary must be satisfied, 
before recommending a free pardon, that in the incident in 
question the accused had no intention of committing an 
offence and did not in fact commit one. 
(2) Conditional Pardon
A conditional pardon excuses or varies the 
consequences of a conviction, subject to certain 
conditions. It 
for 
therefore 
another. 
substitutes one form of 
punishment This power has been used 
primarily to commute a sentence of death to one of life 
imprisonment, a purpose which it still serves in respect 
of sentences in the Isle of Man and Jersey.27 Suffice it 
to say here that the conditional pardon is not much used 
in practice today. In recent years the granting of a 
conditional pardon has been simply as a means of commuting 
a sentence of death, but not as a means of mitigating the 
effect of a wrongful conviction. 
27. Capital punishment for murder was abolished in England
by the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965
and made permanent on the 31st December, 1969.
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(3) Remission of Sentence
A remission is a reduction of the amount of a 
sentence or penalty without changing its character.28
This kind of remission is referred to as "special 
remission," to distinguish it from the statutory remission 
to which a prisoner becomes entitled for good behaviour. 
The power to recommend special remission is 
normally used for reasons unconnected with the merits of 
the conviction. It is generally awarded on one of a 
number of grounds such as compassion, which may be shown 
where a person is released a few weeks early to be with a 
dying relative or because he himself is dying, or where a 
woman is expecting a child shortly before her release. 
Remission is also granted as a reward, as where a prisoner 
has helped the prison authorities in some way. The power. 
of remission is also used where, due to new information 
coming to light, doubt is cast on the correctness of a 
conviction. In such cases the Home Secretary 
recommend remission of the remainder of the sentence. 
28. See n. 25 pg 424.
may 
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(b) How the power of pardon is exercised
Power to exercise the royal prerogative of mercy 
was effectively and irreversibly vested in the Home 
Secretary when Queen Victoria ascended the throne in 
1837. Thereafter no serious attempts have been made by a 
monarch to interfere with the way in which mercy was 
dispensed 
prerogative 
in 
is 
his name. 
personal to 
Consequently, 
the Sovereign, 
although the 
it has been 
delegated to the Home Secretary for more than a century. 
(i) Powers of the Horne Secretary
The Home Secretary has powers to intervene in 
cases where an accused has been convicted of a criminal 
offence. The basis of his powers are twofold. 
Firstly, the Home Secretary is empowered, under 
section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, to refer an 
accused who has been convicted on indictment, to the Court 
of Appeal (Criminal Division), for the determination as to 
conviction or sentence or both. This process is treated 
as if it were an appeal by the convicted person. 
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with) 
Secondly, (and this is what we are more concerned 
the Home Secretary, by constitutional convention is 
responsible for recommending the exercise of the royal 
prerogative of mercy to grant either one of these three-a 
d-- free pardon, a conditional pardon or a remission. 
(ii) Grounds
The Home Secretary will not normally intervene 
where normal avenues of appeal to the Court of Appeal have 
not been exhausted. In cases where the normal avenues are 
not available and intervention seems justified, the Home 
Secretary will use his power of 
Court of Appeal to hear the 
reference to enable the 
case. Therefore the Home 
Secretary will act only where there is new evidence which 
was not available to and considered by the court which 
originally tried the case.29 He may take into account 
evidence that is legally inadmissible. 
The Home Secretary requires a greater degree of 
proof than that which is required by the Court of Appeal 
before he acts. The general rule is that the petitioner 
needs to prove his innocence beyond doubt. If a 
29. Miscarriages, Minutes, pg 20.
/ 
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petitioner fails to establish his innocence, but raises 
serious doubts as to his guilt, he may be granted a 
remission only.30 
(iii) Procedure
There is absolutely no prescribed form of 
application for the Queen's Pardon, and it makes no 
difference to the Home Office whether the plea is 
handprinted on vellum or scrawled in block capitals on a 
postcard.31 
A petition for mercy is normally brought before 
the Home Secretary by the prisoner himself or his friends 
on his behalf. This practice is rather new, in view of 
the fact that before, when the death penalty was involved, 
the Home Office automatically reviewed every case. The 
sentencing judge himself may recommend mercy, and 
sometimes the petition is brought by voluntary 
organisations such as the National Council of Civil 
Liberties,and Justice. 
30. Compare this to the position in India and Malaysia,
whereby there need not be new evidence before the
President or Governor, and the Yang di Pertuan Agung
or Ruler agrees to hear the petition for mercy.
31. C.H. Rolph, The Queen's Pardon, Cassell, London, 1978,
pg 141.
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Theoretically, a petition for mercy may be made 
(and mercy may be granted) even though an appeal before 
the Court of Appeal is pending. In practice however, many 
complaints are rejected at an early stage, the reason 
being that the normal channels of appeal have not been 
exhausted. 
(c) 'Whether there can be judicial review of the power of
pardon
The courts in England will not inquire into the 
manner in which the prerogative of mercy is exercised. 
This is because traditionally the courts will determine 
the existence and extent of the prerogative power but they 
will not superintend the manner of its exercise.32 
The role of the courts and the 
' 
exe cutive in the 
exercise of the power of pardon was enunciated by Lord 
Denning in the case of Hanratty v Lord Buttler of Saffron 
Walden,33 thus: 
32. S.A. deSmith, Judicial Review of Administrative --------------------
Action, (4th Ed.) pg 286. 
33. [1971] 115 Sol. J. 386.
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"The high prerogative of mercy was exercised 
by the monarch on the advice of one of her 
principal secretaries of state who took full 
responsibility and advised her with greatest 
conscience and care. The law would not 
inquire into the manner in which that 
prerogative was exercised. The reason was 
plain to enable the Home Secretary to 
exercise his great responsibility without 
fear of influence from any quarter or of 
actions brought thereafter complaining that 
he did not do it right. It was part of the 
public policy which protected judges and 
advocates from actions being brought against 
them for things done in the course of their 
office.1134 
Lord Justice Salmond concurred as follows: 
"No action for negligence could succeed 
unless it were shown that the negligence 
caused damage. The only damage that could 
be alleged here was that the Crown would 
have exercised its prerogative of mercy 
differently. So if the action were allowed 
to continue the Courts would have to 
pronounce on the Crown's exercise of its 
prerogative, something which they would not 
and could not do.1135 
Therefore, just as in India and Malaysia, in England 
too, the pardoning power is beyond judicial review. 
34· Ibid.
3s. Ibid.
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Both in India and England, exercise of the 
prerogative of mercy is in fact vested in the Ministers, 
whereas in Malaysia, a special body is set up to advise 
the Yang di Pertuan Agung or Ruler. The reason why there 
is a Pardons Board in Malaysia, as opposed to the 
Ministers advising the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler or 
Yang di-Pertua Negeri is so that advice on the exercise of 
the pardon power vests in an apolitical body. In actual 
fact, though, the Pardons Board is still semi-political, 
since the Minister of a State is a permanent member of the 
Board. To sum up, it would not be far from the truth to 
say that in all three countries the granting of a pardon 
basically lies in the hands of another body but just that 
it is granted in the name of the Sovereign. 
In all three countries the basic rules 
practically run parallel to one another. A difference, if 
any, lies with the fact that in England, mercy may be 
pleaded even though an appeal is pending before the Court 
of Appeal, whereas in both India and Malaysia the rule is 
that mercy may only be pleaded upon the exhaustion of all 
legal remedies. 
Having said that, it may be useful to note the 
one major difference between all three 
relation to the death sentence. 
countries in 
In 
abolished. 
England, 
For all 
the 
other 
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death 
offences, 
sentence has been 
it is solely within 
the powers of the Home Office whether or not to grant any 
pardons. 
In Malaysia, powers to grant pardons in respect 
of death sentences other than a death sentence under the 
Internal Security Act, 1960 is determined by the place in 
which the offence is committed and duly sentenced. If the 
offence was committed in the Federal Territories of Kuala 
Lumpur and Labuan the power lies with the Yang di Pertuan 
Agdng, otherwise it lies with the Rulers of the different 
states. 
In India, the power to pardon a death sentence 
lies only with the President, irrespective of where the 
offence was committed. 
CHAPTER VI 
SHOULD THE PARDONS BOARD BE RETAINED? 
Thus far we have seen how, both in theory and in 
practice, the Pardons Boards in Malaysia operate. In this 
concluding chapter the writer will seek to examine whether 
in the light of the present situation the institution of 
the Pardons Boards should be retained or otherwise. 
The arguments for and against this issue will be 
discussed. Suggestions for a more effective operation of 
the Pardons Boards will also be proposed. 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE PARDONS BOARD
(a) The principle underlying pardons
A pardonl suggests forgiveness or the excusing of 
Ii; 
a fault, by the Yang di Pertuan Agrng or Ruler or Yang 
di-Pertua Negeri of a State to a petitioner who has
exhausted all legal channels of appeal. The existence of 
pardon is in fact an acknowledgment that the judicial 
process is fallible; that the rules of procedure and 
evidence do not always give rise to a correct decision 
about guilt or innocence, even when all judicial appeals 
have been exhausted. This is felt to be the main 
principle underlying the power of pardon. In short, its 
1. The word 'pardon' here includes commutations, 
reprieves and respites.
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function is to "exact justice" to its fullest. Insofar as 
justice has been done to the petitioner through the 
imposition of the sentence passed by the courts, the 
principle underlying the grant of a pardon thereafter is 
to afford him (the petitioner) a second chance at 
rehabilitating himself based on humanitarian grounds. 
Taft CJ in Ex Parte Grossman2 said:
"Executive clemency exists to afford relief 
from undue harshness or evident mistake in 
the operation or enforcement of the criminal 
law. The administration of justice by the 
courts is not necessarily always wise or 
certainly considerate of circumstances which 
may properly mitigate guilt. To afford a 
remedy, it has always been thought essential 
in popular governments, as well as in 
monarchies to vest in some other authority 
than the court power to ameliorate or avoid 
particular criminal judgment. It is a check 
entrusted to the Executive for special 
cases." 
Other than to exact justice, a pardon if granted, 
may be purely an exercise of mercy, since the aim of the 
pardoner is to be merciful by declining to exact the full 
punishment that the law, through the courts, deems 
appropriate to the offence committed. An example would be 
the commutation of original sentences that were passed by 
the courts. 
2. (1924] 69 Law Ed 527, 535.
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(b) The case for retaining the Pardons Boards
The main argument in favour of the retention of 
the Pardons Boards rests mainly on the need and importance 
of the power of pardon itself. In Malaysia, in the 
exercise of the power of pardon, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong, Ruler or Head of State usually receives advice from 
some quarter.3 And this, it is submitted, is a very 
important essence of a pardon. Even though the pardoning 
power is vested in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Rulers of 
the States in the sense that he has the final say in 
granting a pardon, he cannot act on his own personal 
judgment. The Constitution requires him to act on the 
advice of the Pardons Board. It is important that the 
grant of a pardon should not be a subjective evaluation of 
one person, no matter how high his status or standing is, 
in any government. To allow this would be akin to a 
system of dictatorship, a system to which Malaysia does 
not subscribe to. It must be emphasized that the power of 
pardon is discretionary and cannot be questioned in any 
court of law. As such it is of the utmost importance that 
3- cf Panama and Zambia. In Panama, the Constitution of
1972 through Article 163(6) provides that the power is
to be "exercised by the President of the Republic 
alone," and in Zambia the constitution of 1973, 
Articles 53, 60 and 61 provide that the President 
"acts in his own deliberate judgment and shall not be 
obliged to follow the advice tendered by any other 
person or authority." 
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whenever a pardon is granted to any particular petitioner, 
thorough discussion has taken place on the matter. Thus 
there exists the need for the retention of the Pardons 
Board to assist the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Rulers in the 
exercise of this power. 
The Pardons Board, in 
di-Pertuan Agong or Rulers of 
advising 
States has 
the 
a
Yang 
heavy 
responsibility too. The former Attorney-General 
Malaysia, 
once4 -
theo Tan Sri Abdul Kadir bin Yusuf 
VJ 
� u
J 
"They have to consider very carefully all 
aspects of the case in the national and 
public interest5, the nature and gravity of 
the offence, the circumstances in which the 
offence was committed and all grounds 
submitted by their counsel before making 
their decision." 
of 
said 
For instance the granting of a complete pardon, 
or a commutation of sentence involves a negation of the 
sentence passed by the courts in accordance with law. It 
is also of the utmost importance to the petitioner, 
especially one who is faced with a death sentence. It is 
<O 
therefore strongly felt that the Yang di Pertuan Ag ng or 
4. 
5. 
The News Straits Times, 4 .7.1968. 
Emphasis added. 
... 
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Ruler or Yang di Pertua Negeri should not weigh the 
evidence before him alone. It is for this reason that the 
Pardons Boards, as advisory bodies, should be retained in 
the system. 
(c) The case for abolishing the Pardons Boards
In a democratic system of government such as 
Malaysia, it could well be said that the whole notion of 
pardon is anti-democratic and unnecessary, since in the 
ultimate the power of pardon allows one person to act and 
decide as he pleases. 
Prima facie, to argue for the removal of the 
Pardons Boards may involve one of two considerations. One 
is that the pardoning power vested in the monarch itself 
should be abolished; secondly the pardoning power should 
be retained in the Constitution but that the advisory 
committee, namely the Pardons Boards, should be abolished 
because it is presently ineffective. 
(i) Abolish the power of pardon
Leslie Sebba, in an article,6 stated that there
are both ideological and practical reasons for doing away 
with the power of pardon. 
6- "The Pardoning Power - A World Survey," The Journal of
Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 68 1977, pg 83.
•The ideological grounds derived from the
fact that the pardoning power appears to be
an archaic survival of an earlier era, 
during which the State was governed by an 
omnipotent ruler, who might have an 
occasional urge to demonstrate his 
benevolent disposition. This seems 
something of an anomaly in a twentieth 
century constitutional democracy having a 
commitment at least in principle - to a 
delicate separation of powers designed to 
ensure independence of the judiciary. This 
independence would appear to be threatened 
by vesting in a non-judicial authority the 
power to pardon offenders duly convicted and 
sentenced in the course of a judicial 
process.• 
According to this submission, the ideological 
reasons for doing away with the pardoning power are rooted 
in constitutional theory. 
they are: 
As for the practical reasons 
• related to the development of modern
penal systems. The pardoning power has
historically served a number of functions,
most of which are adequately provided for 
today by other legal institutions which have 
been developed to meet these needs. For 
example, the avoidance of imposing criminal 
liability on persons lacking in mental 
capacity or acting in self-defense is now 
governed by the penal code itself.7 The 
need to assuage doubts regarding the 
possibility of a miscarriage of justice is 
now commonly met by a system of appeals and 
rehearings before the courts." 
7. In Malaysia it is both under the Penal Code and the
Criminal Procedure Code. The effect of acts of a 
person of unsound mind are to be found in the Penal 
Code, section 84 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 
sections 342-352. For discussion on the procedures 
governing the determination of the sanity of the 
accused at the time of trial, see "Fitness To Plead" 
in Criminal Proceedings, Stanley Yeo Meng Heang [1984] 
2 MLJ lxxxiv. Acts done in private defence are laid 
down in the Penal Code, sections 96-106. 
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It is wholly agreed that the existence of the 
pardoning power seems to undermine the doctrine of the 
separation of powers; and that the possibility of any 
miscarriage of justice would be considerably reduced today 
by the process of appeals. But no matter how detail the 
legal process may be to ensure against the possibility of 
any miscarriage of justice, there is always the chance 
that a miscarriage of justice can result. After all the 
aim of the power of pardon is to obtain justice, and if 
this can be achieved by vesting power in a non-judicial 
authority, albeit threatening the independence of the 
judiciary, it is but a small compromise indeed. Of 
course, great care must be taken to ensure that no abuse 
is possible. The judiciary should not view the existence 
of the pardoning power as a demonstration of a flaw in the 
judicial process. This is important since it must be 
remembered that the pardoner, when granting a pardon, 
commutation or otherwise is not in effect saying that the 
courts have been wrong in sentencing the petitioner to his 
particular sentence; but that by inflicting less than what 
the judgment fixed it is hoped that the welfare of the 
petitioner as well as public welfare will be better served. 
In the Malaysian context especially, the granting 
of a pardon is not necessarily a negation of the sentence 
passed by the courts, nor is it meant to be an 'attack' on 
the judicial process. Instead, a pardon or commutation of 
a sentence when granted is based on humanitarian grounds. 
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A good example can be seen in the case of P.P. v 
Lim Hang Seoh,8 a 14 years old boy who was sentenced to
death following a conviction under section 57 of the 
Internal Security Act, 1960. His sentence of death was 
commuted to detention at the pleasure of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong. He was placed at the Henry Gurney 
School and to remain there until he reaches the age of 21 
years. Even though the reasons for any grant of pardon or 
commutation of sentence are confidential, in the instant 
case it is quite obvious that the main factor for the 
granting of the commutation of sentence was due to his 
tender years at the time of the commission of the offence. 
(ii) Abolish the Pardons Boards
The power and function of the Pardons Boards 
extend only to the tendering of advice to the Yang di 
Pertuan A g or Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri, as the 
case may be. This is provided for in Article 42(4) of 
the Constitution. The Constitution, through clause (9)
requires the Pardons Boards to consider any written 
opinion of the Attorney-General before tendering their 
advice. 
8. [1978] 1 M.L.J. 68.
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These two clauses are fairly straightforward both 
in nature and coverage. However, Clause (8) which 
provides that a Pardons Board is to meet in the presence 
of the Ruler or Yang di Pertua Negeri may give rise to 
practical difficulties in its effect. As has already been 
argued in Chapter III, because of the fact that the Ruler 
himself presides over the discussion and most likely, 
participate in the arguments put forth, the final decision 
may well be that of the Pardons Board and not exclusively 
that of the Ruler's. Two factors arise in assessing the 
appropriateness or otherwise of this situation. 
Firstly, if mercy is intended to be dispensed by 
the Ruler only in name, meaning that the actual exercise 
of the power vests in some other authority, namely the 
Pardons Boards, there is then no abuse of power or 
function with regard to clause (8). In England although 
the prerogative is personal to the Sovereign, it has been 
delegated to the Home Secretary and any exercise of mercy 
by the Crown is only in name. So too in India, where, 
though the power of pardon vests in the President and 
Governor of the States, the Constitution of India provides 
that both the President and the Governor are bound to act 
in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. 
17 9 
Here in Malaysia, because there is no such clear 
delegation, confusion arises as stated above, as to whose 
decision it is in the ultimate to pardon or not to 
pardon? There is a need therefore, to review Clause (8) 
and affirm the actual rationale behind it. 
Secondly if the exercise of the power to pardon 
is intended to be personal to the Ruler, clause (8) may 
have the effect of undermining that position. The courts 
in Sim Kie Chon and Chiow Thiam Guan9 have clearly stated
that the function of the Pardons Boards is merely to 
tender advice. Consequently if the Pardons Board does 
more than simply tender advice, then it is an abuse 
practically of both power and function by the Pardons 
Boards, as envisaged by Clause (8). 
However, this does not apply in the case of the 
States Pardons Boards. They would not be acting in excess 
of their power and function since clause (4)(b) expressly 
states that the Ruler or Yang di Pertua Negeri shall act 
on the advice of the Pardons Board. This carries with it 
the mandatory implication that the final decision of the 
Ruler is only "ceremonial" based upon the deliberations of 
the Pardons Board. 
9 . (1985) 2 M.L.J. 385, (1986) 1 M.L.J. 494 and (1983) 2
M.L.J. 116 respectively.
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The observations would only concern the Federal 
Pardons Board and the Pardons Board for Security Offences 
that would seemingly be acting beyond their power and 
function through the operation of clause (8). 
It is therefore submitted that an abolition of 
the Pardons Boards per se due to the possibility of abuse 
through clause (8) of Article 42 of the Constitution is 
unwarranted. The problem lies not with the Pardons Boards 
as such, but with the intended effect of clause (8). 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
(a) Amending clause (8) of Article 42
If the exercise of the power of pardon is to be 
made personal to the Yang di Pertuan an amendment 
to clause (8) is called for. It is suggested that the 
Pardons Board should meet without the Yang di Pertuan 
., 
Ag ng and upon reaching a 'decision' should then ask for 
an audience with His Majesty to tender their advice. In 
this way, the ultimate decision will properly be that of 
His Majesty's. 
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It would also be useful to include the provision 
that upon receiving advice from the Pardons Board the Yang 
di Pertuan Ag�ng shall not be obliged to act in accordance 
with that advice.10
At present the members of a Pardons Board weigh 
the effect of a pardon as against the national and public 
interest. The Pardons Board has no power to inquire into 
the merits of the case when deliberating upon the issue of 
whether to advise the pardon or otherwise of a particular 
petitioner. Should we in Malaysia, allow the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler or Yang di-Pertu Negeri to 
inquire into the merits of any particular case as in 
India, before a final decision is reached? The test would 
then be that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Head of State 
need not act on the advice of the Pardons Board if, upon 
considerations relating to the merits of the case, the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Head of State strongly feels that 
to heed the advice tendered by the Pardons Board would be 
unjust to the petitioner in question. 
Naturally the issue that arises now is whether we 
should allow the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Head of State to 
inquire into the merits of a case. This is a difficult 
10. In Kenya the Constitution provides that the
may consult the Advisory Committee but "he
be obliged to act in accordance with the advice
committee."
President 
shall not 
of the 
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issue to determine. Suffice it to say here that to allow 
it would seem like an usurpation of judicial powers. On 
the other hand, disallowing it need not mean that the 
chances of a pardon being granted is necessarily reduced. 
Currently, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Head of State does 
not inquire into the merits of a case and maybe it would 
be best to leave the position as it is and consider other 
more persistent problems. 
(b) Change in the composition of the Pardons Board
"A special Pardons Board was set up to be 
one of the safeguards to ensure against 
abuse of the new Essential (Security Cases) 
Regulations (gazetted on Saturday 5th 
October 1975). The Pardons Board will be 
headed by the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister (Tun Hussein Onn), Law Minister and 
Attorney-General Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Yusof, 
Labour and Manpower Minister Datuk Lee San 
Choon and Communications Minister Tan Sri V 
Manickavasagam. The five-ma f board will
advise the Yang di Pertuan Ag�ng, who is the 
only person empowered to grant pardons, 
reprieves and respites under the 
regulations."11
"The powers given to the Government in 
the regulations will be used to preserve 
democracy and the interest of the people. 
The Government's sincerity was questioned in 
setting up the Pardons Board since it 
consisted of the very men who initiated the 
regulations in the Cabinet; and thus how 
could any accused have faith in the Pardons 
Board? If the Government is sincere and 
wants an effective Pardons Board then its 
members should be drawn from the public and 
be men and women of high moral standing and 
integrity.1112 
11. Extract from The Straits Times, 9 October 1975.
/48------
-
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The Pardons Boards at both federal and state 
level have the Attorney-General and the Chief Minister of 
the state as permanent members. The three other members 
are appointed for a term of three years, and are eligible 
for reappointment.13 The criticism that have been 
directed with regard to the members of the Pardons Board 
have usually been that of the Attorney-General being both 
the prosecutor and then sitting in on the Pardons Board to 
hear the petition for mercy. The arguments relating to 
this situation have already been discussed in Chapter 
III. The criticism in this Chapter is aimed at the
appointment of the three other members of the Board. It 
is quite common for medical practitioners to be appointed 
as members in the States Pardons Boards. As for the 
Federal Pardons Board, Ministers have normally been 
appointed for the three-year period. It is strongly felt 
that the time has come for a change in trend. 
One of the factors that may have a bearing in 
favour of the petitioner who is petitioning for mercy is 
his conduct and behaviour as a prisoner. As such it would 
be most appropriate to have the Director General of 
Prisons or the Commissioner of Prisons to become one of 
the members of the Pardons Board. He could supply the 
Pardons Board with information regarding the behaviour and 
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attitude of the prisoner whilst serving sentence and based 
on that information, may well argue to the effect that the 
sentence of the prisoner should not be altered, (therefore 
probably supporting the view put forward by the 
Attorney-General) or that the prisoner should be pardoned, 
(therefore giving a different opinion from that of the 
Attorney-General). The Attorney-General sits on the Board 
and gives expert opinion - that of the law. By the time 
a case comes up to the Pardons Board it is arguable 
whether there will still be need for legal advice proper? 
In any case, by having the Director-General of Prisons as 
a member, the Board would have the benefit of hearing 
another 'expert' opinion that of the conduct of the 
prisoner after conviction. The word 'expert' here is used 
in the sense that the Director-General has actual contact 
with the prisoner and he therefore is able to assess the 
behaviour of the prisoner, albeit subjectively. 
It is also suggested that 
constitute the other member of the Board. 
a psychiatrist 
He too, would 
be able to furnish expert opinion relating to the mental 
state of the prisoner and ascertain whether a pardon is 
desirable. A psychiatrist is a person who is specialised 
in a branch of medicine that addresses itself to the 
treatment of people suffering from emotional or behavioral 
problems. He will be able to assess the conduct of a 
petitioner from a different angle as opposed to the 
Attorney-General and Commissioner of Prisons. 
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The third member may be selected from the public, 
one who has high moral standing. It could be another 
doctor, someone from the social welfare department, a 
criminologist, who would be able to furnish evidence as to 
what type of sentence would probably best suit the 
petitioner in order to 'rehabilitate' him, if any, or even 
a Minister. 
At the same time, since each case is considered 
on its own merits and no two cases can be exactly the 
same, it would also be a good idea if the members are not 
fixed. The Pardons Board could have a 'revolving' panel, 
where the composition of a particular Pardons Board at a 
particular time is dependent upon the nature of the case 
that is to be deliberated upon. Thus it is suggested that 
a list of names be established like a jury. Of course 
this would only apply to the three other members as 
prescribed by Clause (5) of Article 42, as both the 
Attorney-General and the Chief Minister for the particular 
State are permanent members. 
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(c) The exercise of the power of pardon should be subject
to some rules
Even though the pardon is said to be an act of 
grace, in that a pardon if granted is not so much an 
attack at the judicial process, but more on humanitarian 
grounds, the exercise of the powers should be subject to 
some rules or guidelines. 
"lawless state" as it is now. 
It should not be left in a 
By subjecting it to some 
guidelines it will provide certainty. This arguably may 
infringe the discretionary powers of the pardoner but as 
things stand the pardoner, that is the Yang di Pertuan 
Ag,ng or Rulers or Yang di Pertua Negeri do not have full 
discretion anyway. 
Laying down guidelines will at least ensure that 
two cases of similar facts will obtain similar results. 
The guidelines should revolve around procedural matters, 
which includes the extent or amount of 11 evider1ce" needed 
concerning the petitioner before the Board meets. But to 
lay down the guidelines is itself problematical. At 
present, the Pardons Board is not guided by any guidelines 
or rules in reaching a decision. Their decision can be 
termed as the product of an exercise of discretionary 
justice. 
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In this respect it has been said that 
" much discretionary justice is without 
rules because no one knows how to formulate 
rules. Much discretionary justice is 
without rules because discretion is 
preferred to any rules that might be 
formulated; individualized justice is often 
better, or thought to be better, than the 
results produced by precise rules ... 
Even when rules can be written, 
discretion is often better. Rules without 
discretion cannot fully take into account 
the need for tailoring results to unique 
facts and incumstances of particular cases. 
The justification for discretion is often 
the need for individualized justice."14 
The 'catch' however, is that once there are rules 
or guidelines attached to the pardoning power, judicial 
review will automatically follow. Courts then would have 
the power to review the process by which the pardon or 
otherwise is granted. 
It is but a mere opinion that a power to review 
by the courts would not necessarily undermine the actual 
power to pardon. The courts will only be able to question 
the procedural aspects of the exercise of the power to 
pardon. If the procedural requirements are met the courts 
can do nothing to alter the ultimate decision of the 
pardoner. 
14. Davis, K.C., Discretionary Justice
Inquiry, Louisiana State University
15-17, 55.
A Preliminary 
Press, 1970, pg. 
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The courts so far are of the opinion that the power of 
pardon is an act of grace and therefore not questionable in any 
court of law. 
However, the Yang di Pertuan Agong is a "creature" of 
the Contitution and he therefore holds a statutory office. The 
same argument goes for the Pardons Boards, which are statutory 
bodies; and like any other statutory bodies, both the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong and the Pardons Boards should be subject to the 
rules of administrative law. 
Alternatively, having seen that discretionary power is 
necessary, the problem perhaps would lie in the better control 
of this necessary discretionary power or the elimination of 
unnecessary discretionery power. As has been suggested, 
15. Ibid.
"The principal ways of controlling are 
structuring and checking. Structuring 
includes plans, policy statements, and 
rules, as well as open findings, open rules, 
and open precedents ... Checking includes 
both administrative and judicial supervision 
and review ... confining discretionary power 
does not lie in statutory enactments but in 
much more extensive administrative rule­
making ..... i5 
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(d) The scope of pardonable offences should be reduced
At present, persons convicted of "any offence" 
may appeal to the Pardons Boards. Even though in practice 
only those convicted of serious offences actually appeal 
to the Pardons Boards, a clause should be inserted in 
Article 42 limiting the type of offences and sentences 
that qualify to make an appeal. Even with the few cases 
(compared to the number of cases that go to the courts) 
that appeal, the delay in time before the final decision 
is reached is already discouraging, the problem would be 
worsened should those convicted of less serious crimes 
decide to appeal as well. 
Only those who are convicted of serious crimes, 
which entail severe punishment, ought to be able to appeal 
for clemency. 
(e) Notification of Outcome and Delay
The current situation is that only the petitioner 
and the prison authorities are notified of the outcome of 
the petition. It is suggested that the public ought to be 
notified16 of the outcome of a petition for pardon,
16. This was done in the 1960's and early 1970's in the
newspapers but the practice stopped, and the reason is
not known.
190 
especially so if a pardon is granted. This will at least 
have the effect of removing social stigma on the 
petitioner so that he could begin 'a new life.' 
To go even further, maybe the reasons for a 
decision should be made available, not as a matter of 
course, but upon request, which will have the effect of 
incorporating public accountability in the area of pardons. 
On another aspect of social stigma, it is to be 
noted that persons who have been convicted of serious 
crimes, such as murder or any crime the punishment for 
which is life imprisonment; possess a brown-coloured 
identity card as opposed to the familiar blue one. 
Following the grant of an absolute pardon the colour of 
his brown identity card must be changed, otherwise he will 
still be subject to discriminations in society. 
To remove the anomalies in the present system, it 
is suggested that having a separate piece of legislation 
governing all aspects of the Pardons Board such as 
jurisdiction, composition and procedural requirements 
replacing the one in the Constitution may greatly improve 
the functioning of the existing one. 
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Alternatively, the present system should be 
retained but improvement is most needed in the area of the 
administrative machinery. Upgrading the administrative 
machinery will at least ensure that the number of 
practical problems will (it is hoped) be reduced. 
Another area in which reform is urgently needed 
is with regard to the time taken between the date of 
petition and the date of the decision. Currently the time 
taken for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Ruler to decide is 
too long. For instance, in the most recent case of an 
appeal by a Briton to the Penang Pardons Board 17• the 
sentence of death was passed in March 1987. On appeal to 
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court rejected his appeal 
in April 1988. He then appealed to the Pardons Board for 
clemency. Therefore it has taken about 15 months before 
the result of his petition is known. Delays are 
definitely the worst part of the whole oper�tion of the 
Pardons Board. Amendments are urgently needed to ensure 
that a petition does not take too long once it reaches the 
Pardons Board. After all, it is hardly the case that the 
Pardons Board is overloaded with cases, as only those 
whose sentences are severe make an appeal. 
17. The Sunday Star, 16 July, 1989, where Derrick Gregory
was sentenced to death for trying to smuggle heroin.
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(f) Should Muslims be subject to a different system?
Having seen how the Pardons Board operates, its 
difficulties and what could be done to improve the system, 
likewise the Muslim Pardons Board may need some 
improvement as well. 
As seen earlier, the Yang di Pertuan Agong and 
Rulers as head of States are also the head of the religion 
of Islam in the states. Article 42(10) expressly provides 
that the Yang di Pertuan Agung shall exercise the power to 
grant pardons, reprieves, respites, commutations, 
suspension and remission of sentences imposed by any court 
established under any law regulating Islamic religious 
affairs - namely the Syariah Courts in the States of 
Malacca, Penang, Sabah, Sarawak or the Federal Territories 
of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan. The head of the religion of 
Islam in the other states are the respective Sultans. 
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To date there has never been a petition for 
pardon following a sentence passed by the Syariah Courts. 
It is not clear whether the Yang di Pertuan AgOng or 
Rulers, in exercising the power of pardon to Syariah 
matters, have to act on the advice of the Pardons Board. 
In any case it is hereby submitted that a separate Pardons 
Board for Muslims should be set up, since Islamic law ,..-----
prescribes different rules for Muslims than what has been 
laid down above relating to pardons. 
As stated previously in Chapter III, in hudud 
crimes the right to grant or receive a pardon exists for 
as long as the offence has not been brought to the 
courts. The right to grant a pardon only lies with the 
victim. For example, in the offence of theft, the thief 
may be granted a pardon only by the person whose goods 
were stolen and only if the victim has not brought the 
offence to the knowledge of the authorities. When the 
offence is brought to the courts, no pardon is admissible. 
The next category of crimes in Islam is Qisas. 
An example of a Qisas crime is murder. Under Islamic Law, 
if murder is committed, pardon may be given only by the 
victim's heir. The Ruler or head of state has no power to 
pardon Qisas crimes. If the person against whom the 
murder is committed has no heir or guardian, the head of 
state will be treated as his guardian and only then can 
the head of state pardon the murderer. 
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The punishment for murder in Islam is death, as 
Qisas carries the retributionist principles of 
sentencing. However Islam prefers its believers to pardon 
Qisas crimes and opt for the alternative punishment for 
the murderer, namely Diyat, which is compensation in 
monetary form. This way, it will ensure that the family 
of the deceased will be provided for, since if the 
punishment of death is carried out, it would leave two 
families in dire financial straits.18
The heir may also choose to forgo Diyat, which 
means that the murderer will go unpunished. 
A good example of Qisas and Diyat appeared in the 
newspapers recentlyl9 where an 18 year old boy was 
acquitted of a charge of causing grievous hurt to his 
schoolmate after he and his father publicly apologised to 
the victim's family in the juvenile court. The boy was 
charged under section 325 of the Penal Code. The 
forgiveness given in pursuance of the public apology is in 
effect the pardoning of a Qisas crime. 
The father of the victim 
compensation as well. 
18. This of course would be true if the
the men (or father) in both families
sole breadwinner for the family.
19 . The New Straits Times, 7 July, 1989. 
waived monetary 
two deaths involve 
and he was the 
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When the father of the victim forgave the 
commission of the Qisas crime, the right for Diyat exists 
but since the father chose to forgo Diyat as well, thus 
·ex.ploit·d '.:} +h�.,-��itt�I �f ·.fl,e. � 9, ,,ye..a. IC" 01,:,/. boy.
In such a situation the role of the head of a 
state comes into play. He may impose punishment for 
Ta'zir, as a deterrent measure to future offenders. It is 
only in respect of Ta'zir crimes that the state has 
pardoning powers. The state has the discretion to alter 
the sentence to the extent of mere admonition. The 
granting of a pardon is subject to one limitation, that is 
the pardon must not prejudice the right of the aggrieved 
person. The pardon should result in the promotion of 
public good and the hindrance of evil. 
The practice of pardon according to Islamic law 
can be seen in Kelantan,20 but only in respect of Ta'zir 
offences. In all the other states of Malays:iAcriminal 
is Still Very IDUCh the civil law, Q� oprostJ. f'b /S/Q.Mic /411\) • 
20. Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code, 1985.
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The writer foresees no administrative problems in 
implementing a different pardons system for the Muslims in 
the country, since pardon for the serious crimes lies in 
the hands of the victim or his next-of-kin and any new 
enactments are only needed to regulate pardons relating to 
Ta'zir offences. 
An example of a case which has been brought to 
the Pardons Board but which would entail different 
consequences under Islamic law is the case of Datuk 
Mokhtar Hashim, who was convicted of the murder of one 
Datuk Taha. Datuk Mokhtar is currently serving 
imprisonment for life after his sentence of death was 
commuted by the Yang di Pertuan Agung on the advice of the 
Federal Pardons Board. 
Applying Islamic principles, this crime would be 
one of Qisas and 
the right to pardon 
only 
Datuk 
the next-of-kin of Datuk Taha has 
Mokhtar. In the event that 
Qisas is forgone, the family of Datuk Taha could claim for 
Diyat as financial compensation. Datuk Mokhtar could 
even be a free man now assuming Datuk Taha's family 
chooses to forgo both Qisas and Diyat. 
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It is hoped that Muslims in Malaysia adhere to 
the Islamic rules rather than the civil law in matters 
pertaining to pardons, since to follow the civil law may 
lead to consequences totally forbidden by the teachings of 
Islam. 
C. CONCLUSION
The recommendations proposed in the earlier pages 
may be summarised thus 
1. The procedure 
presides over 
whereby the 
the meeting 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong
of a Pardons Board
gives rise to difficulties in determining the
limit of the advisory powers of the Pardons
Board. It also raises doubts as to whether the
final decision is truly that of His Majesty's.
In view of these problems Clause (8) of Article
42 of the Federal Constitution needs 
amended to clarify the matter.
to be
2. The non-fixed members of the Pardons Board should
be people who are experts in the field of 
assessing human behaviour, such as 
psychiatrists. It follows naturally that they 
should be people of high moral standing in the 
society. 
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Membership or appointment need not be for a 
specified period. A list of names should be 
established and members of any particular Pardons 
__, 
Board at any given time should be selected from a 
revolving panel. 
3. The Attorney-General or his representative should
not sit as a constituent member of any Pardons 
Board. This is important so as to 
t 
promote 
impartiality and integrity in the administration 
of justice. Alternatively, the role of the 
Attorney-General should be limited to only the 
submission of a written opinion regarding the 
particular case, to the Pardons Board. 
4. The exercise of the power of pardon should be
subjected to some guidelines. This is to ensure
that similar cases will be decided in similar
5. 
ways.
If guidelines are laid down governing the 
exercise of the power of pardon, then judicial 
review should be available, to ensure that the 
guideliness are complied with. The courts 
however, should have no jurisdiction to question 
the decision itself but only the manner in which 
the power of pardon, with regard to the 
guidelines, is exercised. 
) 
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6. Not every person who is convicted of an offence
should be able to petition for clemency, but only
those convicted of very serious crimes.
7. 
8. 
There is an urgent need for the Pardons Board to 
avoid delay in making any decision. It is of the 
essence that applications or petitions for 
clemency be considered as soon as possible after 
they are made. 
Islamic law prescribes a different system of 
pardons for Muslims. As such, there should be a 
separate Pardons Board for the implementation of 
pardons in accordance with Islamic law. 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
Secretary of State, 
State of Perlis, 
State Secretariat, 
Government Head Office 
01990 KANGAR 
Sir, 
APPENDIX I 
8364620/155/153 
(2)dlm.IPP/KES/BDN/SULIT 015 
14.7.1979 
Re: Appeal for Pardon from CONVICT RAMLI BIN MOHAMAD, 
No. T. 199-83 HI. 
In accordance with provisions of Rule 112 of the Prison 
Rules, 1953, I respectfully forward this appeal letter 
together with Extract from Convict's Original Record for 
presentation to His Royal Highness the Raja of Perlis for 
his due consideration. 
2. For your information, this is the second appeal,
the first appeal being granted and sentence commuted from
hanging to life imprisonment on 24.7.1984.
Signed 
(ZAI ABDUL IATIFF BIN IBRAHIM) 
1 
2 
REPORT ON CONVICT 
Ramli bin Mohamad 
Convict No. T.199-83 HL 
Convict No. T.199-83 HL Ramli bin Mohamad 
was imprisoned in Alor Star, Kedah on 20.10.1982 after 
being sentenced to death upon conviction for trafficking 
in dangerous drugs under section 39(b)(l)(a) Dangerous 
Drugs Act, 1952 by the Alor Star Supreme Court On 
21.2.83, subject was moved from Alor Star to Taiping 
Prison. 
While in Taiping prison, subject appealed to 
His Royal Highness Tuanku Raja Perlis and on 24.7.84, 
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment together with 
eight strokes of the cane. 
Since subject was removed from Death Row, he 
had been working in the carpentary workshop until today. 
His work and conduct are good and satisfactory. He is an 
industrious convict who is willing to cooperate with other 
convicts and also his supervising officers. 
signed 
(JAMALUDIN BIN HJ. MD. RAMTHAN) 
Ramli bin Mohamad 
Convict No. T.199-83 H.L. 
Carpentary Workshop 
Prison Training Centre 
34000 Taiping, Perak 
Date: 27 Jun 1987 
His Royal Highness 
Raja Perlis Indera Kayangan 
3 
Tuanku Syed Putra Ibni Almarhum Syed Hassan Jamalullail 
DK, DKM, DMN, SMN, SPMP, DK (Selangor), DK (Kelantan), DK 
(KEdah), DK (Pahang), DK (Brunei), SPDK (Sabah), DP 
(Sarawak), DK (Negeri Sembilan), DK (Johar), DPSS 
(Sarawak), DK (Perak), DK (Trengganu) 
Your Majesty, I implore upon you 
appeal, that my sentence of life imprisonment 
commence from my date of arrest, which 
1980. At present my sentence commences on 
1982. It is my deepest wish that your 
consider this appeal of mine. 
to consider my 
be taken to 
is February 5, 
October 16, 
Majesty would 
Your Majesty, I was arrested together with two of 
my friends at batu 18, Jalan Padang Besar (Utara), Perlis, 
in a house at No. 1, Institut Penyelidikan Perhutanan 
Perlis, on February 5, 1980, as stated in the Criminal 
Trials File of the Alar Star, High Court, because of the 
offence of trafficking in 6561.1 gm of opium under section 
39B(l) Dangerous Drugs Ordinance 1952 and the court has 
sentenced me to death by hanging on October 16, 1982. On 
October 24, 1984, due to your Majesty's good grace as the 
Chairman of the Pardons Board, State of Perlis, my 
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and 8 strokes 
of the cane. I would like to appeal now for this 
sentence to commence from February 5, 1980 and as a result 
of which, the period I spent in prison, 2 years 10 months, 
be taken into account. 
Your Majesty, since the date of my arrest, I have 
spent seven years in prison, and during that time I have 
had several bitter experiences and experienced hardship in 
life due to the demise of my father, my mother being 
stricken with disease and my divorce from my wife. I am 
also anxious about the condition of my children, who are 
at present with their grandparents. Your Majesty, all 
these bitter experiences have taught me a lesson and made 
me realise and remorseful for all that I've done. I am 
quite advanced in age now and I hope that with your kind 
indulgence I will be released much earlier and will then 
be able to be with my family. Your Majesty, with the 
4 
expertise I had gained in carpentry and wood carving and 
the religious education I had obtained while in prison, I 
assure you that I will be able to live like other members 
of society. I hope these details will be sufficient as a 
basis for consideration of my humble appeal. 
Lastly, I beg upon your Majesty's good grace and 
kind indulgance so that my appeal be considered, so that 
my suffering be put to an end and so that I may return to 
my family as a person useful to his society, religion and 
country. 
I end with all due respect and forgiveness. 
I remain your servant always 
signed 
(RAMLI BIN MOHAMAD) 
5 
PRISONS DEPARTMENT, MAIAYSIA 
EXTRACT OF DETAILS FROM ORIGINAL RECORD 
1. Convict No: T. 199-83 HL. Warrant No.: 125 
2. Name: Ramli bin Mohamed
Address: 1166, Sg Rambai, Bkt Mertajam, P.W.
I.C. No: 4355647 (Blue)
3. Entry Date: 16.10.82 
4. Offence: Trafficking in dangerous drugs under section
39(B)(l)(a) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 
5. Sentence: Death
28.11.83: Federal Court Appeal No. 47/82 
Appeal Dismissal 
24.7.84: Death sentene commuted to life 
imprisonment and 8 strokes of the 
cane with effect from 16.10.82 by 
HRH Tuanku Raja Perlis 
6. Date sentence passed: 16.10.82
7. Name of Court and Place: Supreme
Kedah 
Court, Alor Star, 
8. Fine:
9. Date of Expected Release:
10. Age: 31
11. Race: Malay
12. Religion: Islam
13. Education: Standard V, Malay
14. Occupation: Rubber tapper
15. Identifying body marks: mole
scar 
mole 
scar 
scar 
E.P.D. 16.2.1996. 
L.P.D. 15.10.2002.
on neck 
on left cheek 
on forehead 
on right abdomen 
on right knee 
6 
16. Weight: at point of entry: 55kg Height: 1.67m
17. Previous Offences: Nil At point of release: 
18. Offence while in prison: Nil 
19. Date and time of release: -
20. 
21. 
Date: 
Doctor's Report: 
Other matters: 
Fit to continue 
sentence 
endangering health 
prison 
without 
Mohamed bin Ibrahim 
(Father) 
No 1166, Sg Rambai 
Bt Mertaj am 
Above particulars certified as true. 
27.6.1987 signed 
DIRECTOR OF PRISON 
SENTENCE APPRAISAL BOOK 
Sentence Appraisal once every 4 years 
In accordance with section 6(g) 
Prison Rules made under Cap. 35. 
APPENDIX II 
Prison No: A. 670/83 JL (KJ: 357/87) 
Name: Syed Abu Bakar Syed Mahamud 
State: Kedah 
Court: Sessions, 
Alor Star 
Offence: Section 39B(l)(a) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 
Previous Offences: 
Sentence: Life Imprisonment and two strokes of the cane 
Earliest Parole Date: 
6.4.1994 
Amount of prison offences 
during last 12 months ___ _ 
since imprisonment 
Latest Parole Date: 
5.12.2000 
Pardon granted during 
last 12 months 
since imprisonment 
Date for Appraisal 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1 
2 
SUMMARY OF OFFENCE OF CONVICT SYED ABU BAKAR 
BIN SYED MAHMUD, IC: 3709780 -
SG PATANI RPT: 13654/80 
DIP NO: 1000/80 
Acting on information received, on 6.12.80 at 
about 3.00 pm, Inspector Salleh bin Md Jani from the Head 
Office of the Sg Petani District Police Department with 
his team raided an un-numbered house at Kampung Tebu 
Sungai Patani. At the time the police arrived there was 
witnessed, in front of the house a male Malay (the 
accused) running towards the house and Inspector Salleh 
saw him throw a packet out of a window in the house. At 
that time, the police moved in and retrieved the packet. 
When opened, the packet contained 1 plastic packet which 
contains 350 cartons believed to be opium and the said man 
is the owner of the house named Syed Abu Bakar bin Syed 
Mahmud IC: 3709780, age 30 (4.3.50). At the time of raid, 
there were two women in the house, wife of accused named 
Melah binti Awang Kechik, IC: 2736020 (21.5.49) and mother 
of accused named Sharifah Pok binti Syed Omar, IC: 
1824548, age 66. 
Subject was tried and found guilty of offence 
under section 39B and was sentenced to life imprisonment 
and 2 strokes of the cane. Sentence was passed on 11.6.83. 
Subject is a drug trafficker in Sg Patani and 
also an opium addict since the 60's to the time of 
arrest. In his cautioned statement, accused admitted to 
keeping opium. Subject, at that time, does not possess 
permanent employment. 
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CONVICT'S BACKGROUND 
Convict is 
Kampung Dulang Besar, 
Tebu, Sungai Patani, 
Kampung Tupai National 
married and divorced in 
36 years old. Born on 4.3.1950 in 
Yan Kedah, later lived in Kampung 
Kedai. Educated up to standard 6 
School, Sik, Kedah. Convict was 
1980, with no children. 
Works as trishaw driver during the 
fruit seller in night market during the night, 
of $400 per month. 
day and as 
with income 
Due to social freedom and a 
education convict was involved in 
activities, arrested and sentenced to 
and 2 strokes of the cane for Drug 
section 39B(l)(a) Dangerous Drugs Act 
Court, Alor Star on 11.6.83. 
lack of religious 
drug trafficking 
life imprisonment 
Trafficking under 
1952 by Sessions 
Amount of 
Offences 
Date 
5 
REPORT OF OFFENCES 
Details Fine 
6 
APPRAISAL OF CONVICT'S CONDUCT 
At present, convict is working at a cane workshop 
which is a joint-venture between the prison and a shop. 
An industrious worker and follows all orders given. He is 
a person of good character and is always clean from time 
to time. 
Industrious and has confidence in himself when 
doing work given to him. Has broad outlook in furthering 
himself in his field and this makes him capable in the 
field of making cane furniture. He is also able to 
instruct other convicts in the field of making cane 
furniture. 
He is also industrious in his religious 
obligations and willing to work in furthering this field. 
He studied religion from the prison's religious teacher. 
signed 
(CANE WORKSHOP OFFICER) 
7 
DIRECTOR OF PRISON'S REPORT 
Convict is placed at cane workshop. An 
industrious person in the performance of his duties. 
Always trying to upgrade the quality of his furniture. 
Receives all advice and instructions very well. 
Relationship between himself and prison officials 
and other convicts satisfactory. Convict is very 
adaptable with everyone. He is neat and clean in 
appearance. 
However, it is suggested that convict continue 
with his sentence. 
signed 
(SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT 
PRISON DEPARTMENT) 
8 
REPORT OF MEDICAL OFFICER 
9 
REPORT OF DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 
Still young of age and has far to go in his 
sentence. Expected release on 6.4.94. 
any pardon at this time. 
I do not support 
signed 
(MEDICAL OFFICER) 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
State Secretary 
State of Perlis 
Office of State Secretary 
Government Head Office 
01990 Kangar 
Sir 
APPENDIX III 
Re: Appeal for Pardon Against Sentence From Convict 
CHE ANI BIN ITAM Bil. A. 1712/87 HL 
In accordance with conditions in Rule 112 of Prison Rules 
1953, I respectfully submit, together with this appeal 
letter, Extract from Convict's Original Record and Report 
on convict from Director of Prisoans, Aler Star for 
presentation to His Royal Highness the Raja of Perlis for 
his due consideration. 
2. 
appeal. 
For your information, this is the first 
signed 
(SHAMSUDIN TAN SRI MURAD) 
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Che Ani bin Itam 
Convict No. A. 1712/87HL 
Intan Terpilih Building 
Kedah Prison Department 
05350 Alor Stra 
Kedah 
His Royal Highness 
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Date: 24th April 1988 
Tuanku Syed Putra Ibni Almarhum Syed Hassan Jamalulail 
D.K., S.P.M.P., D.K.M., D.M.N., S.M.N.,
D.K., (Brunai), D.K. (Selangor), S.P.D.K. (Sabah),
D.K. (Kelantan), D.P. (Sarawak), D.K. (Kedah), D.K. 
(Pahang)
D.K. (Johor), D.K. (Negeri Sembilan), D.P.S.S. (Sarawak),
D.K. (Perak), D.K. (Terengganu).
Re: Application for commutation of Life Sentence of 
Che Ani bin Itam, Convict No. A 1712/87 HL, Alor 
Star Prison, Case No. 62/81, Section 4 Firearms 
Act 1971, Sessions Court Kangar, Perlis 
Your Majesty, I respectfully and humbly implore upon you 
so that with your good grace and kind indulgence, my 
sentence of life imprisonment could be commuted. 
Your Majesty. 
For your information I have been arrested together with a 
friend in Kampong Arau, Perlis on January 3, 1979 for 
committing robbery with the use of firearms under section 
4 of the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act, No. 37 of 
1971. My accomplice was charged under sect�ons 392 and 
397 Penal Code. I was tried at the Sessions Court 
Kangar,, Perlis, and was found guilty and sentenced to 
life imprisonment (without parole) with 6 strokes of the 
cane. My accomplice was sentenced to 3 years jail. I 
have appealed to the Alor Star High Court on April 22, 
1984, but my appeal was dismissed. 
Your Majesty, 
I have three (3) children still schooling. My eldest 
child, Azlina, is 15 years and is studying in Sekolah 
Menengah MUkim Tajar; my second child, Mohd Azlizat is 10 
years and schooling in Sekolah Kebangsaan Tok Keling and 
my third child, Azimah, aged 9 is schooling in the same 
school. I am very much aggrieved at my children's 
condition and it has also been the source of anxiety for 
my family. I implore upon your better judgment in this 
matter. 
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Your Majesty, 
As a 
Allah 
Your 
from 
Muslim, I have never lost hope and I always pray to 
that my prayers be answered. Apart from Hirn, only 
Majesty is the source of my hope that I may be freed 
this pain and sorrow. 
Your Majesty, 
I would like to outline the life of my family since I have 
not been at their side. Their lives have been very bitter 
because their daily needs now rests entirely upon my 
wife. The sorrow have increased because recently my wife, 
upon whom my children depends, was involved in an accident 
on July 26, 1987 at Pekan Simpang Empat, Kangkong Alor 
Star as a result of which, her right thigh was fractured. 
She was admitted to the Alor Star General Hospital for 7 
months and the doctors have advised her to refrain from 
heavy work. 
Your Majesty, 
I am filled with remorse and fully realise the folly of my 
actions during my term in prison, which has been almost 10 
years. I am getting older and all my children are almost 
adults. Through the various rehabilitation programmes 
organised by the prison I feel it has been effective in 
guiding and encouraging me and the other convicts to 
return to society as a useful citizen. 
Your Majesty, 
I am an uneducated man, as a result of 
involved in criminal activities, because 
that the offence I committed carried such a 
according to law. 
Your Majesty, 
which I got 
I was unaware 
heavy penalty 
I do 
Judges 
normal 
factors 
family 
so that 
not wish to question the decision of the court, the 
or the country's laws, but I am only stating the 
views of a husband and father. Based on the above 
I present my appeal for your consideration. My 
and I place our hopes upon you and look towards you 
our suffering will end. 
Your Majesty, 
That is all I wish to present and I 
and forgiveness and the fervent 
consider my appeal. 
Signed. 
(CHE ANI BIN ITAM) 
end with all 
hope that 
respect 
you will 
4 
PRISONS DEPARTMENT MAIAYSIA 
EXTRACT OF DETAILS FROM ORIGINAL 
RECORD 
1. Convict No: A. 1712/87 HL
2. Name: Che Ani bin Itrun 
Warrant No. 299182 
Address: Krunpong Tok Keling, Identity Card No: 
Tokai, Kedah 4625413 
3. Entry Date: 17.2.79 
4. Offence: Exhibiting firearms when committing robbery 
under section 4 Firearms (Increased 
Penalties) Act, 37/71 
5. Sentence: Life imprisonment and 6 strokes of the cane
6. Date Sentence Passed: 10.9.81 
7. Name of Court and Place: Sessions Court, Kangar, Perlis
8. Fine:
9. Date of expected release:
10. Age: 35 
11. Race: Malay 
12. Religion: Islam
13. Education:
14. Occupation:
15. Identifying Body Marks: one
big 
16. Weight: at time of entry: 
17. Previous Offences: At 
18. Offence while in prison:
19. Date & Time of release:
Standard VI, Malay 
Retired 
long scar on abdomen; one 
scar on left arm 
124 lbs Height: 5 I 4112 11 
time of Release: -
5 
20. Doctor's o/e g/c satisfactory. Patient has been 
report: losing weight for the past few months. 
Urine for sugar tested and found sugar 
++++. He was referred to hospital and blood 
for sugar was taken and he was put on 
anti-diabetic treatment. 
21. Other matters: -
Above Particulars Certified as True. 
Signed. 
(DIRECTOR OF PRISON) 
Miss Norchaya Hj Talib 
Faculty of Law 
University of Malaya 
59100 Kuala Lumpur 
Madam, 
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL 
Assistance in Academic Research -
APPENDIX IV 
The Functions and Powers of the Pardons Board 
With reference 
regarding the 
reply. 
to your letter 
above subject, I 
of 31 
apologise 
december 1988 
for the late 
2. Together with this letter I append the answers to
the questions forwarded by you. I hope the answers will
be able to assist you.
Yours faithfully 
signed 
(ATTORNEY GENERAL MALAYSIA) 
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Questions on the Pardons Board 
Pursuant to Clause (5) Article 42 of the Federal 
Constitution, the Attorney-General may delegate his 
functions as a member of the Board to any other person. 
(a) Is there any criteria that must be satisfied by the
'delegated member', if any?
Strictly no. However, I am of the view that the person 
must be legally trained. 
(b) Who is normally appointed to take the place of the
Attorney-General?
(c) 
Solicitor-General or the State Legal Adviser of the 
relevant State. 
Is the appointment for only one meeting of 
or for a certain period, therefore should 
few meetings of any of the Pardons Board, 
person will sit in for the Attorney-General? 
the Board 
there be a 
the same 
Normally for one meeting. However, the practice has been for the 
person delegated with AG's functions to attend the subsequent 
meeting which considers the un finished business of the previous 
meeting, i� any. 
(d) Is the advice of the Attorney-General, specified in
Article 42(9), binding on the Pardons Board? Would it
be correct to say that more often than not, his advice
would be adhered to?
No. It is true to say that more often than not, his advice 
is adhered to. 
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2. It seems that Ex-Officio members may be appointed to the
Board.
3. 
(a) Do all the State Pardons Boards have Ex-Officio 
members?
Yes.
(b) What functions do the ex-officio members exercise?
Like any other member of the Board.
(c) What is the criteria for becoming an ex-officio member?
He must be the A.G. & the Chief Minister or Menteri Besar
of the relevant State. In the case of the Jemaah Pengampun�n
Wilayah Persekutuan,the ex-officio members are the A.G. and 
the Minister responsible for the Federal Territory. 
The Yang di Pertuan Agong will preside 
concerns an offence committed under 
Act, 1960 or the senten�e was passed 
Which Pardons Board is involved in this 
whenever the appeal 
the Internal Security 
by military court. 
situation? 
For security cases, the relevant Pardons Board is the 
Jemaah Pengampunan Bagi Kes-Kes Keselamatan. As for the sentence 
passed by military court, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acts on 
the advice of the Cabinet. 
(a) If it is the State Pardons Board, where does it sit?
In the place determined by the Sultan or the Governor.
4. What are the factors that are taken into consideration
before the Pardons Board reaches its decision?
All matters relevant to the case, the Accused and such other
matters raised by the Accused, if any.
.4 
5. Suppose it is agreed that a remission would be granted, who
actually decides the number of months or years to remit?
The Yang di-Pertuan Agong/Sultan/Governor on the advice of 
the relevant Board. 
6. What is the ratio (if any) of the number of cases in which
the sentences remained the same to those cases where the·
sentences were reduced (or the offender was pardoned)?
7. 
I have no record. 
Does the Board 
certain periods 
i.e. on demand? 
function on a scheduled basis i.e. at 
in a year or is it on "each appeal basis" 
If and when there are cases for consideration of the Board. 
8. Does the Board normally reach a decision at the end of a
particular session, or does the Board normally meet for a
few times before a decision is reached?
9. 
Normally at the end of each session. 
Do all the Pardons 
principles? Does 
principles, and if 
rest? 
Board in Malaysia operate on the same 
any Board operate on Islamic or any other 
so, how do these Boards differ from the 
On the same principles. The answer to the second question 
is �no'. 
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STATE OF KEI.ANTAN 
Professor Madya Dato' Nik Ab Rashid b Nik Majid 
No 97 Jalan Telok Pulau 
Bukit Seputeh 
58000 Kuala Lumpur 
Dato' 
Application for Research into Pardons Board, 
State of Kelantan 
I respectfully refer to the letter from Norchaya Hj Talib 
which was forwarded to me by your goodself, regarding the 
above matter. 
2. Application for interview regarding the procedure
and other matters concerning the Board need not be held as
answers to the questions forwarded are sufficient.
signed 
(KELANTAN STATE SECRETARY) 
7. 
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Normally, when an appeal is 
right under rule 112, 
authorities will give their 
otherwise of the convict's 
point of view, does the 
decision based on the 
authorities? 
made based on a convict's 
Prison Rules 1953, prison 
views either in support or 
appeal. From a statistical 
Board generally reach a 
appraisal from prison 
The Board is free to make any decision without being 
bound by the view of any party. 
8. Apart from the appraisal from prison authorities and
other relevant facts, what other guiding factors are
used by the Board to arrive at its decision? Is the
doctrine of precedent applied?
The Board must take into account any written 
of the Attorney General [Art. 42(9) 
Constitution) before advising the Sultan. 
is not applied. 
opinion 
Federal 
Precedent 
9. In coming to a conclusive decision, does the Board
decide by a majority or must the decision be unanimous?
The power of pardon is bestowed upon the Sultan by the
Federal Constitution and this power is exercised on
the advise of Council. The question whether council
makes a majority or unanimous decision does not arise.
10. How long does it take for the Board to arrive at its
decision?
Time for making decision depends on circumstances of
each case.
11. Must the Board sit again to deliver its decision?
No need.
12. Is it true that the Council of Pardons, Kelantan is
administered in accordance with principles of Islamic
Law? If true, how does the Council differ from other
Pardons Board in other States?
Not true. The administration of the Council of
Pardons is in accordance with the Constitution.
Puan Norchaya Hj Talib 
Faculty of Law 
University of Malaya 
59100 Kuala Lumpur 
Madam, 
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STATE OF PERAK 
Application for Research into Pardons Board, State of Perak 
I am directed to refer to your letter dated 18 August, 
1988, regarding the above matter. 
2. This administration has no objections to your
conducting research regarding the Pardons Board, State of
Perak regarding matters of procedure only. Regretfully, 
we are not able to provide information regarding specific 
cases. 
3. Together with this is appended the questionnaire
which has been completed for your further action. You may
communicate with the author thereof in case of problems or
doubts regarding the subject.
signed 
(DEPUTY STATE SECRETARY II) 
1 
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W.IITEN QUESTIONS REGARDING PARDONS BOARD 
1. When an appeal for pardon has been forwarded to the
Board, what is the procedure taken.
See Annexure. 
2. Who are the members of the panel of the Board?
Membership is in accordance with Article 42 Rule 5
Federal Constitution.
3. Are the members of the Board permanent members?
Apart from ex-officio members, length of service
members appointed by the King is 3 years. 
appointment may be reviewed after 3 years. Refer 
42 Rule 6 Federal Constitution. 
of 3 
The 
Art 
4. Must the King preside over each case or does he have
the right to appoint another to take his place?
The Sultan, as Chairman of the State Pardons Board has
to preside over each meeting of the Board personally.
Refer Art. 42, rule 8.
5. Usually, how many members of the Board are there when
the Board sits?
State Pardons Board will sit when all the members are
present.
6. Is the appeal conducted in an inquisitorial manner
where members of the Board question representative of
the appellant, or in writing or others?
At present, the Board considers and makes its decision
based on written documents.
7. Normally, when an appeal is made based on a convict's
right under rule 112, Prison Rules 1953, prison
authorities will give their views either in support or 
otherwise of the convict's appeal. From a statistical 
point of view, does the Board generally reach a 
decision based on the appraisal from prison 
authorities? 
Prisons appraisal is given consideration in all appeal 
cases. Consideration is also given to views of the 
Attorney General and other factors related to the 
case. It is not possible to say whether the prisons 
appraisal is given priority over appraisals from other 
parties. 
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8. Apart from the appraisal from prison authorities and
other relevant facts, what other guiding factors are
used by the Board to arrive at its decision? Is the
doctrine of precedent applied?
9. 
This question is unclear.
In coming to a 
decide by a 
unanimous? 
conclusive 
majority 
decision, 
or must 
does the Board 
the decision be 
The Board is unanimous in all its decision. 
10. How long does it take for the Board to arrive at its
decision?
This depends on each case and a definite time frame
cannot be given.
11. Must the Board sit again to deliver its decision?
Not necessarily, except if the case is postponed to a
future meeting. Normally, the Board makes an
additional decision regarding the implementation of
its decision with immediate effect.
1. 
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Appeals received from several 
based on certain law/rules. 
include: 
Annexure 
sources or parties 
Among others, they 
(i) Section 281 Criminal Procedure Code; and
(ii) Rule 111 to the Prison Rules, 1953
2. When docwnent is received from the Federal Court,
the matter will be referred to the 
Attorney-General for his views under Section 281, 
Criminal Procedure Code. Views of the 
Attorney-General and other relevant documents 
will be brought for the Board's consideration. 
Every case in which the death sentence is imposed 
will be considered by the Board although no 
appeal is received directly from any party. 
3. Appeal under Rule 111 of the Prison Rules 1953
can be made either by the convict himself or 
close relations such as parents, children or 
husband/wife. When an appeal is received under 
this Rule, the Board's secretariat will obtain 
information regarding background and views from 
prisons department regarding the convict. View 
of Attorney-General will also be sought. All 
information received will be forwarded to the 
Board for consideration and due decision. 
4. After the Board has decided, the decision will be
relayed to the appellant for his information.
